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Abstract
The seminal paper of Miller, 1977, highlighted the role of liquidity for price determi-
nation. Since then, several studies have tried to explain the determinants of liquidity,
and to formalize the implications of that for decision making process of agents. Con-
cerns on the market role of liquidity are, however, not as new as one could think.
Two examples, on the importance of liquidity for the determination of asset prices
and on how liquidity and capital are related, are the Florentinian banking crisis in
the 14th century and the burst of tulips market in the 17th century.
The first banking system, considered to work under modern standards, was born in
Florence. Florentinian banks were highly international, family owned, institutions
centered on commercial credit and cash management business. The default of the
English Crown around 1340, triggered bankruptcy of international business based
Florentinian banks. Domestic business based banks, responded reducing the amount
of credit to the real economy, to insure cash holdings, while selling Florentinian
Republic Bonds. High liquidity of those assets granted, initially, a quick recovery
of their investments. However, excess supply of bonds in the market, led to an
abrupt price fall. Regulatory response was, then, to buy bonds in the market, in a
try to guarantee system stability. Despite those e orts, the entire banking system
collapsed and the economic downturn lasted for more than 40 years. Familiar, isn’t
it?
Another good example, of how capital constraints and liquidity interact, was the
burst of tulips market in 1636. Absence of buyers on a routine tulip auction, in
Haarlem, triggered price falls. Those plummeted due to short selling activities, and
the try to recover cash holdings, by merchants. Merchants have, heavily, invested
on tulips following previous years skyrocketing prices. While short selling activities
were banned from the market, prices continued falling. Bankruptcy of merchants,
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then, lead to the collapse of banking institutions that have lent money using tulips
as collateral and despite e orts to sell other assets.
A crucial question is, then, what determines liquidity? My perception is that capital
constraints of levered investors essentially determine market liquidity. When a minor
capital shock takes place, those agents react by re-balancing their portfolios. If a
significant number of investors are shocked, aggregate capital holdings fall below
desired levels. This triggers asset sales and price falls. The process spirals until
funding needs and capital holdings equate.
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the interactions between liquidity and
capital. This objective in mind, the first and third chapter constitute empirical
exercises, that explore the linkages of funding needs, liquidity and price formation on
di erent markets. The first chapter focus on the determination of liquidity formation
on Spanish equity markets, while the third analyzes the determination of government
bond liquidity for a sample of European countries, the interactions of liquidity across
countries and its e ects on other markets.
Findings in the first chapter, reinforcing my perception of the crucial role played
by capital for the determination of equity liquidity, lead to the formulation of a
bank capital determination model. That is presented in the second chapter. The
underlying assumption is that a similar relation, to that linking equity liquidity and
funding needs, will be present in the determination of liquidity conditions on other
markets. High degree of bancarization, then, would lead to put the focus on how
banks determine capital holdings, funding needs of the economy and bank capital
intimately related.
The determination of liquidity on equity markets will be closely related to develop-
ments in the market for borrowing stocks. The prohibition of naked short selling
operations, underlie this relation. Agents holding no stocks, but perceiving equity
price overvaluation, have to borrow stocks from holders, to be sold in the market.
Funding constraints play a crucial role in this process, due to collateral posting.
Those have been found relevant, for the determination of asset prices, in the limits
to arbitrage literature. Constraints will lead to the violation of the fundamental
theorems of finance, preventing agents to exploit profitable investment opportuni-
ties.
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The relation between borrowing and equity markets, for the Spanish case, is the
objective of the first chapter of this dissertation. The e ects, of legal constraints to
short selling, are also analyzed. An innovative aspect of this study is the use of two
di erenciated, and exhaustive, datasets, that independently characterize Spanish
market for borrowing stocks. O cial records from CNMV, on short selling volumes,
along with borrowing fees and supplied volumes from International DataExplorers
are, simultaneously, used to determine supply and demand equations. The econo-
metric model, there proposed, makes use of an instrumental variables, simultaneous
equations, approach. Another di erencial aspect is the independent characterization
of shifts, on demand and supply patterns. Those are seen to relate with changes
either on future stock performance, or on funding needs. Its predictive capacity, on
stock returns, is also tested.
The results show that, opposite to the widespread view that blame short selling
activities as speculative practices, responsible of market crashes, short selling is a
trend chasing behaviour that guarantees price e ciency. Shocking findings relate to
the absence of impact of borrowing demand patterns, while supply side shifts are
found relevant for the prediction of future stocks performance. That post evidence
on the strong impact of financial institutions funding needs for the determination of
stock prices.
I, also, find adverse e ects arising from short selling regulation. Banning short
selling increase the relevance of the borrowing market, stock returns volatility and
reduce price e ciency. A regulatory recommendation is, then, to impulse new laws
aimed to reduce the discretion present in borrowing activities as opposed to laws
that restrict shorting activity.
The close relation between borrowing supply and funding needs, lead me to propose
a theoretical model that explain capital decision of banks. Under that model, welfare
e ects arising from actions in credit markets of monetary authorities are analyzed,
too. The novelty of the model relates to its generality, and to the how capital bu ers
are justified. While existing models found capital on excess of regulation (bu ers)
to arise from ad hoc imposed frictions, my model points towards its relation with
those arise endogenously as a precaution against potential dilution, bankruptcy and
to guarantee access to arbitrage opportunities.
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My results suggest that arbitrage opportunities, between credit and equity markets,
arise simultaneously to the determination of optimal capital levels, granting a proper
remmuneration of banking activities. Therefore, capital will optimally be scarce and
result in the collapse of credit markets, if arbitrage is present. Welfare results suggest
that arbitrage between equity and loan markets is not desirable, leads to increases
on moral hazard problems, faced by bank managers and, hence, to increases in
deposit insurance costs. A conclusion of the model, then, relates to the necessity of
articulate direct banking recapitalization mechanisms.
The relation between capital and bond prices is also analyzed. Bonds are regula-
tory capital free securities, but default risk leads to the existence of an exponential
relation its prices and capital holdings. Further results suggests that bond purchase
programmes, like the ones already in place, will have positive welfare e ects. Loan
acquisitions would be irrelevant, from a welfare perspective, when capital is scarce.
In the third chapter, the exponential relation between bond prices and capital,
theoretically posted in the second chapter, is explored. To this end the a ne bond
price specification presented in Fontaine and Garcia, 2012 is applied for a sample of
European countries. The accumulative nature of capital holdings, leads to justify
the time a bond has been quoted in the market, as a valid instrument of aggregate
economy capital. The a ne model is, then, estimated making use of the Unscented
Kalman Filter method at a country level. Contangion paterns among European
countries are explored using the standardized version of the liquidity factor loading.
That measure, also used to characterize the relation of bond liquidity with bank
capital formation, CDS spread evolution and cash markets.
The novelty of the study relates, first, with the methodology used to devise liquidity
conditions, to the exhaustive set of countries analyzed and, finally, to the use of
that magnitude to characterize the existence of liquidity contangion patterns. Novel
is, as well, the interpretation of time since issuance variable as an instrument of
aggregate capital, while evidence in favour of the validity of that interpretation is
also posted.
My results suggest the existence of two liquidity di erenciated bond markets within
the Eurozone. Those map the traditional Core-Peripherals characterization. An
additional di erenced behaviour, justified in terms of bond market size, is also found.
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However, di erenciation is not circunscribed to the evolution of liquidity but also
found on the relation between bond and cash markets. While bond and cash markets
are sustitutives for Core countries, that is not the case for Peripherals.
Positive evidence on the close relation between liquidity conditions and bank capital,
is also found. Liquidity improvements are found to be negatively related, and to
predict, the evolution of bank’s market-to-book value ratio.
Finally, the commonly accepted leading-lagging relation between CDS spread and
liquidity is challenged. I find changes on liquidity to predict departures of credit
spreads from their average. I suspect traditional proxies for liquidity, like bid-ask
spreads, are highly a ected by a measurement error problem, while the mathematical
formula for the computation of CDS spreads mechanically transfers bond liquidity
variations into those. This results on a higher variation of CDS spreads, when a
liquidity shock takes place. That drives the relation found with liquidity proxies.
Exploring the existence of such e ects, on a longer time span, and for an increased
number of countries, will constitute the base of further work.
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Resumen
El articulo de Miller, 1977, destacó el papel de la liquidez para la determinación
de los precios. Desde entonces, varios estudios han tratado de explicar los determi-
nantes de la liquidez, y de formalizar sus implicaciones para la toma de decisiones
de los agentes. La preocupación sobre el papel de la liquidez no es algo tan nuevo
como se podría pensar. Dos ejemplos, sobre la importancia de la liquidez para la
determinación de los precios y sobre cómo la liquidez y el capital estan relacionados,
son la crisis de los bancos florentinos del siglo XIV y el colapso del mercado de los
tulipanes en el siglo XVII.
El primer sistema bancario que funcionaba bajo criterios modernos, nació en Flo-
rencia. Los bancos florentinos eran entidades familiares, altamente internacionales,
cuyo negocio se centraba en los préstamos comerciales y la gestión de efectivo. El
impago de la corona británica alrededor del año 1340, llevó a la bancarrota de los
bancos florentinos más internacionales. Los bancos domésticos, a fin de garantizar
la tenencia de efectivo, respondieron redujendo el flujo de crédito a la economía real
y vendiendo bonos de la República. La elevada liquidez de dichos activos garantiz-
aba, en principio, una rápida recuperación del dinero invertido. A pesar de ello, el
exceso de oferta de bonos en el mercado, provocó una caída abrupta de los precios.
Las autoridades, para intentar garantizar la estabilidad del sistema, reaccionaron
mediante la compra de bonos en el mercado. A pesar de lo cuál, el sistema bancario
colapsó, y la crisis económica se extendió durante 40 años. Familiar, ¿ verdad ?.
Otro buen ejemplo, de cómo las restricciones de capital y la liquidez interactúan,
fue el estallido de la burbuja del mercado de los tulipanes del año 1636. La ausencia
de compradores en una subasta rutinaria de tulipanes, en Harleem, propicio la caida
de los precios. Estos cayeron, a plomo, como consecuencia tanto de las ventas en
corto, como de las ventas de los mercaderes, que intentaban recuperar los niveles de
7
efectivo. Los mecaderes habían invertido, fuertemente, en dicho mercado los años
anteriores por el imparable incremento de los precios. A pesar de la prohibición de
las ventas en corto, los precios continuaron su caída. La bancarrota de los mercaderes
llevó, a pesar de los intentos por vender otros activos, a la quiebra de las instituciones
bancarias que habían prestado dinero respaldado con tulipanes.
Una pregunta crucial es, por lo tanto, ¿cuáles son los determinantes de la liquidez?.
Mi percepción es que la liquidez en el mercado viene determinada por las restric-
ciones de capital de los inversores. Cuando el capital se ve afectado por una pequeña
perturbación, los inversores reaccionan rebalanceando sus carteras de activos. Si un
número significativo de estos inversores se ven afectados, las tenencias agregadas de
capital en la economía caen por debajo de los niveles deseados. Eso lleva a ventas
de activos y caídas de precios. El proceso se retro-alimenta, hasta que las tenencias
de capital y las necesidades de financiación se igualan.
El objetivo de este documento es analizar las interacciones entre el capital y la
liquidez. Con este objetivo en mente, el primer y el tercer capítulo constituyen
ejercicios empíricos, que exploran los lazos entre las necesidades de financiación, la
liquidez y la formación de los precios, en diferentes mercados. El primer capítulo
se centra en la determinación de la liquidez en el mercado de acciones de España,
mientras que el tercero analiza la determinacion de la liquidez en el mercado de
bonos, para una muestra de países europeos, las interacciones de ésta entre países y
sus efectos en otros mercados.
Los resultados del primer capítulo, que refuerzan mi percepción del papel crucial
que juega el capital para la determinación de la liquidez de los activos, me lleva a
formular un modelo para la determinación del capital óptimo bancario. Este modelo
se presenta en el segundo capítulo. El supuesto subyacente a este modelo es que
una relación similar, a la observada entre la liquidez en el mercado de acciones y
las necesidades de financiación, debería estar presente en la determinación de las
condiciones de liquidez en otros mercados. El alto grado de bancarización de la
economía me lleva a poner el foco en cómo los bancos determinan los niveles de
capital.
La liquidez en los mercados de acciones está íntimamente relacionada con la evolu-
ción del mercado de prestamo de acciones. La prohibición de las ventas en corto
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descubiertas subyace dicha relación. Los inversores sin acciones, que perciben so-
brevaloración en el precio de las mismas, han que pedir prestados títulos para re-
alizar ventas en el mercado. El posteo de colaterales lleva a que las restricciones de
financiación jueguen un papel crucial. La relevancia de dichas restricciones, para
la determinación de los precios de los activos, ha sido ilustrada en la literatura
sobre los límites al arbitraje. Dichas restricciones llevan a la violación de los teore-
mas fundamentales de las finanzas, impidiendo que los agentes económicos exploten
oportunidades de inversión beneficiosas.
La relación entre los mercados de préstamo y de acciones, para el caso español, es el
objetivo del primer capítulo de esta disertación. En él, también se analizan los efec-
tos de las restricciones legales a las ventas en corto. Un aspecto novedoso del estudio
es el uso de dos bases de datos diferenciadas, y exhaustivas, que independientemente
caracterizan el mercado español de préstamo de títulos. Los registros oficiales de la
CNMV, sobre volúmenes de ventas en corto, y las comisiones y oferta de acciones en
préstamo, provenientes de International DataExplorers, son utilizadas, simultánea-
mente, para determinar las ecuaciones de oferta y demanda. Dichas ecuaciones son
estimadas utilizando un enfoque econométrico de variables instrumentales y ecua-
ciones simultáneas. La caracterización independiente de los cambios en las pautas
de oferta y demanda, constituye otro aspecto diferencial. Estos estan relacionados
o bien con cambios en la percepcion del comportamiento futuro de las acciones o de
las necesidades de financiación. Su capacidad predictiva, sobre la rentabilidad de
las acciones, también se analiza.
Contrariamente a la visión que considera las actividades de ventas en corto como
prácticas especulativas, responsables del colapso de los mercados, éstas constituyen
un comportamiento de seguimiento de tendencia que garantiza la eficiencia de los
precios. Interesantes resultados surgen de la ausencia de impacto de las pautas de
demanda de títulos en préstamo, mientras que los cambios en las pautas de oferta
predicen el comportamiento futuro de las acciones. El impacto de las necesidades
de financiación para la determinación de los precios queda claro. Prohibir las ventas
en corto incrementa la relevancia del mercado de préstamo, y la volatilidad de la
rentabilidad de las acciones, mientras que reduce la eficiencia de los precios. Se
habrían de impulsar, pues, nuevas leyes encaminadas a reducir la discrecionalidad
9
presente en dichas actividades y no a restringir las ventas en corto.
La íntima relación entre la oferta de préstamo de valores y las necesidades de fi-
nanciación, me lleva a proponer un modelo teórico que explique las decisiones de
capital de los bancos. Bajo ese modelo, los efectos en términos de bienestar social
que surgen de las acciones de las autoridades monetarias en los mercados de crédito
también se analizan. La novedad del modelo propuesto radica en su generalidad, y
en cómo se justifican los colchones de capital. En los modelos existentes, el exceso
de capital sobre el regulatorio (colchón) surgen de la imposición ad hoc de fricciones.
Mi modelo sugiere que estos surgen endógenamente como protección contra una po-
tencial dilución, la bancarrota y para garantizar el acceso a oportunidades futuras
de arbitraje.
Las oportunidades de arbitraje, entre el mercado de acciones y el secundario de
crédito, surgen simultáneamente a la determinación de los niveles óptimos de capital
bancario, garantizando una apropiada remuneración de las actividades bancarias. El
capital será óptimamente escaso lo que, en presencia de arbitraje, lleva al colapso
del crédito. Los resultados sobre bienestar social sugieren lo indeseable del arbitraje
entre los mercados de acciones y crédito. Éste lleva a incrementos en los problemas
de riesgo moral afrontados por los gestores bancarios, y a incrementos en los costes
ligados al aseguramiento de los depósitos. Una conclusión es, pués, la necesidad de
articular mecanismos directos de recapitalización bancaria.
La relación teórica entre el capital y el precio de los bonos, tambien es analizada.
Aunque los bonos son activos no sujetos a regulación en términos de capital, el riesgo
de impago lleva a la existencia de una relación exponencial entre precio y capital. En
términos de bienestar social, las compras de bonos producen incrementos mientras
que, cuándo el capital es escaso, las adquisiciones de préstamos son irrelevantes.
En el tercer capítulo, la relación exponencial entre los precios de los bonos y el
capital, sugerida teóricamente en el capítulo anterior, es explorada. El modelo afín
para el precio de los bonos presentado en Fontaine y Garcia, 2012, es aplicado
a una muestra de países europeos y estimado mediante el método del Filtro de
Kalman “Unscented”. La naturaleza acumulativa de los niveles de capital, justifica
la utilización del tiempo transcurrido desde la fecha inicial de emision de un bono,
como un instrumento válido del capital agregado de la economía. Las pautas de
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contagio en liquidez entre los páises europeos son exploradas mediante la utilización
del coeficiente estandarizado ligado a nuestra variable exponencial. Esa variable,
tambien es utilizada para caracterizar la relación entre la liquidez de los bonos y la
formación de capital bancario, así como con la evolución del “spread” de los CDS y
los mercados de efectivo.
La novedad del estudio esta relacionada, en primer lugar, con la metodología apli-
cada para recuperar las condiciones de liquidez, con la extensión de los paises anal-
izados y, finalmente, con el uso de dicha magnitud para caracterizar las pautas de
contagio en liquidez. Novedosa es, así mismo, la interpretación del tiempo tran-
scurrido desde la emisión de un bono como un instrumento del capital agregado, al
mismo tiempo que la evidencia en favor de dicha interpretación mostrada.
Mis resultados sugieren la existencia de dos mercados de bonos, diferenciados en tér-
minos de liquidez, en la Eurozona. Esos se corresponden con el tradicional mapeo en
términos de paises nucleares y periféricos. También se encuentra un comportamiento
diferencial adicional, que puede ser justificado en términos del tamaño del mercado
de bonos. Dicha diferenciación no se circunscribe, únicamente, a la evolución de la
liquidez, sino también a la relación de esta con los mercados de efectivo. Mientras
que el mercado de bonos y de efectivo son sustitutivos para los países nucleares, éste
no es el caso para los periféricos.
Tambien se encuentra, en este capítulo, evidencia en favor de la íntima relación
entre liquidez y capital bancario. Las mejoras en la liquidez estan negativamente
relacionadas, y predicen, la evolucion del ratio de valor de mercado sobre valor en
libros de los bancos.
Finalmente este estudio contradice la, aceptada, naturaleza adelantada de los cam-
bios en el “spread” de los CDS frente a la liquidez. Mis resultados indican que
los cambios en la liquidez predicen las desviaciones de los “spreads” de sus valores
medios. Sospecho que los proxies tradicionales para la liquidez, como el spread
oferta-demanda, están afectados por un problema de error de medida, mientras que
la fórmula de cálculo del “spread” transfiere, mecánicamente, los cambios en la liq-
uidez a dichos spreads. Esto implica una mayor variación en los “spreads” frente
a los proxies, en presencia de perturbaciones de liquidez. Explorar la existencia de
dicho error de medida constituye la base para un próximo trabajo.
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Chapter 1.
Stock lending, Short Selling and
Market Returns: The Spanish Market
Abstract
In this chapter, the relation between the market for borrowing stocks and stock
price evolution, for the Spanish case, is illustrated. My findings points towards the
existence of an asymmetric relation between borrowing activities and stock prices.
In line with a trend chasing behavior of short sellers, borrowing costs are relevant
when stocks underperform the market. Supply side “endogenous” borrowing restric-
tions, likely to arise due to funding and capital constraints, are found relevant to
understand future evolution of stock market. Unpredicted changes on demand pat-
terns will not be a ecting that evolution. This is in contrast with the extended view
of short selling as price manipulation activities. The relation between borrowing
market and bubbles conformation, in the short and the long run, is also analyzed.
Borrowing activities help to keep price expectations and intrinsic firm value aligned,
in the short run, while in the long run both measures converge. The e ect of legal re-
strictions to short selling, like the one imposed by CNMV on September 22nd 2008,
is also analyzed. The introduction of new regulation has not reduced the pricing im-
pact of short selling activities. New regulation has reinforced market power of stock
lenders, hence increasing the e ect of borrowing activities on stock performance.
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Resumen
En este capítulo, se ilustra la relación entre el mercado de préstamo de acciones y
la evolución de los precios, de las mismas, para el caso español. Mis resultados sug-
ieren la existencia de una relación asimétrica entre las actividades de préstamo de
títulos y el precio de la acciones. En línea con un comportamiento de seguimiento de
tendencia, por parte de los vendedores en corto, cuando las acciones se comportan
peor que el mercado los costes asociados a la actividad de préstamo son relevantes.
Las restricciones endogenas de oferta de títulos en préstamo, que surgen como re-
sultado de restricciones de fondeo y capital, son también relevantes para entender
la evolución futura del mercado de acciones. Cambios no previstos en las pautas de
demanda no afectan a esta evolución. Esto contradice la visión, ampliamente exten-
dida, que entiende la actividad de ventas en corto como manipulación de precios. La
relación entre el mercado de préstamo y la formación de burbujas en el mercado, en
el corto y el largo plazo, tambien es analizada. La actividad de prestamo de títulos
ayuda a mantener alineadas las expectativas de precios y el valor intrinseco de las
compañias cotizadas, en el corto plazo, mientras que en el largo plazo ambas con-
vergen. El efecto de las restricciones legales a las ventas en corto, como la impuesta
por la CNMV el 22 de Septiembre de 2008, también se analizan. La introducción
de nueva regulación no ha reducido el impacto en los precios de las actividades de
ventas en corto. La nueva regulación ha incrementado el poder de mercado de los
prestamistas de títulos, de este modo incrementado el efecto de las actividades de
prestamo en el comportamiento de las acciones.
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1.1. Introduction
In recent years a discussion on the e ects of short selling for stock performance
took place. The mainstream of thinking blame short sellers of fatal market crashes,
identifying short selling activities with price manipulation. This opinion is not new.
It was in Netherlands, in 1680, when the first short selling restriction was imposed.
Short selling practices were blamed for the crash in tulips market, and those activities
forbid. However, the empirical evidence on the e ects of short selling practices is
mixed.
After the fall of Bearn & Stearns, in March 2008, and the stock exchange crash,
regulators across the world limited short selling activities in the market. The 22nd
of September 2008, Spanish Stocks Exchange Regulator, CNMV therein, published
a regulatory note reminding the prohibition of “naked” short selling operations, and
the obligation of short sellers to disclose their positions when those exceed the 0.25%
of company’s free float. The e ects of that regulation, on market performance, have
not been analyzed, so far. This study pursues a double objective: to analyze the
determinants of stock borrowing decision, and to characterize the relations between
the market for borrowing stocks and stock market.
My findings post evidence on the relevance of borrowing activities to increase mar-
ket liquidity. Theoretical and regulatory linkages between stock borrowing and
short selling activity allow an interpretation, of my results, in terms of short selling
behavior. Short selling (stock lending) present a non monotonic relation with con-
temporaneous company returns. When a stock performs better than the market,
short selling activity has no relation with performance while bad performance is
reinforced by borrowing activities. This should be understood as the outcome of
limited rationality (trend chasing) and overreaction of stock markets.
Evidence of a negative relation between lending activity and future stock returns is,
also, found. That relation is driven by restrictions in borrowing supply rather than
in demand, and reflects the existence of a supply monopoly, outcome of funding and
capital constraints.
I, also, find a negative relation between short term market bubbles and constraints
to borrowing activities for highly capitalized companies. That is related to the
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liquidity role of short selling activities.1 On the other hand, long term market
performance and lending constraints are not related. Hence, in the long run, negative
information is impounded in market prices independently of market liquidity, while
lending constraints a ect the speed at which information is reflected in market prices.
Market capitalization is relevant to understand the relation between stock and lend-
ing markets. Highly capitalized companies are more sensible to borrowing restric-
tions than small capitalized firms. This highlights the prevalent role of liquidity to
determine investment decisions.
Regulation enforced by the CNMV, on September, has tightened the link between
stock and lending market, increasing the market power of stock lenders and rein-
forcing above described relations.
My results are of special relevance for regulators and practitioners, and post evidence
in favor of the positive price e ciency e ects of short selling activity. Short selling
regulation will translate on restrictions a ecting the lending market, increases in
funding costs and reductions of price representativity.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: in the next section I explain what a simple
shorting operation looks like and the mechanics of shorting in Spain. In section 3
a brief review of existing literature is presented. Section 4, presents the data used
in this study. In section 5, supply and demand for lending are characterized. In
section 6 results on the relation between lending and stock markets are presented
while, in section 7, I conclude.
1.2. Short selling
In this section I characterize the players in short selling market, describing the
mechanics of short selling for naked and a non-naked operations, further explaining
the singularities of short selling activities in Spain. Finally I elaborate on the e ect
of dividends, recalls and collateral for borrowing activity.
1Short selling increases the liquidity of a stock by increasing supply of stocks, which in turn
increases trading possibilities of the agents
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1.2.1. Players
Stock lenders are custody banks. They lend stocks on behalf of large institutional
owners such as pension funds, mutual funds and endowments. Financial intermedi-
aries play a central role as clearinghouse of this operations, dampening seeking costs
and noise induced by positions taken by individual money managers.
Security borrowers are an heterogeneous group. Specialists and market makers have
obvious shorting needs to balance buy and sell orders. Traders of options are another
important group of borrowers while, perhaps, the most important group is composed
by Hedge Funds, that use borrowing positions in their “arbitrage” strategies (see
Table 1.1).
Table 1.1.: Relevant Short Selling Positions In Spain
Company/Date 24-Sep-08 25-Sep-08 29-Sep-08 09-Oct-08
Banco de Sabadell Calypso Capital
Management, Highside
Capital Management
Tiger Global
Management,
Calypso Capital
Management
Bankinter John A. Gri n, Highside
Capital Management
Banco Popular Amber Master Fund,
John A. Gri n,
Harbinger Capital
Partners Master Fund I,
Lansdowne Global
Financials Fund,
Highside Capital
Management
Tiger Global
Management,
Viking Global
Investors
Fidelity
International
Banco Pastor Fortelux Capital
Management
BBVA Harbinger Capital
Partners Master Fund I
Harbinger Capital
Partners Master
Fund I
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1.2.2. The mechanics of short selling
To explain the mechanics of short selling operations I consider an example concerning
three agents (A, B, C) and one company (D). Agent A is the short seller, agent B
is the lender, agent C is a potential stock buyer and D is a traded company. I will
distinguish between naked and non-naked operations.
1.2.2.1. Pure Naked shorting operation
A naked short selling operation implies an agent (A, in our simple example) going
to the market to sell stocks of a company (D) that she does not already own. There
are many reasons to short sell stocks in the market but two emerge as principal.
The first one is the existence of some necessity by the agent to hedge a previous
operation (e.g. a long position in a convertible bond), whilst the second obeys
to purely speculative motives (e.g.information about negative development of the
company in the future).
By undertaking this position the agent will earn money whenever the stock falls,
as he will be able to close the position buying previously shorted stocks at a lower
price. Simultaneously she faces some costs, due to the payment to agent C any
dividend the stock pays until the position is hedged.
This style of shorting leads the seller to behave as a market maker, implying an
artificial increase in the supply of stocks of the company. Consequently, those ac-
tivities are forbidden, in most developed countries, as could result on stock price
manipulation.2
1.2.2.2. Non naked shorting operation
As pure “naked” short selling operations are not allowed in most developed countries,
short sellers have to posses stocks before the liquidation date arrives. To do so, the
short seller (A) borrow stocks from an investor (say B) already owning them.
2If the amount of assets a Short Seller could trade in the market is not limited by the existing
mass of issued stocks, agents could reduce the price below its “true” value. This could lead to
the creation of arbitrage opportunities.
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On exchange for this loan, agent B typically asks for some acceptable collateral (for
simplicity cash) which he remunerates to A at an interest rate (rebate rate). As in
the case of a naked position, agent A pays to B any dividend until the operation is
canceled. Once the loan operation is set, A goes to the market and sells stocks to
C.
After some time, agent A buys back stocks in the market, giving them to B, end-
ing the lending operation. The complete result of the operation for agent A will
be determined by the di erence between payments (rebate plus the di erence be-
tween selling and buying price) and costs (opportunity cost of the collateral and any
dividend payment during the operation)
1.2.2.3. Settlement, liquidation and fail to deliver
On the vast majority of markets in the world, settlement and liquidation happen
simultaneously (typically three days after the operation is performed) with trading
taking place in advance. Decoupling of trading and liquidation opens room for de
facto “naked short selling” operations and fail to deliver.
De facto “naked short selling” follows the gap between liquidation and trading day,
and the role of the clearing house as a mere transmitter of stocks. As verification
of property just takes place after e ective trading, any agent would have enough
time to look for stocks to hedge a short selling operation, if at the moment he took
this short position he did not own enough stocks. This practice raise moral hazard
concerns for custody banks, their payment dependent on the number of Trading
Accounts.
Fail to deliver occurs when an agent is unable to locate stocks to deliver in settle-
ment/liquidation date. Such phenomena cancels the trading operation, short seller
having to pay a predetermined fee as penalty. Fail to deliver causes damage for the
buyer, who could find himself in a higher price market to buy stocks.
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1.2.3. Short selling in Spain
1.2.3.1. Short selling mechanics in Spain before September 22nd 2008
Let us, now, suppose that agent A, who does not own stocks of company D, sold
stocks of that, to agent C, at date t. According to Spanish regulation settlement
of the operation will happen at the very moment that the operation happens but
liquidation will take place at t + 3. It implies that A has 3 days to borrow stocks
from another agent (B), who actually owns the stock, in order to hedge his position.
If liquidation date arrives and A’s position is not covered, an special mechanism will
be initiated, the clearing house (Iberclear) will subtract from A’s guarantee account
the money obtained from the short selling operation plus a 10% as penalty.
1.2.3.2. Short selling mechanics in Spain after September 22nd 2008
In September 22nd 2008, CNMV imposed regulatory restrictions to short selling. In
concrete, from that date on, no agent can sell stocks in the market if at the date
of the operation she cannot prove the property of enough stocks or rights on stocks
to hedge her operation. From that date on mechanics have simplified very much:
Agent A borrows stocks from agent B at date t or before, then agent A sells these
stocks to agent C in the market at t. At t+ 3 liquidation happens.3
1.2.3.3. Settlement and liquidation timing in Spanish Market
Under Spanish market laws settlement of the operation takes place in the very
moment trade happens, t, and there is no room for fail to deliver. The clearing
house has to deliver the stocks to C and the operation can not be reversed. In case
liquidation date arrives, t+3, and agent A doe not hold enough stocks to cover the
operation, the Clearing creates a Registry Note (or Nota de Registro). This Registry
Note is in fact a temporal issuance of stocks of company D, which will be reversed in
the moment Iberclear buys stocks in the market to hedge his position. This implies
a temporary increase in the supply of company C stocks.
3Liquidation in this context is just the registry of the operation and the exchange of money from
one broker’s account to another
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1.2.3.4. Dividend dates
Taxation on dividends is similar in Spain and in other OECD countries. Dividends
are taxed in the moment they are received by the agent with a general tax rate
of 21%. As a consequence, lending around dividend dates exhibits a di erential
behavior translated into an increase in both, supply and demand due to tax shield
motives.4
Regarding stocks property, Spanish laws claims that the actual owner of the stock is
the one who should receive dividend payments. Coming back to our example, when
a dividend date arrives, agent A has to pay any dividend to agent B. This implies
an increase in the cost “paid” to short stocks in the market.5
1.2.3.5. Recalls and collateral
Spanish laws do not di er to US laws on recalls. Any lender has the right to cancel,
in any moment, the operation asking for the return of lent stocks. If that happens,
short seller need to go to the market and buy back as many stocks as borrowed. On
collateral, legislation is not in place. However, CNMV general recommendation is
those not to be smaller than 100 percent.
1.3. Literature review
Some studies are of special relevance to understand the importance of short selling,
from a theoretical point of view: Miller (1977), Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and, more recently, Goldstein
and Guembel (2008).
In Miller (1977), the author concludes that, under uncertainty, banning short selling
will go against market e ciency, reducing the incorporation of negative information
on stock prices. This will lead to a reduction of stock liquidity, to the creation
4Suppliers receive dividends from demandants, these dividends are taxed at their marginal rate
and they avoid to pay in advance at a bigger rate. The type of borrowers is then modified,
with pension and mutual funds interested on dividends, changing their typical role of lenders.
5A is paying the Lending Fee+Perceived dividend+Tax of dividend
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of bubbles, and to a reduction on the frequency of negative returns and volatility.
When prices are high enough, no one is willing to buy stocks, bubbles collapse and a
market crash follows. Similar results are found in Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000).
Similar conclusions, now arising from informational asymmetries, are found on Di-
amond and Verrecchia (1987). Assuming that informed traders receive a perfect
signal on firm value, short selling bans will impede informed traders, with negative
expectations, to translate their information on prices. This will cause a reduction
in market e ciency, volatility and liquidity, while feeding up bubbles.
More recently, Goldstein and Guembel (2008) arrive to opposite conclusions, by
means of game theory, under a four date model of heterogeneously informed traders.
Opposite to the assumption in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), the signal perceived
by informed traders is not perfect, and beliefs are updated every period by both
uninformed and informed agents. Uninformed traders will behave as trend chasers,
perceiving price falls as signals of informed traders behavior. Therefore, short selling
activities could lead to e ciency losses, prices not reflecting negative information
but overreacting to imperfect signals..
Some empirical papers are also relevant: Jones and Lamont (2002), D’Avolio (2002)
and Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007).
Jones and Lamont (2002) analyze the capacity of short selling restrictions to predict
future market returns and bubble creation (overpricing hypothesis) for the 1925-1933
period. They conclude that short selling restrictions open room for predictability,
on stock returns, and lead to company overvaluation (measured as market to book
ratio).
D’Avolio (2002) studies borrowing stocks market, concluding that firm size, insti-
tutional ownership and recall probabilities are crucial to understand the supply of
lending stocks. He also posts evidence in favor of Miller’s assumption: short sell-
ing reflects asymmetric beliefs on stock prices. Stock prices and lending supply are
positively correlated, falling prices increase recall probabilities: lenders are more
tempted to sell stocks to reduce risk. The fall in lending supply will impose an
endogenous constraint on short selling, reducing rebate rates and liquidity, while
increasing the cost of lending.
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Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) test for the e ciency (predictability) in stock
returns by means of panel regression. Using a legal indicator of short selling restric-
tions for each considered market, they conclude that short selling restrictions cause
market ine ciency, creating room for returns predictability.
My study is close to D’Avolio (2002) and embeds in the not so exhaustive litera-
ture on the interactions between the lending and stocks market. Making use of a
new database, I analyze the e ects of borrowing activity on stock market perfor-
mance. I find a positive relation between endogenous supply side restrictions on
lending, understood as unexpected divergences on borrowed amounts from its long
run equilibrium, and abnormal stock returns. Also, opposed to the assumption in
Goldstein and Guembel (2008), I find evidence on a trend chasing behavior of bor-
rowers (short sellers) when market prices fall. Hence, short sellers do not seem to
behave as informed investors.
1.4. The data
My data is composed of 135 Spanish listed companies during the period between
January 2005 and December 2008. It includes lending volumes from CNMV o cial
registries, closing prices, volumes, bid-ask spreads, and specific company data from
Thomson Financial Datastream. From this provider I also get data on right issuances
and convertibles. This results on 56 rights issuances and two traded convertibles.
From individual closing prices, a value weighted index along with its returns are
computed. Those are, then, used to obtain abnormal returns for each company,
using the CAPM equation.
Additionally, I got daily data on lending fees and total supply of stocks for lend-
ing, from International Data Explorers of London. The computation of lending fees
depends on the collateral posted. When a loan is cash collateralized, lending fee is
computed as the di erence between the one day Libor and the rebate rate. Other-
wise, the fee is fixed, by the bank, according to internal considerations. Data on fees
is aggregated, to a weekly level, using daily lending volumes as weights. However,
data on fees is not exhaustive. Lending activity is absent for 32 companies included
in our original sample and those are dropped from the final data-set.
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In Table 1.2 and Table 1.3, major descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and by
market capitalization, are shown. Untabulated correlation tables post evidence on
the existence of negative correlation between lending interest6 and borrowing fees.
More borrowing implies bigger rebates and lower fees. However, when controlling
for market capitalization, this relation is not so clear. Small capitalized firms (up
to 80% of market capitalization) exhibit the typical positive relation, whereas for
big companies that relation inverts. Also, a negative relation between costs (fees)
and market-to-book values is found. This suggests the existence of overvaluation on
stocks subject to higher borrowing constraints.
Table 1.2.: Descriptive Statistics (Panel A)
Deciles of
Market
capitalization
Number of
companies
Mean
Lending
interest
(%)
Standard
deviation of
lending
interest
Weekly
Return
volatility
Mean
lending
Fee
(%)
Total Sample 103 0.07 1.58 0.04 1.420
Decile 1 11.00 0.04 0.31 0.048 2.840
Decile 2 10.00 0.15 0.79 0.059 2.520
Decile 3 10.00 0.17 0.50 0.046 2.240
Decile 4 10.00 0.29 0.71 0.041 1.580
Decile 5 11.00 0.31 1.00 0.050 1.980
Decile 6 10.00 0.42 1.35 0.043 1.380
Decile 7 11.00 0.72 1.32 0.039 0.890
Decile 8 10.00 1.11 1.65 0.041 1.020
Decile 9 10.00 1.03 1.82 0.040 0.960
Decile 10 10.00 1.69 2.67 0.031 0.540
Figure 1.1 illustrates the existing relation between lending fees and lending volumes.
On average, lending volumes and fees have increased over the considered period.
This could reflect the existence of market overvaluation, resulting on an increase in
short selling interest. However, fees have experienced a tight increase from April
2008, following the fall of Bear & Stearns while lending activities have reduced. As
funding needs are relevant to understand the interest of stock suppliers on lending,
this reflects an increase on funding costs (risk perception) from that date.
Figure 1.2 depicts the relation between lending fees and dividend dates. Clearly,
6See sec. A for a description on how this variable is constructed
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Table 1.3.: Descriptive Statistics (Panel B)
Abnormal Return>=0 Abnormal Return<0
Deciles of
Market
capitalization
Mean
Weekly
return (%)
Mean
Lending
interest(%)
Mean
Lending
Fee (%)
Mean
Weekly
return (%)
Mean
Lending
interest(%)
Mean
Lending
Fee (%)
Decile 1 0.032 0.047 2.596 -0.024 0.038 2.649
Decile 2 0.037 0.145 2.496 -0.031 0.155 2.398
Decile 3 0.032 0.165 2.096 -0.027 0.177 2.176
Decile 4 0.032 0.284 1.578 -0.025 0.300 1.527
Decile 5 0.034 0.290 1.831 -0.028 0.321 1.870
Decile 6 0.031 0.386 1.309 -0.026 0.442 1.411
Decile 7 0.029 0.681 0.846 -0.024 0.765 0.937
Decile 8 0.030 1.092 0.883 -0.025 1.133 1.028
Decile 9 0.029 1.021 0.866 -0.024 1.045 1.010
Decile 10 0.021 1.760 0.478 -0.018 1.633 0.617
Total Sample 0.030 0.691 1.297 -0.025 0.671 1.442
tax shield motives drive borrowing decisions around dividend dates. Consequently,
dividend payment dates should receive a di erential treatment when characterizing
the structural relation between stocks performance and the behavior of agents in
the lending market.
Figure 1.3 plots the evolution of our value-weighted index against the evolution of
lending fees. The increase of lending fees, from April 2008, have been paired with
a reduction on the index value. However, the graphical illustration is unclear on
whether the increase on lending fees is prior to the fall on index value.
In Figure 1.4 the relation between abnormal returns and lending fees is illustrated.
An increase of abnormal returns volatility is paired with above average lending
fees (and of lending volumes) while the increase in abnormal returns at the end
of the sample period, coincides with a fall in lending fees. The tight relation here
illustrated emphasizes the importance of lending fees to understand the evolution of
stock prices.
1.5. The market for borrowing stocks
Absence of exhaustive databases on lending volumes (I am just aware of the existence
of such o cial records for Spain) has almost totally prevented (see D’Avolio (2002))
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Figure 1.1.: Lending Interest vs Lending Fees
the existence of studies analyzing the relation between borrowing and stock markets.
In what follows I propose a market micro-structure approach based on the estimation
of borrowing markets supply and demand equations to analyze that interactions.
Estimation of supply and demand equations is problematic. One only observes
equilibrium lending volumes and fees, resulting from interactions between supply
and demand, then identification of equation based coe cients should rely on an
instrumental variables approach.7
Why is so important to determine supply and demand equations? One of the biggest
findings in Jones and Lamont (2002) is that short selling restrictions predict future
abnormal returns. Those short selling restrictions could be the result either of legal
restrictions or of market conditions. While regulatory (legal) constraints to short
selling could be directly identified, the identification of endogenous constraints to
short selling should relate to frictions in stock lending markets.
7I use a simultaneous equations approach to avoid the inconsistency of estimators that is present
when using single equations model. It also allows us to find plausible instruments to identify
the e ects of endogenous variables in the model
26
Figure 1.2.: Lending Fees and Dividend Dates
The evolution of supply and demand in the lending market is related to di er-
ent factors. While stock supply would relate with funding and capital constraints of
financial agents,8 or from company specifics, changes in demand relate to the percep-
tion of future evolution of stock prices and, hence, on the existence of informational
asymmetries amongst market participants.
In Figure 1.5 an illustration of the theoretical implications of shifts on supply and
demand for lending fees is presented.
A negative demand shift will, “ceteris paribus”, reduce cost. This shift should arise
as a consequence of a reduction in the amount of negative information a ecting a
company, as perceived by market participants. Then, this reduction will result in a
decrease of short selling activities and on higher stock returns. Similarly, a negative
shift in supply should correspond to a reduction in funding needs of stock holders,
8The reason why funding and capital constraints are related to supply patterns rely on the
existence of regulatory capital asymmetries regarding the threatment of stocks incorporated in
balance sheets of financial entities subject to regulation, as well as in the characterization of
the lending market as the only way to finance equity positions
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Figure 1.3.: Index vs Lending Fees
and should also lead to higher returns. Summarizing, predicted e ects of shifts are:
• A positive demand shift will increase cost and lending volume. A higher
amount of stocks could be short sell and returns will reduce.
• A positive supply shift reduces costs and increase lending volumes. A higher
amount of short positions would follow, reducing stock returns.
1.5.1. Specification of Demand and Supply Equations
To identify borrowing stock supply, I propose the following heuristic equation:
Sit = ci+–Costit+”CostitúCNMVit+—Sit≠1+ÊSit≠1úCNMVit+“PctileMKit+◊CNMVit+uit
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Figure 1.4.: Abnormal Returns vs Lending Fee
while demand equation is:9
Dit = –i + —Costit + “Lendit≠1 + ÊDividendoit + ◊Momentumit + ÷Pctlendingit≠1+
+ ⁄Costit ú CNMVit + ŸLendit≠1 ú CNMVit + vit
Funding needs are, essentially, determined by stable variables, opportunity costs
and economic situation. A big supply of stocks for lending will be related to strong
funding needs, whose determinants would be persistent. Hence, present and past
lending supply, Sit≠1, should be positively related.
The existence of two di erentiated market indexes in Spain, facing di erent liquidity,
and with stocks assigned to each one according to market capitalization, underlie
the inclusion of a variable characterizing market cap, PctileMKit, on supply speci-
fication.
9On estimation, supply and demand amounts on the left hand side of the equations are charac-
terized via lending interest whose definition could be found in sec.A
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Figure 1.5.: An illustration of a Demand Shift
The modification of the legal environment, due to new regulation, lead my decision
of introducing a dummy variable, CNMVit, (and its interactions with cost and
past supply) that takes a value of 1 for each week from 22nd of September 2008,
on supply equation. This variable, is also incorporated on the specification of the
demand equation.
When short selling activities are not distorted by frictions (legal or market based),
bad information on a company is incorporated in prices through an increase in short
positions and demand of borrowing stocks. That increase in short positions, will
result into a fall in prices. When prices completely reflect information, short selling
activities will not be profitable, and short sellers will buy back stocks on the market.
Borrowing relations are ended, and a reduction in demand follow. Consequently, I
incorporate on the demand equation variables, Lendit≠1 and Pctlendingit≠1, that
controls for previous period borrowed stocks.
If short sellers behave as trend chasers, piling losses should lead to increases in short
selling activity. This idea in mind, a market momentum variable that accumulates
the return of 3 previous weeks is incorporated on demand equation.
The cheap gain, for borrowers, derived of tax asymmetries on dividend payments,
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lead to the introduction of a dividend related variable, Dividendoit, on demand
equation. This variable ranges from ≠4 to 4 according to the number of weeks
to/from dividend payment date.
The relevance of the exogenous determinants of supply as instruments for demand
is now presented, then illustrating the relation between exogenous determinants of
demand and supply.
Past supply, Sit≠1, correlates with present costs while being independent of current
demand. The informational nature of demand conditions underlie independence
of previous period supply and actual demand, while persistence of costs (funding
needs) leads correlation with previously supplied amounts.
D’Avolio (2002) exposed the reasons relating market capitalization and demand.
The higher market capitalization, the lower the costs due to the reduction on im-
plied liquidity (opportunity) costs. However, market capitalization does not lead to
modifications on company information and, hence, on demanded amounts.
The structural nature of borrowing lead the relation of past lending, Lendit≠1 and
Pctlendingit≠1, with costs. The more stocks borrowed on previous period, the higher
actual costs will be. Supply of stocks will depend on funding needs, while the incor-
poration of lagged supply on supply equation will make present supply independent
on (previous) borrowing activities.
The splitting of tax shield derived profits between lenders and borrowers, imple-
mented through the payable rebate rate, lead directly to the relevance of the divi-
dend related variable, Dividendoit, when characterizing the relation between costs
and supply.
The auto-correlation of market momentum measure, Momentumit, translates on
correlation between that variable and previous cost. The structural nature of bor-
rowing costs imply auto-correlation of that variable, and hence correlation with ac-
tual market momentum. However, the evolution of market prices will not influence
funding needs of holders and, hence, supplied amounts.
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Table 1.4.: Estimates of Supply and Demand Equations
Dependent variable: Lend Interest I II III IV
Cost 1.466*** 0 -0.123** 0
Past total supply of stocks for lending 0.0002*** 0
Regulatory Note September 22 2008 -1.045*** 0.01
Cost* Regulatory note -3.740*** 0.2979
Past total supply*Regulatory note -0.0006*** 0.6995
Lend Interest t-1 0.454*** 0
Weeks to dividend 0.135*** 0
Market Momentum -0.497*** 0.04
Percentile Lending t-1 -0.005*** 0.15
Constant -0.820*** 0.903***
Observations 16658 16658
Number of groups 103 103
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Instrumented in Supply Eq.: Cost, Cost*Regulatory Note; Instruments: Lending t-1, Market Momentum,
Percentile of Lending t-1, Weeks to Dividend, Lending t-1* Regulatory Note
Instrumented in Demand Eq.: Cost; Instruments: Supply t-1, Percentile of Market Capitalization,
CNMV*Supply t-1
1.5.2. Supply and Demand Estimates
Table 1.4 present results for the estimation of supply and demand equations under
above specification. Columns I and III correspond to the estimation of equations us-
ing within-group fixed e ect estimators, whereas in columns II and IV, p-values for
the Wilcoxon test of significance of each coe cient are presented, when this equa-
tions are computed at a company level. Those estimations are equivalent to testing
the model that considers an stable relation across firms (the regression coe cients
being the same for all companies) against a company driven behavior.
The existence of an stable relation is rejected in our sample. There exists a signif-
icant amount of information, at a company level, influencing supply and demand.
The change in regulation do not seem to have modified the behavior of borrowers
(estimates dropped for consistency) but lenders. After the introduction of new regu-
lation, the slope of supply inverts (point estimates change from 1.466 to ≠2.274) on
aggregate with results of non parametric testing, indicating the absence of inversion
for most of our sample of companies at an individual level. Hence, equations are
estimated at a company level to ensure representativity.
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Having estimated demand and supply equations, I use residuals10 to create a set of
variables characterizing shifts:
• SOUT: Observed supply is bigger than expected supply. Residuals are positive,
shorting is easier and, returns reduce. This will be typical of unexpected
increases of funding needs.
• SIN:Observed supply is lower than estimated supply. Residuals are negative,
shorting is more di cult and, returns increase.
• DOUT: Observed demand is bigger than expected demand. Residuals are
positive, higher negative information is perceived and returns should reduce.
• DIN: Observed demand is lower than expected demand. Residuals are nega-
tive, less negative information is in place for a concrete stock, shorting is lower,
and returns bigger.
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) presented a similar procedure to control for
constraints in the borrowing market that could a ect shorting of stocks.
1.6. Market returns, abnormal market returns and
existence of bubbles
In this section, I study the interaction between borrowing stocks market, returns
and abnormal returns. I, also, analyze the predictive capacity of that market on
future abnormal returns. I estimate my equations using the fixed e ect methodology
unless explicitly mentioned, controlling for year specific e ects. Finally, the relation
between borrowing restrictions and the conformation of market bubbles, in the short
and long run, is studied.
1.6.1. Present Returns and present abnormal returns
Table 1.5 present estimates for the relation between borrowing costs and contempo-
raneous returns. In line with previous results, such as Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu
10On the following estimations, only residuals above 1 standard deviation are used. Changing that
criteria does not change qualitatively my results
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(2007), a negative relation is observed. Columns II to IV illustrate the robustness
of my results, even in presence of company specifics.
Table 1.5.: E ect of the lending market on equity returns
Within group estimates using company and year fixed e ects. The returns are ex dividend and
expressed as fraction of one. Cost in percentage. Lending Interest is the percentage of total
equity lent at a week. Dividendo is the number of weeks to dividend date ranging from 4 to -4.
Direction is equal to one if the supply determines the price and -1 if it is demand. CNMV is
one from 22 September on. Sample period Jan 2005 to Dec 2008
Dependent Variable: Return I II III IV V
Cost -0.0103*** -0.0103*** -0.0099*** -0.0100*** -0.0101***
Lending interest -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0034*** -0.0039*** -0.0039***
Dividendo 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0035** -0.0035**
Direction 0.0057*** 0.0053*** 0.0053***
Cost x Direction -0.0009+ 0.0000 0.0000
Convertibles -0.01 -0.01
Rights issuances 0.0155** 0.01 0.01
Cash to Sales 0.0000 0.0000
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000
Lending interest x CNMV 0.0000
Cost x CNMV 0.0000
CNMV -0.01
Constant 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 17043 17043 17043 15111 15111
Number of group 103 103 103 91 91
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The relevance of the direction variable on stock returns is interesting. That is build
using the Ellis, Michaely, O’Hara algorithm (Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000)) and
reflect the market side (supply or demand) driving price formation. This variable
takes the value 1 when the price is supply driven and -1 otherwise. When the price
is determined by sellers, returns are a 0.5% higher. This reflects the e ect of scarcity
on price formation.
In column V, I study the price formation distortions induced by new short selling
regulation. No e ect on contemporaneous relation are found. This is in contrast
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with the extended view of short selling activity inducing market falls.
In Table 1.6, I present evidence on the relation between relative company perfor-
mance and borrowing behavior. Column I, suggest the existence of a volatility
increasing relation between borrowing costs and performance. When a stock is per-
forming better than the market, an increase of 100 basis points in cost, increases
abnormal returns in 1 percent, however when the stock is performing worse than the
market (abnormal return is negative), the same increase in costs increases the size
of losses in a 1 percent. Those results are robust to the introduction of company
specifics (columns II to IV) and new regulation, (column V).
Endogeneity concerns, leading to inconsistency of estimates, due to the use of inter-
actions of borrowing costs and an abnormal return related variable, make me present
estimates of columns VI and VII. In those, I estimate, using a maximum likelihood
random e ects approach, truncated regressions for both positive and negative ab-
normal returns cases. Following this methodology, I rule out the existence of any
relation between borrowing and relative performance when companies over-perform.
However, higher borrowing activity, leading to cost increases, will worsen stock per-
formance when that is relatively bad. This is consistent with both, a reduction of
lending supply, due to a risk reduction of stock holders (market sale), and a trend
chasing behavior of short sellers.
All my findings are coherent with previous literature, and stresses the informational
role played by short sellers (stock borrowers). When a stock is under-performing,
rational expectations lead potential short sellers to believe there is some hidden
information yet to be released. Hence, they increasing borrowing activity, pushing
up lending fees. Stocks are then sold in the market and the negative relation observed
in data follows.11
1.6.2. Predictability of abnormal returns
In Table 1.7, I estimate the e ect of borrowing activity on the predictability of
abnormal returns. In line with findings in Jones and Lamont (2002) and Cohen,
Diether, and Malloy (2007), a negative relation is found. An increase of 100 basis
11Goldstein and Guembel (2008)for further theoretical discussion
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Table 1.6.: E ects of the Lending Market on Abnormal Equity Returns
Within group estimates using company and year fixed e ects. The abnormal returns are computed applying
CAPM equation with a value weighted Index, expressed as fraction of one . Cost in percentage. Lend Interest is
the fraction of total equity lent. Dividendo is the number of weeks to dividend date ranging from 4 to -4.
Direction is equal to one if the supply determines the price and -1 if it is demand. CNMV is one from 22
September on. Sample period Jan 2005 to Dec 2008
Dependent variable: Abnormal Return I II III IV V VI VII
Cost -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0078*** -0.0078*** -0.0079*** -0.0011*** 0.0003
Cost x Abnormal return>0 0.0176*** 0.0176*** 0.0175*** 0.0174*** 0.0174***
Dividendo -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0025
Direction 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0018*** 0.0008+
Cost x Direction -0.0007** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0002+ 0.0002
Lending interest x Direction 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Convertibles -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0077+ -0.0090+
Rights issuances 0.0076** 0.0064+ 0.0064+ -0.0050 0.0152**
Cash to Sales 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Lending interest x CNMV 0.0000
Cost x CNMV 0.0000
CNMV 0.0000 -0.0147*** 0.0202***
Constant 0.0010** 0.0010** -0.0011+ 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0152*** 0.0251***
Observations 17043 17043 17043 15111 15111 7978 7133
Number of group 103 103 103 91 91 91 91
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
points in borrowing costs will, on average, reduce future abnormal returns in a 0.1
percent. When a higher amount of negative information is perceived, the amount
of stocks borrowed, and costs, increases. Market sales, then, lead to price falls and
company stocks under-perform the market.
In columns II to IV, I analyze the e ect of di erent borrowing supply and demand
shifts (constraints) on future abnormal returns. If short selling activity underlie
market falls, unexpected reductions on borrowing demand should have a positive
impact on future stock returns. This due either to the fact that stock prices are
accurately reflecting information available, and short sellers netting their positions,
or because better perceptions on future company performance are held.
Results on columns II and III point towards the relevance of supply side restrictions
to understand interactions between lending and stock markets, while changes on
demand will not a ect performance. As supply changes would be driven by funding
and capital constraints, while demand is determined by information, I conclude,
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making use of previous results, that market liquidity (characterized by abnormal
returns), is only a ected by changes on funding and capital conditions, short sellers
behaving as trend chasers.
To confirm my findings, column IV presents regression results when including a
tighter restriction on borrowing conditions. This, considers those situations in which
a simultaneous reduction in supply and an increase in demand took place. The e ect
of this variable on future abnormal return is less significant than the one that just
considers supply shifts (significance at a 10 percent level) and of bigger, but not
significantly di erent, magnitude. Supply side restrictions are, consequently, the
ones relevant to understand stock performance.
Table 1.7.: Lending market e ects on abnormal returns predictability
Within group estimates using company fixed e ects. The abnormal returns are computed applying CAPM equation with a value
weighted Index, expressed as fraction of one . Cost in percentage. Lend Interest is the fraction of total equity lent. Dividendo is
the number of weeks to dividend date ranging from 4 to -4. Direction is equal to one if the supply determines the price and -1 if
it is demand. CNMV is one from 22 September on. Sample period Jan 2005 to Dec 2008
Dependent Variable: Abnormal returns t+1 I II III IV V VI VII
Cost -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0011***
Cost x Abnormal return t >0 0.0001
DIN 0.0002
SIN 0.0011**
SIN & DOUT 0.0014+ 0.0014+ 0.0014+ 0.0013+
Dividendo -0.0027** -0.0036** -0.0038***
Direction -0.0012+ -0.0012+
Cost x Direction -0.00003 0.00006
Convertibles -0.0301*** -0.0291***
Rights issuance 0.0017 0.0010
Cash to Sales 0.00001 0.00001
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000
Cost x CNMV -0.0024***
Constant 0.0011** 0 0 0.0010** 0.0011** 0.0021*** 0.0018**
Observations 17246 17246 17246 17246 17246 15043 15043
Number of group 103 103 103 103 103 91 91
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The possibility of bias, due to the existence of non-modeled company specifics driv-
ing my findings, lead me to compute additional regressions incorporating a wide
variety of firm and market related variables (direction, weeks to dividend, existence
of convertibles and right issuances, Cash to Sales and Firm Leverage) with no mod-
ification in results (columns V and VI). From these variables, two are of special
relevance: direction and convertibles.
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When previous market price was supply determined (direction variable equal to one)
future abnormal return is lower. Previous results post evidence on the existence of
a positive relation between contemporaneous returns and direction, coherent with
trend chasing behavior. On the other hand, results on abnormal returns illustrate
the existence of market overreaction. If the market overreacts to news, so agents are
just partially informed, a positive abnormal return in one period should be followed
by a correction, subsequent abnormal returns being of smaller size.
Even though convertible issuances are scarce in our sample (just two are present),
those are related with a relatively worse performance in terms of abnormal returns.
This is in line with findings in Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) and consistent with
the dilutory e ects arising from its conversion into new equity. While both, equity
an convertibles are quoted in the market, agents have the possibility of trading
through any of them. At convertible’s maturity, the sum of conversion price and
convertibles market price should equal the price of the stock. Then, stock returns
will be splitted between both products and abnormal returns will be lower.
Results on the e ects of regulatory (legal) restrictions on short selling are presented
in column VII. Following the introduction of regulation, the relation between bor-
rowing and stock markets increases. The tightening on the borrowing schedule
underlies this result. The increase in borrowing costs (lending fees), following the
increase on daily borrowing demand, would lead short sellers to require a higher
reduction of stock prices to accommodate for both, the increase in funding costs
and negative company information. Untabulated results by percentile of market
capitalization confirm the results here presented, while pointing towards a higher
impact on middle capitalized companies (those belonging to the 40-70 capitalization
range).
1.6.3. Stock Lending and the 2008 Market Crash
1.6.3.1. Short term evidence
In this section, I turn to the determination of the role played by borrowing markets
on the creation of stock bubbles. The idea of short selling restrictions leading to
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the creation of market bubbles was initially incorporated in Miller (1977), developed
by Jones and Lamont (2002) and widely explored by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).
Restrictions to borrowing will translate on short selling restrictions. Those will
increase the di culty of impounding negative information on stock prices, leading
to stock overpricing.
To study the presence of such relation, I start by creating a variable that character-
izes the di erence between fundamental and market price of stocks in the short run.
That is computed as the ratio of market to book values, for each week, and year
end market to book value. Market value is computed as the product of number of
equity shares and end of week closing price.
A positive relation between this measure and borrowing costs is found (Table 1.8),
even when company and market specifics are considered. Companies facing yearly
reductions on market to book value ratios have been more heavily borrowed (positive
relation between borrowing costs and volumes) while changes on borrowing condi-
tions does not a ect my results (column VI). This reflects the role of borrowers
as price e cient agents. Discrepancies between market and fundamental company
value are cleared o  the market by increases on borrowing activities.12 Further
evidence on this behavior is presented in the following section.
1.6.3.2. Long term evidence
Subsequent to the results on the short term relation between market bubbles and
borrowing activities, I analyze the e ect of borrowing constraints on the long run
performance of stocks. To this end I measure the accumulated increase in market
to book value ratio from March 2008 to December 2008, and for the same period in
2007. This period is not chosen arbitrarily. Following the fall of Bearn & Stearns
in March 2008, the financial crisis become more visible and short selling activities
12I also verify the robustness of our results to capitalization and lending size running the same
regressions by percentile of market capitalization and percentile of lending volume. I find
an asymmetric relation when firms are pooled by market capitalization while no qualitative
changes are found according to lending volumes. Bigger companies are a ected by the existence
of borrowing constraints (DIN, SIN and SIN&DOUT variables). As the amount of stocks to be
sold, for negative information to be perceived, is bigger, restrictions to borrowing a ect more
market liquidity and prices.
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Table 1.8.: Lending market e ects on short term bubbles creation
Within group estimates using company fixed e ects. Market to book value is computed as the value of market to
book value relative to this ratio the last trading day of December. Cost in percentage. Lend Interest is the fraction
of total equity lent. Dividendo is the number of weeks to dividend date ranging from 4 to -4. Direction is equal to
one if the supply determines the price and -1 if it is demand. Sample period Jan 2005 to Dec 2008.
Dependent Variable: Market to Book I II III IV V VI
Cost 0.0837*** 0.0842*** 0.0876*** 0.0877*** 0.0879*** 0.0928***
DIN -0.01
SIN 0.01
SIN & DOUT -0.0569*** -0.0577*** -0.0576*** -0.01
Weeks to dividend 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Rights issuance -0.1842*** -0.2019***
Convertibles 0.2204*** 0.2868***
Cash to Sales -0.0021***
Leverage -0.00001***
Constant 0.9658*** 0.9567*** 0.9629*** 0.9629*** 0.9571*** 0.9778***
Observations 17043 17043 17043 17043 17043 15111
Number of group 103 103 103 103 103 91
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
were banned from the market in subsequent months. Market manipulation concerns
underlie those decisions. To test for the existence of an asymmetric e ect of short
selling activities during this sample period, the same period of 2007 is included as
a seasonality control.
Opposite to previously used weekly variables, a new set of variables is computed. I
aggregate the number of weeks with borrowing supply and demand shifts, to mea-
sure borrowing activity constraints. Borrowing costs are computed as the weighted
average, by borrowed amount, of weekly lending fees. Hence, regression coe cients
should be understood as the long run e ect of borrowing activities (between esti-
mator), as proposed by Mundlak (1978).
Regression results displayed in Table 1.9 illustrate the irrelevance of borrowing con-
straints, in the long run, for the formation of bubbles. Borrowing activity, on the
other hand, continues to be significant while those companies that experienced higher
overvaluation, in previous period, also su er stronger price reductions. This adds
to results on previous section, and to short term e ects of short selling constraints
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found in Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), pointing towards the existence of pric-
ing on fundamentals in the long run. Borrowing activities increase the speed at
which price adjustments take place, while long run price e ciency is granted, even
in presence of lending rigidities.
Table 1.9.: Lending Market e ects on long term bubbles creation
Within group estimates using company fixed e ects. Market to book value is computed as the value of market to
book value relative to this ratio the last trading day of December. Increase in MTB is the increase in Market to
book from March to December. Cost mean is the weighted by volume cost of lending expressed in
percentage.Sample period March 2007-Dec 2007 and 2008-Dec 2008.
Dependent Variable: Increase in MTB 2008 I II III IV V VI
Increase MTB 2007 -0.0833*** -0.0834*** -0.0873*** -0.0845*** -0.0877*** -0.0922***
Average fee 08 -0.0421*** -0.0416*** -0.0368** -0.0413*** -0.0367** -0.0305+
Weeks demand<0 -0.0012 -0.0024 0.0013
Weeks supply<0 -0.005 -0.0032 -0.0004
Weeks supply<0 & demand>0 -0.0028 -0.0034 -0.0017
Rights issuance -0.01
Convertibles -0.05
Percentile of lending volume 07 0.0030
Constant -0.2734*** -0.2428*** -0.1458+ -0.2546*** -0.11 -0.18
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.2
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1.7. Conclusions
In this chapter I have studied the interactions between borrowing and stock mar-
kets. As in previous papers, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), Jones and Lamont
(2002), D’Avolio (2002), a negative relation between contemporaneous returns and
short selling activity, characterized by borrowing costs, is observed. The higher bor-
rowing costs, the lower stocks returns. This relation has not been a ected by the
introduction of legal constraints to short selling activity.
The relation between borrowing and stock markets is further explored. Borrowing
costs and relative stock performance (abnormal returns) exhibit a negative relation-
ship. It occurs when performance is worse than the market, even when company
specifics are considered. In contrast with the assumption in Goldstein and Guembel
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(2008), short sellers behave as trend chasers. As proposed by Miller (1977), legal
constraints to short selling resulted on an increase on abnormal returns volatility.
This has to be understood in terms of the liquidity role of short selling activities.
Short selling activities help to increase stock liquidity and, thus, price e ciency.
Also, borrowing activities are relevant to predict future relative performance. As
for the contemporaneous relation and in line with findings in D’Avolio (2002), bor-
rowing costs and future abnormal returns are negatively related. This relation was
reinforced after the introduction of legal constraints to short selling. My results
highlight the crucial role of stock lenders to understand future stock performance,
while increases of negative information that push up borrowing demand will not
a ect future performance. Irrelevance of borrowing demand changes, strength the
perception of short sellers as trend chasers. My results on relevance of supply-side
constraints, to predict stock performance, are in line with findings in the arbitrage
theory (see Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Kyle and Xiong (2001a)). Modifications on
funding and capital needs, will a ect borrowing supply and then market liquidity
and prices.
Borrowing markets also a ect the conformation of bubbles, both in the short and the
long run. Higher borrowing activities, reflected on cost increases, lead to reductions
on stock overvaluation. However, unpredicted changes on the borrowing market
do not a ect stock values, in general. Only highly-capitalized firms are a ected by
borrowing constraints. This arises as the result of the di culty on impeding negative
information on stock prices for those companies. Highly-capitalized firms are also
highly traded, hence, the amount of stocks to be borrowed for shorting activities to
be relevant is also high.
Evidence in favour of market overreaction is, also, found. Stock prices and funda-
mental values converge in the long run. Stocks beating the market for a period of
time, underperform on subsequent periods. Borrowing activities both, increase the
speed at which this process happens and reduce market overvaluation.
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A. Variable Definitions
• Lend Interest: It is computed as the ratio between total number of equity
shares borrowed in a week and the total number of equity shares of the com-
pany
• Direction: It is computed using the Ellis, Michaely, O’Hara algorithm at a
daily level and aggregating. This algorithm assigns the value 1 if the ratio
2ú(askt≠closet)
askt≠bidt is smaller than one for more than 2 days in a week, otherwise the
value is 0
• Cost: The cost of borrowing is computed as follows. If the loan is cash collat-
eralized it is the di erence between one day Libor and the Rebate rate. If the
loan is not cash collateralized it is the fee of the loan. To get cost at a weekly
level a weighted by daily lending volume cost average is computed
• Dividendo: It is the number of weeks to dividend, takes the value 1 for the
week in which dividend payment is done. It ranges from 4 to -4.
• CNMV: It takes the value 1 from 22 September 2008 on. In any other case it
is 0.
• Leverage: It is the ratio between Short Term Debt and Cash Flow.
• Cash-to-Sales: It is the ratio of Cash Flow to Total Sales
• Right issuance: It is 1 for the period whilst rights are traded in the market
• Convertibles: It takes the value one for the week in which convertible bonds
are issued
• Market to Book: It is the ratio of Market to book value for a week and the
same value the 31st of December of that year
• Cost Mean 08: It is the weighted mean of borrowing cost from March to
December using as weights lending volumes.
• Increase MTB: It is the increase in Market to Book ratio from March to De-
cember. It is computed as the inverse of Market to book ratio minus one.
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Chapter 2.
Limit Arbitrage Implications on Bank
Capital
Abstract
Here, I present a two state dynamic equilibrium model for the determination of opti-
mal bank capital. Banks are assumed to have access to two types of default tradable
assets and to equity markets every period. It relies on limiting arbitrage theory to
derive the results. Endogenously determined capital constraints play a central role
on my model. Banks hold endogenous capital bu ers as a precaution against po-
tential dilution, bankruptcy and to guarantee access to arbitrage opportunities. On
recessions, endogenous capital constraints lead to the prevalence of equity markets
as the preferred recapitalization mechanism, with refinanciation processes motivated
by the chance of resurrection. On expansions, deleverage techniques prevail. Lim-
ited capital leads to the collapse of primary and secondary markets of private credit
by inducing arbitrage between equity and loan markets. This points towards the
convenience of an increased monitoring of market prices to ensure correct pricing
of risks. The modeling of asset markets allow me to analyze, from a social welfare
perspective, the e ects of regulatory actions on markets: Bond and Loan purchases.
While buying bonds will lead to welfare increases under any capital choice, loan
purchases are only welfare increasing when equity and loan markets are aligned.
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Resumen
Aquí, presento un modelo dinámico de equilibrio para la determinación del capital
bancario óptimo. Se asume que los bancos tienen acceso a dos tipos de activos
transables sujetos a riego de impago y a los mercados de acciones en cada periodo.
Los resultados se basan en la teoría de los limites de arbitraje. Las restricciones de
capital determinadas endógenamente juegan un papel central en mi modelo. Los
bancos mantienen colchones de capital para protegerse contra el riego de dilución,
la bancarrota y para garantizar su acceso a las oportunidades de arbitraje. En las
recesiones, las restricciones endogenas de capital conllevan a la prevalencia de los
mercados de capital como mecanismo preferido de recapitalización, los procesos de
refinanciacion motivados por la oportunidad de resurrección. En las expansiones, las
técnicas de desapalancamiento prevalecen. Los limites de capital llevan al colapso
de los mercados primarios y secundarios privados de crédito, induciendo arbitraje
entre los mercados de acciones y préstamo. Esto sugiere la conveniencia de una
monitorización incrementada de los precios de mercado para asegurar la correcta
valoración de los riesgos. La modelización de los mercados de activos me permiten
analizar, desde un punto de vista de bienestar social, los efectos de las acciones reg-
ulatorias en los mercados: compras de bonos y préstamos. Mientras comprar bonos
conlleva incrementos de bienestar bajo cualquier elección de capital, las compras de
préstamos solo incrementan el bienestar cuando los mercados de acciones y préstamo
estan alineados
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2.1. Introduction
Following the burst of the sub-prime crisis in 2008, a massive reduction of out-
standing credit contracts has been observed. Also growth rates, bankruptcies, un-
employment and poverty, have deteriorated1. In the aftermath of Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, regulators deemed necessary to re-capitalize banks. Authorities of some
countries2 have taken strong market actions (Quantitative Expansions) to ensure the
quick recovery of credit activities and profits, while some others3 have followed a
more normative approach instead.
In Europe, ECB4 implemented, recently, non-conventional instruments of monetary
policy, to channel credit back to economy, via:
1. The purchase of ABS5 intents to reduce capital needs, by transferring assets
from commercial banks to ECB.
2. Negative interest rates to restore interbank market, severely damaged by the
uncertainty of bank capital quality.
3. Long-term refinancing operations linked to liquidity creation, such as the TL-
TRO6, designed to help the recovery in primary credit markets.
I analyze monetary instruments, as ECBs, and I also seek to formalize the relation
among bank capital, credit and equity markets. Doing so, I follow Repullo and
Suarez (2013), set up of the world, with a main di erence I use limit arbitrage the-
ory, see Kondor (2009), to generate frictions endogenously. Therefore now, capital
bu ers are produced organically in my model via the optimizing behavior of bank
managers, requiring to equalize cost of capital and trading profits. This is in con-
trast with previous studies7, where capital bu ers arise from limited competition or
1In Europe for the period 2008-2014, outstanding loans to private sector reduced 0.55% per year
compared to an 8.5% of growth for the period 2003-2008, growth rates have dropped from 1.5%
to 0.15% and unemployment increased from 9.8% to 11.8%. according to data from ECB and
Euro-stat
2Amongst others U.S., Japan, UK or Canada
3Essentially those belonging to the European Monetary Union
4It was not before 2014, when EU set ECB as a common supervisor in the euro-zone.
5Asset Backed Securities
6Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations
7While some papers like Suarez (1994) or Repullo and Suarez (2013) illustrate the determination
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from asset illiquidity. Various studies on the limits of arbitrage8 document that a
general equilibrium model incorporates frictions via the existence of risky arbitrage
opportunities.
It is further assumed, perfect mobility of borrowers among entities and loan refinanc-
ing at the end of first year. Perfect mobility in borrowers signals perfect competition
in primary loan markets. Borrowers are not tied up to entities through relational
lending and interest rates are uniform. Loan refinancing would give the possibility
to reset rates and extend maturity from the initial 2 period to three. This is impor-
tant because it adapts better to the loan market reality where loans are not payed
up but are rather refinanced. This extends Repullo and Suarez (2013).
External shareholders would price banks according to book value, and they would
be risk averse and with no capital constraints. They are risk averse in the sense
that external shareholders will be reluctant to buy equity of any institution holding
capital below regulatory level. Such investors would be an opportunity cost for
existing shareholders. When economy deteriorates (higher VaRs and lower prices)
those investors become more important, leading to capital injections and symmetric
bank capital equilibrium. This behavior is in line with findings in Estrella (2004)
and Peura and Keppo (2006).9
I endogenously generate capital scarcity which justifies the existence of an ordered
recapitalization scheme, in contrast with the indi erence condition, see Admati et
al. (2012). My model suggests that when the ratio of arbitrage capital relative to
recapitalization capital falls below some threshold, the indi erence point, there will
be misalignment in equity and loan portfolio returns. As a result, secondary loan
market would collapse, and recapitalization is only possible through equity markets
of optimal capital bu ers in absence of capital raising processes, or consider the existence of
arbitrage opportunities based on ad hoc assumptions regarding asset liquidity, an analysis of
the welfare implications of market actions is unfeasible without considering asset liquidity as
an outcome of the optimization process of bank managers
8Zigrand (2004), Kyle and Xiong (2001b), Basak and Croitoru (2000), Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Xiong (2001), and Kondor (2009) to name just a few
9I derive the same results without having to assume time and liquidity rigidities. The implications
of imperfect asset liquidity for bank capital determination were initially analyzed in Pennacchi
(1988) while the relation between imperfect equity liquidity and capital regulation has been
widely analyzed under both dynamic (Winter (1994) and Froot and Stein (1998)) and static
(Winter (1991), Blum and Hellwig (1995), Heid (2005), and Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002)
) frameworks.
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thus pushing up bank value. When the ratio is higher than the threshold level,
the new equity issues will collapse. Similar results are found in Acharya, Shin, and
Yorulmazer (2013). Recapitalization through equity, reduces both capital bu ers
and liquidation threshold, will have a negative welfare e ect for the state guarantees
on bank deposits.
Capital unregulated assets are also present in the setup via bonds, subject to the
same default risk, as loans, and paying no interest rate. The bond market e ect on
the capital ratios is determined by arbitrage conditions. If arbitrage opportunities,
between loan and equity, are present, the higher the weight of bonds on the total
portfolio the lower capital ratios. Due to regulatory arbitrage, managers would
substitute new loans, by bonds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I set-up the model. In
section 3, I solve for the optimal trading decision of a single bank and characterize the
global equilibrium determining optimal bank capital and interest rates. In section
4, I present comparative statistics. Section 5, presents a model calibration and
numerical results on capital bu ers, failure probabilities, existence of rationing, loan
rates, secondary market prices and trading. In section 6, I attempt a social welfare
analysis on ECBs policies. In section 7 I conclude.
2.2. The Set-up
Here is a summary of the model framework:10
• There are two types of credit assets in the economy, bonds and loans. Bonds,
of one year maturity, are conditioned by default probability but they are not
subject to capital regulation. Loans are two year tradable assets at inception,
that could, later on, be refinanced, or traded. Loans are subject to capital
regulation.
10This framework should be interpreted as a simplification of the environment faced by banks that
develop their activities under the supervision of a common authority (such as the ECB), where
private entities borrowing money do not di er by their managerial quality but are exposed to
economic shocks a ecting their payment capacity.
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• I assume a free entry economy with two states. The primary credit market is
perfectly competitive,11 and under a regulatory environment fixed by a supra-
national authority. Regulation takes the form of a minimum capital to asset
ratio threshold common to both equity and loans.12
• Any bank operating in the economy is subject to an idiosyncratic default risk
that depends only on the state of the economy.13 The default rate of the
portfolio is common to bonds and loans, within an entity, but varies across
entities.14
• Banks have the possibility to raise equity from external investors.
For the welfare analysis I need an additional assumption:
Assumption 1. There can be a value transfer from previous capital constrained
shareholders to a new generation of rich shareholders.15
11The surge of the number of participants in the credit market, due to the appearance of hedge
funds, crowd funding and direct lending, and the increased availability of credit quality in-
formation during recent years, have raised borrowers capacity to migrate from one entity to
another justifying perfect competition in primary markets.
12An homogeneous regulatory treatment of loans and equity, could seem inaccurate given the
existence of penalties on the tenency of equity instruments among regulated institutions. A
shortcut to a full modeling of the e ects of such penalty, which would introduce discontinuity
in asset demand, is taken incorporating it through non-financial expenditures of equity. This
shortcut is sustained in present regulation regarding equity holdings which does not depend on
default probability. Under this, Banks holding equity instruments of other regulated institutions
should either deduce from the Common Equity Tier 1 the 90% of those or assume a 250% asset
Risk Weighting (RW) on their positions.
13Di erences on the diversification strategy, from one financial entity to another, will lead to
di erences in default rates across entities
14Economic shocks exhibit positive correlation with the state of the economy, while this positive
correlation leads to positive correlation of financial assets among themselves.
15Under this assumption, arbitrageurs will see no interest in transferring shares, leaving this task
to bank shareholders who already have, two year maturity, loan portfolios. Bank managers, will
ask new shareholders for new capital until they reach the optimal capitalization level. Investors
outside the financial sector will be providing the new capital needed, because they are deciding
based on book value rather market value of the bank. This raises welfare concerns. Money
used to recapitalize banks could, alternatively, be used to create new entities.
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2.2.1. The assets
2.2.1.1. Bonds
Bonds bought in auction, in the sense of Menezes and Monteiro (1995), promise
to pay the notional at maturity. The bond price, B = B (s), will only depend
on current state of the economy, s, and it is subject to default risk, with recovery
value 1 ≠ ⁄. Bond supply is exogenous, but I adopt the optimality condition seen
in Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), to describe how the governments manage
fire-sale risk, by selling bonds at the expense of short term private debt.
2.2.1.2. Loans
Loans are financial instruments designed to provide funding, per unit of investment
opportunity, a penniless investor demands. These are risky investment projects that
either pays µ , or 0. 16 The level of state contingent fixed rate, rs, stipulated in
the two year loan agreement, is competitively determined. Loans are fully repaid at
maturity.17 I allow for re-financing to occur at intermediate date. The bank receives
1≠ ⁄,18 when the loan defaults and the entrepreneur receives nothing.
Further, banks could use secondary loan market to o oad remaining one year loans
to other, regulated, financial entities. The market clearing price, P Õ, for such a
transaction will be state, s, contingent and homogeneous,19 P Õ = P (sÕ|s) = 1≠ ‡Õ.
2.2.1.3. Equity
Any existing bank is assumed to have one unit of shares issued to existing share-
holders. Those shares, are equity instruments representing a contingent claim on
16µ, includes social gains.
17The absence of amortization schedule is typical in corporate bonds and bullet loans, and in any
case, does not a ect the findings of the paper.
18Commonality on loss given default of loans and bonds, ⁄, does not modify the conclusions of
the paper
19Price homogeneity, should be understood as a simplification of the environment faced by credit
traders that, knowing the capital costs associated to the tenency of loans, observe a price in
the market and decide if they are interested in buying/selling those.
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bank capital. New equity could be issued by existing banks, at rate ,  nbi , and share
price, P Õi , being P Õi = Pi (sÕ|s). Each equity buyer invest  nni of their loan portfolio
in a well diversified, and representative equity portfolio tracking a banking index of
weighted average, new share, prices, P Õx.
2.2.2. The economy
My economy behaves as a two state, s = {l, h}, Markov chain. Agents are fully
informed about the state of the economy when taking their decisions. The shifting
probabilities from s to h are denoted by qs,h . Default probabilities are ranked,
in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, while the average failure rate, ps,
common20 for the two assets, is contingent on the state of the economy, s, so that:
ph =
ˆ
xdFh(x) Ø
ˆ
xdFl(x) = pl
where Fs (x) is the cumulative distribution function of the failure rate , x, under
state s, and the states of the economy, {h, l}, could be interpreted as recession (high
probability of default) and expansion (low probability of default) periods.
2.2.3. The Banks
Banks are competitive entities channeling funds from depositors/investors to the
economy. At any date, banks are funded through deposits and equity capital, and
this funding is used either to give loans to entrepreneurs (liquidity creation) or to
purchase assets in secondary markets (trading activities).
Deposit supply is assumed to be completely elastic with zero deposit rate allowing
the banks to serve the demand for loans. They will charge a rate, rs, for loans on
20If bonds are assumed to be instruments representing government debt, commonality is a sim-
plification of the existing relation between public income and loan default. Reputational costs
due to non-recapitalization, as in Segura (2013), justify the commonality of default rate and
recovery rates when bonds are o -balance credit operations hold in SPVs without recourse.
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top of the risk free rate. Bank shareholders require a, time invariant, excess return,
” Ø 0 , per unit of capital invested.
Banks are managed in the interest of existing equity holders (summarized by capital
of the bank), protected by a limited liability assumption and subject to a state
contingent capital requirement21, “s, per unit of asset.
Banks hold a portfolio of legacy assets (loan and equity portfolio) from previous
period lending activities, Le = Le (s), with endogenous capital level, K Õ = K (sÕ|s).
Banks are also assumed to face non financial expenditures22, c, per unit of credit asset
(bond or loan) held in the portfolio in previous date. The equity in the portfolio also
faces non-financial cost, ce. In this case, non financial costs include the regulatory
di erentiation between equity and credit assets.
Those banks with capital ratio, kÕ = k (sÕ|s) = KÕLe > “sÕ have the possibility to
reduce/increase their portfolios, to increase capital or do nothing. If capital ratio is
below the regulatory level, kÕ < “sÕ , managers will have to present a recapitalization
plan, involving loan sales, capital injections or a mix. If the bank fails to recapitalize,
authorities will take control under a process driven by the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Any bank with insu cient capital, is nationalized. Shareholders
receive nothing, and assets are held until maturity.
I are ready to establish the evolution of capital, K Õ, and loans, Le:
Definition 1.  
The level of endogenous capital, K Õ, and residual portfolio of loans, Le, are:
Le = (1≠ x)L · 1{ =0}
K Õ = [rs + ks ≠ ci + ir¯sÕ +  ‡ ≠ x (rs + ⁄i)]L
with ci = c ≠ –i (1≠ c≠B) being the e ective managerial costs, ⁄i = (1 + –i)⁄ the
loss given default of the joint credit portfolio, –i the bond share in the loan portfolio.
21To guarantee comparability, in this paper I assume that the capital requirement is set according
to Basel II formula on corporate loans under the standard IRB approach whose formula is
presented in the appendix.
22This expenditure relates to managerial costs from holding previous period assets
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r¯sÕ = P
Õ
x≠(1+ce)Px
Px
is the net return and  i =  n
n
i
L Px is the equity portfolio share.   =
‰
1+‰
is the portion of loans acquired in previous period, ks = K+ n
bP Õi≠›‡Le
L is the previous
period capital-to-loan ratio, ‡ is the capital gain/loss due to loan trading, L = (1≠ ›)Le ·
1{›>0} + 11≠ Le · 1{ >0} +max
1
k
kús
, 1
2
Le1{ =›=0} is the loan portfolio in previous period,
› the share of the loan portfolio sold, and x the default rate.
In the following section I present the optimal decision of bank managers on trading
quantities
Ó
›, nb, nn, 
Ô
, contingent on respective asset prices, {P, Pi, B, Px, P Õx},
capital ratio and interest rate, {ks, rs}. Then, the value function arising from the
optimization process is derived. Further, I determine the market clearing prices for
both equity and loan markets, {P, Px}. I conclude with a discussion on conditional,
on the state, optimal pair {kús , rús}.
2.3. Equillibrium
2.3.1. Trading Decision and optimal value function
In this section I present the major results of the optimization problem solved by
bank managers in form of propositions and corollaries. See appendix for formal
proofs.
Given the zero profit condition,23 leading to the determination of bond prices, and
the homogeneity24 of the problem faced by bank managers, one period ahead max-
imum bank capital, (that obtained when x = xs = 0), could be rewritten as:
K = rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c+ r¯s (2.1)
where I make , c = ci, ⁄ = ⁄i and   =  i.
23The expression for zero profit condition is Vs (ks, Puú|rús) = ks, with Vs(.), is the optimal value
function presented later, in the paper. See appendix D for full analysis.
24Homogeneity is implied by both assumption 1 and definition 1. They further guarantee that
optimal decisions are not determined by legacy assets.
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Now, let me denote by — the discount factor, — = 11+” , and define the upper bound
for loan prices, P = P (sÕ, s) = 1≠ ‡¯, beyond which losses occur as:
P = arg
P
ﬁs (P )≠ “s = 0 (2.2)
where, ﬁs (P ) = — (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ rsÕ+“s≠c+1≠PrsÕ+⁄
0 Fs (x) dx.
Let me further define the state contingent expected profits, ‡a = ‡a (s|sÕ), as:
‡a = ﬁs ≠ “s (2.3)
with ﬁs (1) = — (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ rsÕ+“s≠crsÕ+⁄
0 Fs (x) dx, the discounted expected value of a nor-
malized loan portfolio, acquired at par, under the minimum regulatory capital.
Finally, let me define the fair price of loans, in absence of capital regulation and
limited liability, Pl = Pl (s|sÕ), as:
Pl = 1≠ ‡l (2.4)
where ‡l = ps (rsÕ + ⁄) + c≠ rs, is the credit spread.
Then, in the following proposition, I illustrate the relation25 between the three
variables.
Proposition 1. There exists an almost exact relation between funding profits, ‡a,
maximum price , P , and fair price, Pl, such that:
25While this relation is not exact, simulation results shown in FigureA.1 in the appendix illustrate
the di erence between the value of those magnitudes using the numerical evaluation of the
integral and approximated formulas, for di erent values of the average default rate, ps, and
previous period interest rate, rsÕ . Also, it could be proved that the di erence between both
approximated and real values reduces when average default probabilities increase while being
increasing on interest rates. However, even for polar cases of small default probabilities and
high interest rate simulation results illustrate how this distance is kept at levels below 1bp.
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P ¥ Pl ≠ ”“s (2.5)
‡a ¥ ≠—‡¯ (2.6)
The above equations show the mechanics of the economy. If regulatory capital
increases, it will reduce the range of feasible prices and portfolio profits, due to the
rise of the funding cost in the economy. Rise of regulatory capital could even lead
to market collapse, should the loan price be very low. The maximum value attained
is a ected by the state of the economy, that could deteriorate, pushing ps up. That,
would have negative e ect on fair values and portfolio profits while increasing capital
requirements and asset volatility.
Proposition 2. For each bank, the relation between loan price and its maximum is:
‡ =
Y_]_[‡i ≠ ‡i
“s
k , ‡ > 0
‡i + ”‡i “sk , ‡ Æ 0
(2.7)
The expression26 is exact when the maximum loan price is below par. If above
par, then I have approximated solution.27 2.7, shows that regulatory shocks are
asymmetric on prices. If the economy is in recession, the impact on prices is bigger
due to capital scarcity.
For a certain capital threshold, k = k¯, banks will have the market valuation for
loans, resulting in ‡i = ‡. For k > k¯, it is ‡i < ‡, arbitrage opportunities are
present and expected bank value28 is given by proposition 3:
26Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013) produced similar results using a di erent model. They
don’t allow hedging adverse shocks like a default event via deleveraging.
27See FigureA.2 in the appendix of this document.
28Assets are acquired until the regulatory restriction is binding,   = k≠“sk due to the marginal
reduction in funding costs. They compensate the rise of portfolio risk by reducing capital
ratios. The funding costs present a linear relationship (linear payo ) in portfolio size while the
portfolio risk is concave.
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Proposition 3. A bank holding capital k > k¯, will buy the maximum feasible amount
of loans,   = k≠“sk . The expected bank value, V 1 = V 1 (s|sÕ), is given by the following
expression:
V 1 ¥ K
A
1 + —‡ ≠ ‡¯
“s
B
≠ —‡Le (2.8)
The expected value of the bank will be determined by the sum of its capital and
trading income less mark-to-market loan valuations.
Given that a trading bank will always be subject to regulation capital, I can work
out equity portfolio and loan weights:
  = (1≠  ) k
“s
≠ 1 (2.9)
where  , corresponds to equity portfolio value, weighted by the book value of loans.
The RHS gives the residual amount of available capital, when new loans represents
a portion, œ, of total portfolio.
Maximizing the expected value of the bank that arises from taking expectations, in
Definition 1, while setting L = 11≠ Le, and   according to 2.9, allows me to identify
the unique relation, between equity and loan prices, that guarantees indi erence
between those two markets.
Proposition 4. A bank with a capital ratio above regulatory one, k > “s , will be
indi erent between buying equity or loans, if the following condition is true:
Es (r¯sÕ) = ‡ ≠ ‡l (2.10)
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Expected value when holding the maximum equity portfolio, with   = k“s ≠ 1 is:
V 1 ¥ K
A
1 + —Es (r¯sÕ)≠ ”“s
“s
B
≠ — (Es (r¯sÕ) + ‡l)Le (2.11)
The one period expected net return on equity positions should be equal to expected
return on loan trading. When returns in the two markets are not equal, I get
arbitrage possibilities and bank managers use their excess capital on cheaper assets
thus, either   = 0 with   = k“s ≠1 (banks only buy equity) or   = 0 with   = k≠“sk
(banks only buy loans).
The value function, V 1, set in 2.11 will be higher to that of 2.8 when arbitrage
between equity and loan markets is present. Hence, the capital ratio, k¯, at which
banks become arbitrageurs, k > k¯, will be lower. This rises welfare concerns due to
potential reductions of new credit to the economy.
When capital ratios are below arbitrage threshold, k < k¯, there are two scenarios
based on the direction of the inequality P 7 1. When market price of loans exceeds
par, P > 1, and equity is fairly priced, Pi = K≠‡Le, managers would sell all assets,
meaning › = 1, and no new equity placement will occur (see corollary 1). Banks
with capital k > ‡ will survive.
In the case P < 1, with equity priced at Pi = K ≠ ‡Le, managers are indi erent
in which asset to sell (until they reach regulatory level), when banks capital makes
up for the losses on the loan portfolio but it is below regulatory capital, ‡ < k <
“s. Banks with capital above regulation level, k > “s, will not participate in the
secondary markets.29
Individual equilibrium equity prices, Pi, help identify current equity index price,30
Px. Expectations on equity returns are taken under two di erent probability mea-
sures. The statistical measure, P, that describes the fundamental value of the bank,31
29Here symmetric information on default rates su ce to produce trading in secondary markets in
contrast with Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) who use asymmetric infromation to justify
trading when loans are priced under par.
30See appendix.
31See appendix for a proof
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as Es (rsÕ) = ‡“s≠‡ , and the risk neutral measure, Q, where equity risk premium
equals that implied in loan prices and 2.10 holds.
Now I are ready to state the optimal value function in corollary 1.32
Corollary 1. When P > 1, banks with su cient capital ratios, k > k¯1, become
arbitrageurs and buy loans,   = k≠“sk , from those with a capital ratio k¯1 > k > ‡,
that sell all previous period loans, › = 1. One period to maturity assets are held
by arbitrageurs with a capital to loan ratio k = “s while banks hold two period to
maturity loan portfolios with an optimal capital ratio,k = kús Ø “s. The value of any
bank, V¯ = V ú (s|sÕ), is:
V¯ =
Y___]___[
0 k < ‡
[k ≠ ‡]Le k¯1 > k > ‡Ë
k
1
1≠ (1≠ —) ‡
k¯1
2
≠ —‡
È
Le k > k¯1
(2.12)
If P < 1, ‡≠‡l Ø Es (r¯sÕ) and k > k¯2 , banks become arbitrageurs and buy œ percent
of loans,   = k≠“sk (with   = 0). In case “s > k > ‡ banks sell › percent of loans,
› = “s≠k“s≠‡ (with  n
b = 0):
V¯ =
Y______]______[
0 k < ‡
[k≠‡]
“s≠‡ “sL
e “s > k > ‡
kLe k¯2 > k > “sË
k
1
1 + — ‡
k¯2
2
≠ —‡
È
Le k > k¯2
(2.13)
If P < 1, Es (r¯sÕ) > ‡≠‡l and k > k¯3, banks become arbitrageurs and buy   percent
of equity,   = k≠“s“s (with   = 0). In case “s > k > ‡ banks sell  n
b percent of new
32A graphical illustration comparing Repullo and Suarez (2013) value function to ours can be
found in FigureA.3.
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equity,  nb = “s≠kk≠‡ (with › = 0) and :
V¯ =
Y______]______[
0 k < ‡
[k≠‡]
“s≠‡ “sL
e “s > k > ‡
kLe k¯3 > k > “sË
k + —
11
k ≠ k¯3
21
‡¯
k¯3≠“s
22È
Le k > k¯3
(2.14)
where k¯i = ¯ki (sÕ, s) ’i‘ {1, 2, 3},k¯1 = ” ‡‡¯≠‡“s, k¯2 = “s+ ‡¯‡≠‡¯“s, k¯3 = “s+ ‡¯Es(r¯sÕ )≠”“s“s
and k¯2 Ø k¯3
2.3.2. Equilibrium in Secondary Markets
I now consider the existence of a capital unconstrained central planner. She op-
timally allocates capital on a continuum of independent and equally sized asset
portfolios, that sum up to one.33 Interestingly, the optimizing process over capital
heterogeneous agents, would result in capital homogeneity at equilibrium. These
considerations are used to formulate the joint market clearing conditions for equity
and loan markets in proposition 5. Definition 2, rewrites parts of corollary 1, in
terms of arbitrage, recapitalization and liquidation thresholds for the default rate.
Definition 2.  
i) Arbitrage indi erence, xk¯, is:
xk¯ = xk¯ (s|sÕ) = rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ k¯
i
rsÕ + ⁄≠ k¯i
k¯i, is described in Corollary 1.
ii) Compulsory recapitalization, x“s, is:
33Assuming rational expectations on prices and capital unconstrained planner would guarantee
homegeneity in capital allocation process. See FigureB.1.
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x“s = x“s (s|sÕ) = rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ “s
rsÕ + ⁄≠ “s
iii) Liquidation, x‡,is :
x‡ = x‡ (s|sÕ) = rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ ‡
rs + ⁄≠ ‡
Proposition 5, characterizes the clearing price, P , that sets aggregate demand and
aggregate supply equal (see 2.15 and 2.16). Asset demand is a decreasing function
with respect to both secondary market prices and regulatory capital, reaching a
minimum of zero when ‡ = ‡¯.
The relation between supply and regulatory capital is positive, while supply and loan
prices relation is ambiguous. When ‡¯ < 0, asset supply and prices are positively
related and price increases lead to supply increases. If ‡¯ > 0 the relation would be
either positive or negative, depending on the size of ‡, or of capital scarcity.
If ‡ is close to its maximum value, “sÕ , the increase in the recapitalization region,
x‡ ≠ x“, following a price increase, is bigger than the reduction in individual recap-
italization needs, ˆ
“s≠k
k≠‡
ˆ‡ d‡ < 0. Then supply and prices positively relates. As price
further increases, ‡ reduces approaching to ‡¯, and the relation is reverted.34
Proposition 5. If rsÕ Ø rfs = 11≠ps (”“s + c+ ps⁄), previous period interest rate, rsÕ,
exceeds current period actuarial (fair) interest rate, for one period loans, then the
unique price of loans, P , is such that:
ˆ xk¯
0
(K ≠ “sLe) dFsÕ (x) =
ˆ x‡
xk¯
“sL
edFsÕ (x) (2.15)
and no new equity is sold,  nbi = 0.
34A graphical illustration of supply and demand can be found in FigureA.4
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If rsÕ < rfs , the unique value of P leading to market clearing satisfies
ˆ xk¯
0
(K ≠ “sÕLe) dFsÕ (x) =
=
ˆ x‡
x“s
!
“sL
e ≠ V¯ " dFsÕ (x)≠ “s ˆ x‡
x“s
 nbi (1≠ “s + ‡)
[k ≠ ‡]
“s ≠ ‡ L
edFsÕ(x) (2.16)
If ‡ ≠ ‡l Ø Es (r¯sÕ) , no new equity is sold,  nbi = 0, and P is the market price of
loans. Otherwise recapitalization takes place through equity, with  nbi = “s≠kk≠‡ , and
P is the equity implied price of loans.
2.3.3. Optimal Capital, kús, and Interest rate, rús
Expressions characterizing the optimal bank value and market clearing conditions
(see Eq. 12-16) depend only on previous period capital, ksÕ , and interest rates, rsÕ .
Assumption 1 guarantees that when k > “s the maximization problem solved by
bank managers in the determination of the optimal capital ratio, kúsÕ , is identical and
independent of the arrival capital level for all entities, k. In the proof of proposition
5, the reason leading those banks not to increase capital above the arbitrage level,
k¯i, is presented.
I could determine the value of a bank that holds a two period to maturity portfolio
under state sÕ, VsÕ , by taking expectations on the expressions for V¯ set in corollary
1. If the bank decides to hold a capital ratio ksÕ , when the interest rate is rsÕ , its
expected present value would be35:
VsÕ = V (ksÕ , rsÕ) = —
ÿ
s={h,l}
qsÕ,sEsÕ
3
V¯ 1{V¯Ø0}
4
(2.17)
35See appendix for the expressions of VsÕ (ksÕ , rsÕ)
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while the value of rsÕ is such that:
VsÕ ≠ ksÕ = 0 (2.18)
Bank managers, for the determination of the optimal amount, kúsÕ , will solve the
following problem
The discounted expected value of a bank subject to capital regulation is given by
2.17, managers of existing banks choose the capital ratio, kúsÕ , to maximize the
expected net present value of the bank, VsÕ (ksÕ , rúsÕ) ≠ ksÕ , with the interest rate rúsÕ
given by 2.18, while prices are set via 2.15 and 2.16:36
max
ksÕ
VsÕ (ksÕ , rsÕ)≠ ksÕ
s.t : ksÕ Ø “sÕ
The solution, {rúsÕ , kúsÕ}, to this problem is unique, and its implications summarized
in corollary 2:
Corollary 2. The optimal solution for bank managers problem imply that:
i) rúsÕ, lies within the set defined by
1
rfl , r
f
h
2
. Independently of the initial state of the
economy, when the economy ends up in state l there is both trading of loans in the
secondary loan market and an endogenous upper barrier for the pledgable income a
bank could get from its lending activities.
ii) The only stationary equilibrium imply ⁄ + c > kúsÕ > “h ≠ (rúsÕ ≠ c), and could be
interior with kúsÕ > “sÕ or at the corner with kúsÕ = “sÕ.
iii) The equilibrium interest rate spread, rúsÕ is unique.
iv) If the equilibrium is interior there is a positive probability that existing borrowers
su er refinanciation constraints. There is also a positive probability that banks end
up with excess lending capacity.
36I assume that the state of the economy is sÕ, and normalized to one the two-periods-to-maturity
loan portfolio size, LsÕ = 1.
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v) Secondary loan market prices are su cient statistics of the state of the economy.
When the economy is in an expansion, sÕ = l, loan and equity prices are strictly
above book value, while when the economy is in a recession, sÕ = h, loan and equity
prices are strictly below its book value.
vi) When the solution to optimal capital is interior, there is a positive probability
that in state sÕ = h, banks ask for a capital injection from the new generation of
shareholders.
vii) When sÕ = h banks not becoming arbitrageurs will refinance the non traded
portion of surviving loans.
Three important implications are extracted from this corollary.
1. Capital inflows from outside the financial sector to the banking system will
exist when VaR increases, ‡a < 0, as in Estrella (2004), but only to banks
holding suboptimal capital levels, k < kúsÕ . This result being an outcome
of funding scarcity, rather than of ad hoc assumptions on equity liquidity
(quadratic costs to new equity sales).
2. First order stochastic dominance of default probabilities, in expansive states,
leads to, rfh > rúl > rfl . Interest rate, rúh, would be lower than rfh, managers
following a gamble for resurrection pattern. When in recession, rfh > rúh > rúl
and refinancing practices are optimal.
3. Asset prices characterize the state of the economy, Ps,l > 1 > Ps,h.37
2.3.4. The Bond Market
Bank managers decision on capital is unconstrained due to free access to new capital
and bond prices are independent of interest rates to avoid arbitrage. Hence only op-
timal capital, kús , is a ected by bond shares decision, –. When –, changes to a new
level –b, banks could react modifying either capital ratio or interest rates. If optimal
capital, kús , remains unchanged and interest rates change from rústo rb,ús , perfect com-
petition on primary loan market would imply Vs
1
kús , r
b,ú
s |⁄Õ, cÕ
2
= Vs (kús , rús |⁄, c) =
37In this I make explicit the dependence of loan prices, P , on current and previous state of the
economy
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kúsL. However, in this case and with rb,ús > rús , bank managers would have incentives
to set – = 0 and get profits from liquidity provisioning activities. Otherwise, when
rb,ús < r
ú
s they would set –æŒ, to profit from absence of capital regulation on bond
market activities. A similar argument would rule out any simultaneous variation on
both variables. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate, rús , is constant and independent
of bond shares.
Bank managers would first solve for the initial equilibrium pair, {kús , rús} when – = 0.
Secondly, they will find the optimal capital ratios solving problem 2 (see appendix),
holding bond prices at the zero profit level:
Vs
1
kb,ús , r
ú
s ,⁄
Õ, cÕ
2
= kb,ús L (2.19)
Hence, bond activity a ects secondary loan prices and liquidity provisioning through
changes in the optimal capital ratio. The risk perception summarized by rús , is
unchanged.
2.4. Comparative Statistics
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, present the variation on equilibrium levels, {kús , rús}, due to
changes in parameter values, m = {⁄, qs,h, “l, “h, ”, c}.
When kús > “s, comparative statistics for the equilibrium loan rate, rús , are presented
in Table 2.1. Those are obtained by di erentiating the zero profit condition, 2.19,
with respect to each element, mi, dr
ú
s
dmi
. The total derivative, dVdmi , is the sum of the
direct e ect, ˆVˆmi , and the price e ect,
ˆVs,i
ˆPs,i
ˆPs,i
ˆmi
. It has opposite sign to drúsdmi .
Table 2.1.: E ect of changes in model parameters on the equilibrium loan rate, rús
mi = ⁄ qs,h “i ” c
ˆVs,i
ˆPs,i
ˆPs,i
ˆmi
(≠) 0 (≠) (≠) (≠)
ˆV
ˆmi
(≠) (≠) (≠) (≠) (≠)
drús
dmi
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
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Table 2.1 shows the flexibility of my model in capturing the comparative e ects on
prices, unlike Repullo and Suarez (2013).38 A change in any parameter, mi, other
than qs,h, leads to a reduction in asset demand and increases aggregate supply39,
damaging bank profitability.
An increase in loss given default, ⁄, has a direct e ect on bank profitability. It will
increase financial impairments faced by banks due to borrowers default. Increase in
losses due to recapitalization will add up, to further reduce bank value. Changes in
financial regulation will go through the same channels of rising financial impairments
and reducing arbitrage profits.
Increasing impatience parameter, ”, or non financial expenditures, c, have a similar
direct e ect. Lending profitability, bank continuation value and arbitrage profits
fall. That reduces profits from banking activity, while equilibrium interest rates
rise.
Changing qs,h leads to a di erent bank value through altering the share of expected
bank value in the two states. As banks expect ordinary losses in recessions and
trading profits on expansions, an increase on qs,h will reduce bank valuation thme
pushing equilibrium interest rates up.
When kús > “s, comparative statistics for the optimal capital ratios, kús , are presented
in Table 2.2. Those are obtained by di erentiating the first order condition obtained
in the solution of problem 2, with respect to each element, mi, dk
ú
s
dmi
. The total
derivative, d2Vdksdmi is the sum of the interest rate e ect,
1
ˆ2V
ˆkˆr +
ˆ2V
ˆkˆP
ˆP
ˆr
2
ˆr
ˆmi
, the
price e ect, ˆ2VˆkˆP
ˆP
ˆmi
, and the direct e ect, ˆ2Vˆkˆmi .
Table 2.2.: E ect of changes in model parameters on the equilibrium capital ratio, kús
mi = ⁄ qs,h “i ” c
ˆ2V
ˆkˆmi
(+) (+) (+) (≠) (+)
ˆ2V
ˆkˆP
ˆP
ˆmi
(+) 0 (+) (+) (+)1
ˆ2V
ˆkˆr +
ˆ2V
ˆkˆP
ˆP
ˆr
2
ˆr
ˆmi
(≠) (≠) (≠) (≠) (≠)
dkús
dmi
(?) (?) (?) (?) (?)
38This model is nested to ours by fixing P = 1, and one period interest rates to an exogenome
level a
39This two e ects being the outcome of the reduction on maximum price, P¯ , and the increase on
arbitrage capital threshold, k¯i.
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The total e ect, dkúsdmi , is ambiguome but partial e ects are identified. Changing
any parameter, mi, but qs,h, have opposite interest rate and price e ects. That is
explained by means of sustitivity between interest rate, prices and capital ratio. The
impact of parameter changes follow from comparative statistics on equilibrium loan
rates.
Increasing loss given default, ⁄, regulatory capital, “i, or transition probabilities, qs,h,
have a positive direct e ect, ˆ2Vˆkˆmi > 0, on optimal capital, k
ú
s . This is explained
by means of the insurance role of capital. The reduction in banking and arbitrage
profits and the increase on financial impairments and probability of facing capital
shortages, increase insurance needs of bank managers, hence increasing optimal
capital.
Rise in non financial expenditures, c, lead to a positive direct e ect ˆ2Vˆkˆmi > 0 on
capital. Sustitivity between capital and interest rates, and between those and non
financial expenditures are behind this result. Higher c would be equivalent to lower
rús . As dk
ú
s
drús
< 0, and ˆ2Vˆkˆr < 0 the result follows.
Negative e ect of increases in ” follows the reduction in insurance capacity of capital.
While both arbitrage profits and continuation bank value fall, the former dominates.
Next I discuss the calibration of model parameters and perform numerical simulation
to compare my model with that presented in Repullo and Suarez (2013).
2.5. Parameter values and Numerical Example
My baseline parametrization of the model is presented in Table 2.3 and discussed
below:
Table 2.3.: Baseline scenario parameter values
a = ⁄ ql,h qh,h ” c ce ph pl –i
45% 20% 64% 4.85% 3.4% 32% 3.6% 1.1% 10%
Transition probabilities from state s to recession, qs,h, and average default rates, pi,
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are obtained from Repullo and Suarez (2013). A reference value for qhh of 0.64 for
generating recession of 11≠0.64 = 2.78 periods is used while for 5 periods expansion
ql,h equals 0.2. Average default rates, pi, are set to result in a 4% average regula-
tory capital ratio (as in Basel I). Loss given default, ⁄, equals 45%, following the
Assessment under Basel II Accord for the IRB Standard approach.
Concerned with the wide range of estimates of ” in the literature (see Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), Van den Heuvel (2008)), 3.16% < ” < 5.6% I use the average
di erence between the yearly returns of the Eurostoxx 600 Banks Index and the
yearly average value of the 5 years Itraxx Main for the period 2005-2015, obtaining
a value of 4.85%. It is based on the idea that average returns, of a well diversified
banking index, include the disadvantage of equity versme debt and the average credit
risk of the representative asset portfolio.
The role of the parameter c is to reduce profitability of banking activities to guar-
antee realistic interest rates. It is calibrated to real non financial unit operating
expenditures (taken from the European Consolidated Banking Data40). I compute
average cost to income ratio of 65%, and 2.6% is the average ratio of income to total
assets. The share of retained earnings is found to be around 50%. Non financial
operating expenditures to total assets is then obtained41 as 0.65X0.0260.5 = 3.38%.
Parameter ce accounts for both non-financial costs on equity holdings and regulatory
disadvantage of equity versme loans. It will a ect the market to book value ratio,
and is calibrated at a 32% level to render values in the 65% to 180% range. This
range is obtained using minimum and maximum values of the average market to
book value ratio of Eurostoxx 600 Banks Index over the periods 2002-2007, 2008-
2009, 2009-2011 and 2011-2014. 42
To parametrize –, I calculate an upper bound of 15% using the average ratio of
Total Debt Instruments over Total Assets over the period 2007-2013 from European
Consolidated Banking Database, setting a conservative reference value of 10%.
40See http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=71390
41I divide by the ratio of retained earnings to normalize the e ect of cost, in terms of its real
impact on capital
42These periods have been identified by Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Commitee as expansions
and recessions. See http://www.cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee
for further details
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2.5.1. Numerical Example
Numerical results under my baseline parametrization are presented in this section.
First I define refinancing-rationing, RR = RR (s|sÕ), then results concerning equi-
librium loan rates, capital ratios, bankruptcy costs and refinancing-rationing are
displayed in Table 2.4, along with a brief description of those. Finally, market re-
lated results are shown in Table 2.5.
Refinancing-rationing extends the concept of credit rationing introduced in Repullo
and Suarez (2013), by taking into account legacy loans from previome period credit
activities and trading incentives. RR amount is normalized, by a 12 factor, to take
into account the additional mass of newly incorporated entrepreneurs for each pe-
riod. It is calculated as the expected reduction in the stock of loans following non
refinanciation (net of liquidity provisioning activities), because of bank nationaliza-
tion or trading decisions.
RR =
Y____]____[
1
2
!
PLsÕ ≠NCsÕ,s
"
, P > 1
1
2
!
PLsÕ ≠NCsÕ,s + S ≠NA
"
, ‡ ≠ ‡l > Es (r¯sÕ)
1
2
!
PLsÕ ≠NCsÕ,s ≠NA
"
, Otherwise
(2.20)
with NA =
´ x‡
xk¯ L
edFsÕ(x), and S =
´ x‡
x“s
1
1≠ ks≠‡“s≠‡
2
LedFsÕ (x).
The first term, PLsÕ = 1 ≠ psÕ , represent next period mass of performing loans.
NCsÕ,s, the excess lending capacity or new credit to the economy43, S the aggregate
supply of loans for trading, and NA the mass of loans in hands of non nationalized
banks or arbitrageurs.
43Its expression could be found in the appendix
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2.5.1.1. Results on banking variables
Table 2.4.: Numerical results on banking variables
Q Measure P measure RS [2013]
rúh 1.7% 1.7% 3.3%
rúl 0.73% 0.69% 1.3%
kúh 6.09% 6.09% 6.70%
kúl 6.81% 5.19% 6.90%
kúh ≠ “h 60bps 60bps 120bps
kúl ≠ “l 365bps 203bps 380bps
Bankruptcy Probabilities
State: h after h 2.51% 2.51% 2.25%
State: l after h 0.87% 0.87% 0.16%
State: h after l 2.41% 0.82% 2.25%
State: l after l 0.09% 0.25º% 0.16%
Unconditional 1.04% 0.919% 0.9%
Bankruptcy Cost
State: h after h 2bps 2bps
State: l after h 1bp 1bp
State: h after l -6bps 0.6bps
State: l after l 0.2bps 0.4bps
Unconditional -0.1bps 0.8bps
Liquidation level
State: h after h 1.28% 1.28% 0%
State: l after h -1.15% -1.15% 0%
State: h after l 5.05% 1.84% 0%
State: l after l -0.1% -0.06% 0%
Unconditional 0.74% 0.35% 0%
Refinancing/credit Rationing
State: h after h 5.58% 7.58% 12.4%
State: l after h 25.77% 18.59% 5.3%
State: h after l -7.08% 0.36% 12.6%
State: l after l 24.57% 31.36% 0.9%
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The first panel of Table 2.4 presents equilibrium loan rates, optimal capital and
capital bu ers for my model, with and without imposing absence of arbitrage op-
portunities between equity and loan markets, like Repullo and Suarez (2013). In
panel 2, state contingent bankruptcy probability and its unconditional mean are
displayed.44 Panel 3 illustrates bankruptcy costs faced by the government on their
role as deposit insurer, panel 4 the optimal liquidation threshold of banks and, panel
5 results on rationing.
Loan rates are always greater when arbitrage between loan and equity markets
is absent (under Q measure). When arbitrage is present (P measure), banks re-
capitalization possibilities increase, following the increase in recapitalization power
of capital. This reduces costs of bankruptcy, and insurance needs, while increas-
ing arbitrage profits and the return on banking activities. Both e ects considered,
equilibrium loan rates and optimal capital ratios fall, while bankruptcy costs for
the government increase. The increase in bankruptcy costs follow the reduction in
banks liquidation threshold, ‡. My calibration suggest a fall in capital bu ers of
160 bps, when arbitrage between equity and loans market is endogenized (column
2). This value is very close to the preservation bu er under Basel III Accord.45
When arbitrage is absent, capital bu ers on expansions, are similar to those in
Repullo and Suarez (2013). Capital bu ers on recessions, or when arbitrage is en-
dogenized, along with interest rates, exhibit significant di erences. The discrepancy
in interest rates is justified by both di erences in the value assigned to parameter
”, and on the selection of optimal capital bu ers. Calibration of the ” parameter is
motivated by a di erent perception on the remuneration of capital. While I assume
a value for ” of 4.85%, corresponding to a fair remuneration of Tier 1 Capital, in
Repullo and Suarez (2013) that is set to 8%, to guarantee a fair remuneration of
both, Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. The reduction in capital bu ers, on recessions,
comes directly from the cyclical nature of arbitrage profits. Repullo and Suarez
(2013) justify arbitrage profits via relational lending, variations on regulatory cap-
ital inducing cyclicality on those. In contrast, in my model, those profits exhibit a
lower cyclical pattern. Capital exuberance on the transition to expansionary states,
44Results presented for RS model correspond to bankruptcy probabilities for first period banks.
45Preservation bu er rules out moral hazard problems and reduce deposit insurance related costs
for governments.
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leading a fall on those. The fall in capital bu ers, when arbitrage between equity
and loans is present, comes directly from the reduction in the bankruptcy region
which relaxes capital demand for insurance purposes.
Partial commitment on loans to entrepreneurs, assumed in Repullo and Suarez
(2013), lead results on credit rationing. Banks capacity to re-balance loan port-
folios when capital shortages are present and without incurring in losses, reduce
liquidation thresholds, bumping up bank liquidity provisioning activities. Results
on refinancing rationing, in my model, reflect the existence of legacy portfolios and
arbitrage patterns across banks. Those lead to dependence between actual and pre-
viome period credit activity, implying the existence of lags between economy state
and credit growth, better observed in transition periods. The reduction in arbitrage
threshold, k¯i, when arbitrage opportunities between equity and loan markets are
present, reduce volatility of credit activities on recessions along with banks liquidity
provisioning46, while volatility rises on expansions.
2.5.1.2. Results on market variables
The first column of Table 2.5 present results for market variables when absence of
arbitrage is imposed, second column accounting for the endogeneization of those.
Panel 1 presents loan clean prices, making those comparable with bond prices dis-
played on panel 2. Comparability among those allow me to interpret the di erence
between loan and bond prices as a direct measure of regulatory costs. When arbi-
trage opportunities between equity and credit are dependent on capital constraints,
a proper functioning of secondary loan market is not guaranteed, and loan prices
are implied from equity valuation. Loan prices are directly derived when arbitrage
opportunities are absent. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrate the e ects of changes
on parameter – on bond prices and optimal capital. In panel 3, the ratio of market
to book value of capital for an optimally capitalized bank is presented.
Market to book value ratios are higher when arbitrage opportunities between equity
and loan markets are endogenized, higher di erences observed in the transition from
46Under my baseline scenario, liquidity provisioning activities in the transition from expansion to
recession collapse
78
expansions to recessions. This relates with results on refinancing rationing and
capital scarcity. Increase in trading profits reduce the arbitrage threshold, k¯3, and
capital scarcity, while bumping implied asset prices up. When equity and loan prices
are aligned, strong discount on loan prices in the transition from an expansion to
a recession provide theoretical support to empirical evidence of high discounts on
book valuation, following IPOs, on recent crises.
Comparing homogeneous loan and bond prices allow me to quantify the e ect of
regulatory costs. When arbitrage opportunities are absent and on recessions, cap-
ital constraints, lead to significant di erences between bond and loan prices. The
endogeneization of arbitrage bumps loan prices up when capital is more scarce (in
the transition from expansion to recession).
Table 2.5.: Market Prices and Market to Book value of capital
Q Measure P measure
Loan Prices, P
State: h after h 93.91% 93.89%
State: l after h 96.21% 96.21%
State: h after l 91.18% 94.30%
State: l after l 96.13% 96.12%
Bond Prices, BÕ
State: h 95.29% 95.30%
State: l 96.13% 96.16%
Market to book value of capital, k
ú
sÕ≠‡
kú
sÕ
State: h after h 78.98% 78.98%
State: l after h 116.9% 122.2%
State: h after l 17.07% 69.78%
State: l after l 101.46% 101.15%
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Figure 2.1.: Relation between bond portfolio size and optimal capital
The relation between bond shares and prices is inverse due to price-quantity substi-
tution e ects, irrespectively of the model considered. However, this is not the case
for the relation between capital ratios and bond prices. When arbitrage between
equity and loans is exogenous, Figure 2.1 illustrate the positive relation between
bond shares and capital due to insurance needs. This relation inverts when arbi-
trage is endogenized, following the increase of recapitalization power of capital and
arbitrage profits. The relation between bond prices and optimal capital illustrated
on Figure 2.2 is explained by similar means.
Figure 2.2.: Optimal capital and Bond Prices
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2.6. Welfare Analysis
Equilibrium conditions characterized in 2.18 and 2.19, imply no welfare e ects on
banks shareholders, (see Repullo and Suarez (2013)). I can therefore focme on
welfare implications47, following modifications of loan flows to the economy 48 and
costs faced by governments on their role of deposit insurers. State contingent social
welfare, Ws,sÕ = W (sÕ|s), is:
Ws,sÕ = (NCs,sÕ ≠NRs,sÕ ≠Rs,sÕ) (µ≠ rúsÕ)≠ ÊBRs,sÕ (2.21)
The first term, NCs,sÕ , represents next period expected mass of new loans to the
economy, NRs,sÕ the (expected) mass of non refinanced loans. Rs,sÕ is the reduction
on new loans due to capital injections from new shareholders, then, BRs,sÕ the cost
faced by governments due to their role as deposit insurers49. Parameter Ê Ø 1,
represents, in a reduced form, governments aversion (or financial constraint) to
assume losses coming from financial sector. For the two models analyzed in previome
section, a welfare analysis on the variation of that parameter over the 1 to 100 range
is presented. Last, µ was defined, on previome sections, as the total return including
social benefits of entrepreneurial activities. Following Repullo and Suarez (2013) I
set a reference value for that parameter of 8%, while my results hold for di erent
parametrization.
Total social welfare,W , is then obtained by aggregation, for all states of the economy,
of each state contingent social welfare measure, Ws,sÕ , weighted by its corresponding
ergodic probability:
W = zl (qlhWlh + (1≠ qlh)Wll) + (1≠ zl) ((1≠ qhh)Whl + qhhWhh) (2.22)
47The numerical exercise is performed under my baseline parametrization.
48Loan flows are modified either by non refinancing or recapitalization through capital injections.
49The formal expression of those variables can be found in appendix
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with zl the unconditional probability of an expansion.50
Figure 2.3 illustrate welfare e ects of changes on risk aversion parameter, Ê. It
follows, from the specification of Ws,sÕ , that increases on risk aversion will lead to
reductions on welfare, with independence of arbitrage opportunities between equity
and loan markets. However, my results suggest that the size of welfare variations
will be contingent on banks capacity to obtain profits from equity trading.
Figure 2.3.: Short selling and Social Costs of Bankruptcy
When risk aversion parameter is low, social welfare improves due to the endogeneiza-
tion of arbitrage opportunities on equity, as in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer
(2013). Improvements come from the increase in the provision of new credit and
the fall on both recapitalization needs and fewer refinanced loans. A fall in opti-
mal capital shifts up liquidity provisioning and reduce recapitalization needs. Drops
50Under my baseline parametrization zl = 64.29%.
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in arbitrage, k¯3, and liquidation threshold, ‡, lower the mass of refinanced loans
and pushes up bankruptcy costs. Increasing risk aversion of governments, Ê, erase
welfare gains from liquidity provisioning, elevating the weight of bankruptcy costs.
These results are in line with short selling literature (see Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu
(2007)) and against the regulatory perception blaming short sellers as speculators
(see Goldstein and Guembel (2008)).
Price ine ciencies due to short selling frictions post an additional theoretical jus-
tification to benefits of short selling activities on financial stocks. Underpricing
of stocks reduce moral hazard problems of bank managers, increasing e ciency of
capital ratio regulation.
Figure 2.4 illustrate welfare e ects, when Ê = 1, arising from modifications on equi-
librium bond portfolio shares, –, due to market actions from monetary authorities
(ECB).
Figure 2.4.: E ect of changes in the composition of the portfolio on Welfare
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Bond purchases reduce bond shares on bank portfolios and lead to welfare increases.
This is true independently of the endogeneity of arbitrage between markets. On ex-
pansions, when arbitrage is endogenous, falling bond shares elevate bond prices and
optimal capital. This relation is inverted in recessions and when arbitrage is absent.
Loan trade activity and loan prices along with refinancing possibilities augment as
capital needs drop now, in turn pushing bankruptcy costs higher. Welfare e ects
are positive on aggregate. Increasing optimal capital on expansions, when arbitrage
is endogenized, lead to direct reductions on liquidity provisioning activities and it
is fully compensated by the reduction on bankruptcy costs. Higher loan prices and
fewer arbitrageurs (k¯1 rises) result in lower bankruptcy costs .
Figure 2.5.: Welfare E ects of an Intervention in Loan Markets leading to the reduction
in Supply
Central banks can opt for buying loans in secondary markets, instead of bond pur-
chasing. They execute via either direct trading of loans or through acquisition of
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securitizations, irrelevant to my model, as long as synthetic securitizations are con-
sidered. Loan acquisitions are modeled as a reduction on loan supply in recessions,
S in 2.20, so that final loan supply is dS with d Æ 1. I decide not to consider the ac-
quisition of equity because of legislation forbid direct financing of commercial banks
from Central Banks. In Figure 2.5 I show the impact on welfare of such execution,
for values of d in the 60% to 100% range.
While welfare e ects of loan and bond purchases are similar when arbitrage between
markets is absent, capital scarcity drives to neutral e ects of such action, even for
reductions on loan supply by up to 40%.
2.7. Conclusion
I have presented a model for the determination of bank capital within an infinitely
lived economy with two aggregate default states (identified as expansions and reces-
sions). Banks have access to equity markets and two di erent credit assets (loans
and bonds), and are subject to regulatory requirements a ecting their leverage ca-
pacity. Credit assets di er on their regulatory treatment, maturity and trade-ability.
Using this set up I explored the implications of capital regulation on asset prices,
regulatory arbitrage and maturity transformation role of banks. My model di ers
from previome studies as I relax ad hoc assumptions on liquidity and informational
asymmetries, see Repullo and Suarez (2013), Estrella (2004) or Peura and Keppo
(2006). Instead I employed an endogenome profit generating mechanism, based on
the concept of limit arbitrage presented in Kondor (2009). Within this framework,
new optimal trading and recapitalization rules are derived.
My model highlights the role of equity as the preferred recapitalization mechanism
on recessions for both banks complying with capital regulation, k > “, and under-
capitalized banks of highly capital constrained economies. Under expansions, asset
sales are preferred. The characterization of trading and recapitalization rules permits
me the derivation of an optimal value function, arising from bank manager maxi-
mization problem, which then helps to determine optimal bank capital and analyze
its relations with price formation. In this context, capital bu ers may arise opti-
mally to avoid potential dilution of shareholders, deleverage costs and bankruptcy,
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while endogenously kept at a low level to guarantee the existence of profits from
arbitrage opportunities. When the economy is at recessive states, my results point
towards the optimality of refinanciation processes (asset maturity increases). Cap-
ital exuberance on expansions lead to non refinanciation of existing positions and
to increases on credit provision in the economy which would result on reductions of
overall asset maturity.
New results on pricing e ects of capital decisions are discussed at a cost of increased
complexity in the model coming from the introduction of markets. While perfect
competition on primary loan and bond markets drives results in interest rate se-
lection and liquidity provision activities. Scarcity of capital destined to arbitrage
activities lead results on secondary market prices. When capital scarcity is severe,
arbitrage between equity and loan markets arises. Arbitrage between equity and
loan markets reduce the volatility of loan prices and the interest on liquidity provi-
sioning activities, keeping unchanged bond pricing. I find that scarcity also reduces
bank resilience coming from the fall in the precautionary impact of capital regula-
tion. My model indicates higher profitability of arbitrageurs trading activities, in
this case. The e ect of introducing bond markets on banking variables is mixed.
Bond portfolios reduce non financial expenditures and private lending while over-
all risk rises, see Mergaerts, Vander Vennet, et al. (2015). Bond size portfolio and
equilibrium prices are, as expected, inversely related due to price-quantity substitu-
tion. However, the relation between bond prices and capital depend on the degree
of integration between equity and loan markets. When capital scarcity is high,
bond portfolios further reduce the resilience of the banking system. This is due to
the reduction of optimal capital and lower levels of liquidity provisioning coming
from regulatory arbitrage. Otherwise, bond portfolios increase the resilience of the
banking system increasing optimal capital.
Following the theoretical discussion of the model, a numerical example is presented.
This example is based on a similar calibration to that presented on Repullo and
Suarez (2013) for comparison. When arbitrage between loan and equity markets,
due to capital scarcity, is present, pro-cyclicality (reduction of capital bu ers on
expansions) is reduced. In that case, volatility of optimal capital (and thme risk)
increases along with costs faced by governments due to their insurance role of de-
86
posits. The state of economy conditions liquidity provisioning decisions, while its
importance increases with arbitrage between markets. Under my conservative cal-
ibration, a collapse in both secondary loan trading and liquidity provisioning will
follow the transition from expansive to recessive states.
The introduction of market prices as a crucial decision variable for banks allow me
to analyze welfare e ects arising from market actions of monetary authorities. This
constitutes one of the biggest advantages of my model. My numerical results point
towards the convenience of bond purchase programs like the ones performed under
quantitative expansions. Bond purchases increase the provision of private loans
to the economy while reducing the amount of additional capital required by bank
managers for its recapitalization. Also, evidence in favor of a more tighten capital
regulation is suggested as a way to reduce bankruptcy costs faced by governments.
This costs would be further reduced through an increase in the market monitoring
role of central authorities aimed to guarantee the correct pricing of risks (e.g. the
convergence between loan and equity prices). The increase in market monitoring will
rise welfare e ects from secondary loan market acquisitions from central authorities
which will otherwise be non e ective.
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A. Figures
Figure A.1.: Di erences between exact and approximated Maximum Price
1
P p ≠ P¯
2
Figure A.2.: Di erence between Exact and Approximated Loan Prices P˜ ≠ P
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Figure A.3.: Comparison of my value function V¯ with Repullo and Suarez (2013)
Figure A.4.: Characterization of Aggregate Supply and Demand
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B. Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the integral: ﬁs (x (P )) = — (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ x(P )
0 Fs (x) dx
where x(P ) = rsÕ+“s≠c+1≠PrsÕ+⁄ . I could rewrite that as:
ﬁs (x (P )) = — (rsÕ + ⁄)
A
1≠
ˆ 1
x(P )
Fs (x) dx≠ ps
B
Then call H (x) =
´ 1
x(P ) Fs (x) dx, under a Taylor expansion around x = 1, I could
write:
H (x) = 0 + 1 · (1≠ x (P )) + 12
a
c
„
1
a ≠1(1)≠b
c
2
„ ( ≠1 (1)) (1≠ x (P ))
2 +O (x)
where a = Ô1≠ ﬂ, b =  ≠1 (p), c = Ôﬂ. If ﬂ Æ 12 both ac
„
1
a ≠1(1)≠b
c
2
„( ≠1(1)) and O (x)
converge to zero when x = 1 so that H (x) could be approximated by:
H (x) ¥ (1≠ x (P ))
Consequently:
ﬁs (x (P )) = — (rsÕ + ⁄) (1≠ (1≠ x (P ))≠ ps) = — (rsÕ + ⁄) (x (P )≠ ps)
Hence:
ﬁs (x (P ))≠ “s = 0≈∆ — (rsÕ + ⁄) (x (P )≠ p)≠ “s = 0≈∆
≈∆ — (rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ 1≠ P ≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)) = “s
≈∆ P¯ = (1 + rsÕ ≠ c≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)) ≠ ”“s
Also:
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‡a = I (x (1))≠ “s = ﬁs (x (1))≠ ﬁs
1
x
1
P¯
22
=
= — (rsÕ + ⁄)
1
(1≠ x (1))≠
1
1≠ x
1
P¯
222
= ≠—‡¯
This approximation is also used in Repullo and Suarez (2004)
Proof of Proposition 2. Let me start by characterizing the value of the bank (ab-
stracting from the possibility of buying an equity portfolio), contingent on its trad-
ing/liquidity provisioning decision, under Definition 1:
V¯ = VsÕ,s =
Y__________]__________[
V 1 = 11≠ 
A
— (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ rsÕ+(1≠ )k≠c+ ‡rsÕ+⁄
0 Fs (x) dx
B
Le with   > 0
V 0 = (k ≠ ‡)Le with › = 1
Vˆ 1 =
A
— (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ rsÕ+k≠crsÕ+⁄
0 Fs (x) dx
B
Le with – =   = › = Ê = 0
V 2 = kLe with – > 0 or Ê > 0
V 1 denotes the value of a bank that decides to buy loans in the market (it could
be easily proven that in this case   = k≠“sk ) and become an arbitrageur, V 0 is the
value of the bank if it is liquidated through asset sales, Vˆ 1 is the value of the bank
if it decides not to do anything so that it is liquidated in the very next date and V 2
is the value of the bank if it decides to refinance its loan portfolio and/or provide
new loans given the perfect competition environment.
First, when P > 1 it is clear that V 0 > Vˆ 1 and V 0 > V 2, hence banks decision
could oscillate between full deleverage and full leverage. Indi erence takes place
whenever:
1
1≠  
Qa— (rsÕ + ⁄)ˆ rsÕ+(1≠ )k≠c+ ‡rsÕ+⁄
0
Fs (x) dx
Rb = (k ≠ ‡)
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Making use of the proof of previome proposition and   = k≠“sk , one could rewrite
above expression as:
k
“s
—
1
rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ ‡
1
1≠ “s
k
2
≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)
2
= (k ≠ ‡)≈∆
≈∆ —
1
rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ ‡
1
1≠ “s
k
2
≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)
2
= “s ≠ ‡“s
k
≈∆
P¯ = P ≠ ”‡ “s
k
Second, when P Æ 1 it is clear that V 2 > V 0 and also V 2 > Vˆ 1. Therefore,
banks decision oscillate between refinancing/liquidity provisioning and full leverage.
Indi erence happens whenever:
—
1
rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ ‡
1
1≠ “s
k
2
≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)
2
= “s
which given Proposition 1 and the definition of P¯ imply:
‡
1
1≠ “s
k
2
= 1≠ P¯ ≈∆ P¯ = P + ‡“s
k
and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Trivially, from the specification of the value function when
banks decide to become arbitrageurs, V 1, in previome proposition and making use
of the proof of Proposition 1, one could write:
V 1 = k
“s
—
1
rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ ‡
1
1≠ “s
k
2
≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄)
2
Le ∆
≈∆ V 1 = K
“s
— (rsÕ + “s ≠ c+ ‡ ≠ ps (rsÕ + ⁄))Le ≠ —‡Le ≈∆
≈∆ V 1 = K
“s
—
3
‡ ≠ ‡¯ + 1
—
“s
4
≠ —‡Le
Expression equivalent to the one shown in text
Proof of Proposition 4. Let me first state the problem solved by bank managers
when P¯ < 1.
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Under Definition 1, the next period capital of a bank that decides to buy assets in
the market (and become an arbitrageur) will be characterized, with a simplifying
abuse of notation, by:
K = 11≠   (rsÕ + (1≠  ) ksÕ +  ‡ + r¯s ≠ c≠ x (rsÕ + ⁄))L
e
where   =
1
(1≠  ) k“sÕ ≠ 1
2
for the regulatory restriction to be satisfied. Therefore,
the expected value of the bank would be:
V¯ = E
!
K1{K>0}
"
= 11≠  L
e— (rsÕ + ⁄)
ˆ rsÕ+(1≠ )k+ ‡+ r¯s≠c
(rsÕ+⁄)
0
FsÕ (x) dx
Which under Proposition 1 becomes:
V¯ = E
!
K1{K>0}
"
= 11≠  —
3
‡ ≠ ‡¯ + ”“s + (1≠  ) (k ≠ ‡) + E (r¯s)
3 (1≠  ) k
“s
≠ 1
44
(A.1)
The problem solved by bank managers is:
max
 
EsÕ
!
K1{K>0}
"
s.t   Æ k≠“sk
EsÕ
!
K1{K>0}
" Ø K Õ (A.2)
The first order condition of this problem implies:
F.O.C. : — (‡ ≠ ‡¯ + ”“s ≠ E (r¯s)) = 0
Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraint set in A.2 implies that banks only
buy assets if k Ø ‡‡≠‡¯“s with (‡ ≠ ‡l ≠ Es (r¯s)) Ø 0 or if (‡ ≠ ‡l ≠ Es (r¯s)) < 0 with
k Ø “s + ‡¯E(r¯s)≠”“s“s. Those are the expressions provided in Corollary 1 for k¯2 and
k¯3.
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Proof of Corollary 1. The expected value of an under-capitalized bank, for existing
shareholders when the bank decides to refinance their loan portfolio is, making use
of Assumptions 1 and 2:
V¯ = 11 + nni
!
K ≠ ‡›Le + nni P¯i
"
(A.3)
Given that the bank has to comply with capital regulation, bank manager’s decision
will be the result of the maximization problem:
max
›, nni
1
1+ nni
!
K ≠ ‡›Le + nni P¯i
"
(A.4)
s.t  nni Ø “s(1≠›)≠(k≠›‡)P¯i Le (A.5)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem imply that the shadow value of new capital
is ⁄¯ = ‡(1+ n
n
i )
(“s≠‡)(1+ nni )2
, while for indi erence it has to be P¯i = K≠‡Le. Whenever 0 <
‡ Æ “s, the shadow value of the bank is positive, ⁄¯ > 0, the inequality in A.5 would
be binding, expected bank value is V¯ = k≠‡“s≠‡“sL
e and the bank is indi erent between
increasing its capital ratio through a capital expansion or through deleverage. If
P¯i ? K ≠ ‡Le no equillibrium will exist.
If ‡ < 0, the shadow value of new capital is negative, ⁄¯ < 0, banks do not sell new
stocks,  nni = 0, the value function characterized by A.3 is increasing in the amount
of assets sold, so that › = 1, and V¯ = K ≠ ‡Le.
If the bank decides not to refinance the loan portfolio, the value of the bank would
be:
V¯ = 1≠ ›(1 + nni )
Qcca— (rsÕ + ⁄)ˆ
rsÕ+
K≠‡›Le+ nn
i
P¯i
(1≠›)Le ≠c
rsÕ+⁄
0
Fs (x) dx
RddbLe
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The bank would prefer not to refinance wheneverQcca— (rsÕ + ⁄)ˆ
rsÕ+
Ke≠‡›Le+ nn
i
P¯i
(1≠›)Le ≠c
rsÕ+⁄
0
Fs (x) dx
Rddb Ø K ≠ ‡›Le + nni P¯i(1≠ ›)Le
or equivalently if
Qa— (rsÕ + ⁄)ˆ rsÕ+k
Õ≠c
rsÕ+⁄
0
Fs (x) dx
Rb Ø kÕ
which can only be true for those banks becoming arbitrageurs.
Making use of the proof of Propositions 2 and 4, whenever loan market prices are
above its book value, P > 1, those banks holding a capital ratio k Ø ”
1
‡
‡≠‡¯“s
2
will
prefer to buy loans in the secondary market as V 1 Ø V 0 as long as Es (r¯s) = 0 which
implies P¯i = K ≠ ‡Le, while for those with “s Æ k Æ ”
1
‡
‡≠‡¯“s
2
it is optimal to sell
the entire portfolio of loans in the secondary loan market. If the expected returns
of equity were Es (r¯s) ? 0 so that P¯i ? K ≠ ‡Le no equilibrium will exist.
On the other hand, when loan market prices are below its book value, P Æ 1, proof
of Proposition 4 implies that banks holding a capital to loan ratio “s < k Æ k¯i
with i = {2, 3}, and expressions provided in the text, will prefer to refinance the
portfolio of loans and/or concede new loans to the economy while for those with
k > k¯i become arbitrageurs and its expected bank value is given by (18). So that
whenever ‡≠ ‡¯+ ”“s≠Es (r¯s) > 0, buyers only invest in the loan market,   = k≠“sk ,
and (18) becomes:
V
Õ1 = k
“s
—
3
‡ ≠ ‡¯ + ”“s + k ≠ ‡
k
“s
4
Le ≈∆ V Õ1 = kLe + —
3
k
‡ ≠ ‡¯
‡“s
‡ ≠ ‡
4
Le
while if ‡ ≠ ‡¯ + ”“s ≠ Es (r¯s) < 0, buyers only invest in the equity market,   = 0,
and
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V
Õ1 = —
3
‡ ≠ ‡¯ + ”“s + k ≠ ‡ + Es (r¯s) > 0
3
k
“s
≠ 1
44
Le ≈∆
≈∆ V Õ1 = kLe + —
33
Es (r¯s)
“s
≠ ” “s
“s
4
(k ≠ “s)≠ ‡¯
4
Making use of the definitions of ¯kisÕ,s and Proposition 3, expressions shown in text
follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider, first, that assumption 1 is relaxed. Bank equity
still being transferred at book value between shareholder generations, while those
are capital constrained. And let me prove the first part of the proposition.
Definition of P¯ , then implies that rsÕ Ø 11≠ps (”“s + c+ ps⁄) ≈∆ P¯ Ø 1. When
P > 1 those banks holding a capital ratio ‡ < k Æ k¯1 will decide to sell the
portfolio of loans, so that the aggregate supply of loans to the economy would be´ x‡
xk¯ L
edFsÕ (x). Similarly, those banks holding a capital ratio k > k¯1, decide to
increase leverage until the regulatory restriction is binding, and aggregate demand
of assets in the economy would be
´ xk¯
0
(k≠“s)
“s
LedFsÕ (x). An equilibrium price would
be, implicitly, set by the equality of both expressions:
ˆ xk¯
0
(k ≠ “s)
“s
LedFsÕ (x) =
ˆ x‡
xk¯
LedFsÕ (x) (A.6)
Proving the full statement, then, is equivalent to prove that, P¯ Ø 1 =∆ P > 1 so
that there exists an unique market price (above the book value) satisfying the zero
excess demand condition A.6.
If P > 1 demand is increasing in price and non-negative whenever ksÕ Ø k¯1≠(rsÕ ≠ c),
reaching its lower bound when P Ø P¯ + ‡¯ ”“srsÕ+ksÕ≠c+‡“s while supply is increasing in
price and strictly positive. Therefore, if for a su ciently big price, supply is above
demand the existence and unicity of the equilibrium price will be guaranteed. Con-
sider the price P = 1 + ‡a, with rsÕ Ø rfs so that ‡a > 0, and let me prove that
demand is above supply at this point.
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Let me assume that the default rate that makes banks holding a capital ratio above
the regulatory capital of the final state,“s, is above the average default rate of current
state for any final state, x“s = rsÕ+ksÕ≠c≠“srsÕ+⁄≠“sÕ > psÕ . Then, the aggregate supply in the
transition from sÕ to s, S =
´ x‡
xk¯ L
edFsÕ (x), with P = 1 + ‡a Ø 1 will be strictly
bounded above, S Æ (1≠ x“s)FsÕ (x“s), as in this case FsÕ (x“s) > 12 > 12FsÕ (x‡s)
where x‡s = rsÕ+ksÕ≠c≠‡rsÕ+⁄≠‡ .
Moreover, as x“sÕ > psÕ , the unconditional expected value of capital satisfies EsÕ (K) >
“sEsÕ (Le) so that, in aggregate terms, there is enough capital to hold all existing
loans in the economy and cope with regulation under the final state. This allows
me to write the following inequality:
LHS = D ≠ S Ø EsÕ
!
Le1{≠‡aLe>K}
"≠ 1
“s
EsÕ
!
K1{“sLe>K}
"
= RHS
To prove that RHS > 0, so that demand is enough to satisfy supply, I should
develop the expectations:
EsÕ
!
Le1{≠‡aLe>K}
"≠ 1
“s
E
!
K1{“sLe>K}
"
=
1ˆ
x‡s
3
Le ≠ K
“s
4
dFsÕ (x)≠ 1
“s
x‡sˆ
x“s
KdFsÕ (x) =
= ⁄≠ (ksÕ ≠ c)
“s
≠ rsÕ + ⁄≠ “s
“s
1ˆ
x“s
FsÕ (x) dx ≠ S
As ⁄≠(ksÕ≠c)“s ≠
rsÕ+⁄≠“s
“s
´ 1
x“s FsÕ (x) dx > (1≠ x‡s)
1
1 + ‡a“s
2
FsÕ (x‡s) > (1≠ x“s)FsÕ (x“s),
the di erence between supply and demand is such that:
D ≠ S > (1≠ x“s)FsÕ (x“s)≠ S > 0
Thus, the equilibrium will exist and is unique if x“s > psÕ . Let me now prove that
x“s > psÕ whenever rsÕ Ø rfs and ksÕ Ø “sÕ , or equivalently that:
ksÕ
1≠ psÕ ≠
“s
1≠ ps > “s
3
1≠ 1
— (1≠ ps)
4
+ psÕ ≠ ps1≠ psÕ
⁄+ c
1≠ ps
First, if both probabilities ps and psÕ are equal I have “s = “sÕ , above expression
collapses to ksÕ≠“sÕ1≠ps Ø 0 > “s
1
1≠ 1—(1≠ps)
2
, which holds true and implies x“s > psÕ .
To analyze the e ect of changes in psÕ , let me divide both terms by psÕ≠ps1≠psÕ
⁄+c
1≠ps so
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that whenever psÕ > ps above inequality becomes:
(1≠ ps) ksÕ
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c) ≠
(1≠ psÕ) “s
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c) >
“s
1
1≠ 1—(1≠ps)
2
psÕ≠ps
1≠psÕ
⁄+c
1≠ps
+ 1
While if psÕ < ps I have:
(1≠ ps) ksÕ
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c) ≠
(1≠ psÕ) “s
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c) <
“s
1
1≠ 1—(1≠ps)
2
psÕ≠ps
1≠psÕ
⁄+c
1≠ps
+ 1
Computing the limit in the first inequality when psÕ æ 1 then renders:
lim
psÕæ1
(1≠ ps) ksÕ
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c)≠
(1≠ psÕ) “s
(psÕ ≠ ps) (⁄+ c) > limpsÕæ1
“s
1
1≠ 1—(1≠ps)
2
psÕ≠ps
1≠psÕ
⁄+c
1≠ps
+1≈∆ ksÕ(⁄+ c)≠1 > 0
Which is also true given that the expected value of the bank under state sÕ when
psÕ = 1 is ksÕ≠(⁄+ c) and banking activities would only be profitable if ksÕ > (⁄+ c).
Similarly, computing the limit when psÕ æ 0 in the second inequality leads to:
(” ≠ (1≠ ps)) “s Ø ≠ (ksÕ (1≠ ps) + ps (c+ ⁄))≈∆ ps (ksÕ ≠ “s ≠ c≠ ⁄) Æ ”“s + ksÕ ≠ “s
Hence, for the inequality to be true I should require |ps| Æ | ksÕ≠“s+”“sksÕ≠“s≠(c+⁄) |, which holds
true given that | ksÕ≠“s+”“sksÕ≠“s≠(c+⁄) | > 1. Therefore x
“s > psÕ whenever rsÕ Ø rfs for any fea-
sible combination of probabilities{psÕ , ps} so that there exists a price P¯ > P Ø 1+‡a
such that D ≠ S = 0.
Let me now turn to the second part of the proposition. Consider P < 1, so that
according to Corollary 1 the decision of bank managers of overcapitalized banks
would depend not only on loan prices but also in equity ones, while asset sellers
would be indi erent between selling loans and equity, at a price P¯i = K ≠ ‡Le, in
an amount such that final capital is equal to regulatory one. This way, the amount
of assets bought by each bank holding a capital to loan ratio k > k¯i with i = {2, 3}
is, by equation (9), Di =  nni Px +  1≠ “sLe =
K≠“sLe
“s
while the amount of assets
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sold by each individual bank with a capital to loan ratio ‡ < k < “s would be such
that  nbi P¯i = “sLe ≠ K ≠ › (“s ≠ ‡)Le to comply with capital regulation, while
the supply of assets would be ›Le +  nbP¯i. Consequently, substituting › in the
individual supply equation implies that Si = “s≠k“s≠‡L
e≠ nbi k≠‡“s≠‡Le+ nbi (k ≠ ‡)Le.
Integration of individual demand and supply equations, over the relevant interval,
then yields the expression shown in text.
As in the proof of the first part of this proposition, I have now checked the validity
of the equation stated in the text for those cases where P < 1, the only thing left
is to prove that there exists a unique solution to the equality of aggregate supply
and demand schedules such that when P¯ < 1 =∆ P < 1. In order to do so, let me
start by considering the case when  nbi = 0, as if it is not the case asset supply will
always be lower and its derivative with respect to price greater so that the proof
will still hold.
Consider ‡a < 0, so that rsÕ < rfs and assume P Ø P¯ . The expression of the capital
threshold, k¯2, set in text, then implies that k¯2
1
P¯
2
æ Œ, so that aggregate asset
demand is zero, D = 0. Given that dk¯dP =
“sÕ ‡¯
(‡≠‡¯)2 > 0, for any price P Ø P¯ , I would
have D = 0.
On the other hand, if P Ø 1≠“s, aggregate supply is non negative, S Ø 0. Continuity
of supply and demand functions, then, imply that there exists at least one price at
which S = D. In order to prove the unicity of such equilibrium, I proceed by
contradiction. Let me assume that there are two equilibrium prices P , P 1 with
1 > P > P 1, such that D (ksÕ , rsÕ , P ) = D = S = S (ksÕ , rsÕ , P ) and D (ksÕ , rsÕ , P 1) =
DÕ = S Õ = S (ksÕ , rsÕ , P 1). Given the functional form of aggregate demand, I have
that
DÕ = D+ k¯
2Õ ≠ “s
“s
1
1≠ xk¯Õ
2
FsÕ
1
xk¯
Õ2≠ k¯2 ≠ “s
“s
1
1≠ xk¯
2
FsÕ
1
xk¯
2
+ rsÕ + ⁄≠ “s
“s
xk¯
Õˆ
xk¯
FsÕ (x) dx
(A.7)
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while supply satisfies
SÕ =
3
1 + (‡
Õ ≠ ‡)
“sÕ ≠ ‡
4QcaS + 11≠ x‡Õ2Fs 1x‡Õ2≠ (1≠ x‡)Fs (x‡) + rsÕ + ⁄≠ “s
“s ≠ ‡
x‡ˆ
x‡Õ
FsÕ(x)dx
Rdb
≠ (‡
Õ ≠ ‡)
“sÕ ≠ ‡
1
1≠ x‡Õ
2
FsÕ
1
x‡
Õ2 (A.8)
As D = S and DÕ = S Õ, I could substitute equation A.8 into A.7 so, after some alge-
bra, I getD =
1
1≠ x‡Õ
2
FsÕ
1
x‡
Õ2≠(DÕ ≠D) or equivalentlyDÕ = 11≠ x‡Õ2FsÕ 1x‡Õ2
which given the expression of aggregate supply implies DÕ > S Õ. Therefore when
‡a < 0, the equilibrium is unique and such that 1≠ “s Æ P < 1.
When assumption 1 is fully considered, all the entities with k > “s have unlimited
access to new capital. A distortion on demand, as presented above, would take place
if any bank finds optimal to increase capital to a level kn > k¯i. Recalling that 2.8
implies:
V¯ ≠K = —K ‡ ≠ ‡¯
“s
≠ —‡Le
And taking derivatives with respect to capital, I have:
dV¯
dK
≠ 1 = —‡ ≠ ‡¯
“s
+ —
A
K
“s
≠ Le
B
d‡
dK
(A.9)
A capital expansion taking place whenever dV¯dK > 0, or equivalently when
d‡
dK
> ≠ ‡ ≠ ‡¯
K ≠ “sLe (A.10)
Given the continuity of the CDF, the probability of any bank ending up with a
capital K is zero, so that:
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d‡
dK
= 0
This, in turn, implies that A.10 holds for any capital K, the only equilibrium price
implying ‡ = ‡¯, and no arbitrage profits V¯ = K. However, comparing this new
situation with the original one, banks holding K Æ k¯iLe are indi erent between
its original capital and the after-capital-injection level, Kn. On the other hand,
those for which K > k¯iLe would be strictly worse. Consequently, neither banks nor
arbitrageurs are interested on increasing capital to finance the acquisition of new
assets and previome proof su ces.
Proof of Corollary 2. i) Let me first simplify the notation so that I omit in what fol-
lows the state sub-index, sÕ, s. Assume ‡a Ø 0, defineH(‡) = (r + ⁄≠ ‡) ´ x‡0 F (x) dx
and H(k¯) =
1
r + ⁄≠ k¯
2 ´ xk¯
0 F (x) dx with k¯ = k¯1. Then the supply of loans for sale
is S = dH(k¯)
dk¯
≠ dH(‡)d‡ , demand is D = “≠k¯“ dH(k¯)dk¯ + H(k¯)“ and that the value of the bank
is V = H(‡)≠ (1≠ —) ‡
k¯
H(k¯).
The derivative of bank value with respect to k is dVdk =
ˆV
ˆ‡
ˆ‡
ˆk +
ˆV
ˆk . In order to
identify the value of ˆ‡ˆk , let me recall that in equilibrium S ≠ D = 0 so, by the
envelope theorem, it has to be true that d(S≠D)dk =
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆ‡
ˆ‡
ˆk +
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆk = 0, which
implies ˆ‡ˆk = ≠
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆk
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆ‡
so that dVdk = ≠ˆVˆ‡
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆk
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆ‡
+ ˆVˆk .
Assume that dVdk < 0, and let me prove that this is true. If
dV
dk < 0, then
≠
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆk
ˆ(S≠D)
ˆ‡
< ≠
ˆV
ˆk
ˆV
ˆ‡
(A.11)
.
As ˆVˆk = F (x‡)≠ (1≠ —) 1≠Pk¯ F
1
xk¯
2
and ˆVˆ‡ = ≠ (1≠ —)S, A.11 could be rewritten
as: A
k¯
ˆ2H
!
k¯
"
ˆk2
BA
1
1≠ xk¯ +
k¯‡¯
‡ (‡ ≠ ‡¯)
ˆV
ˆk
ˆV
ˆ‡
B
Ø
3
“
ˆ2H (‡)
ˆ‡2
4A 1
1≠ x‡ +
ˆV
ˆk
ˆV
ˆ‡
B
≠F
1
xk¯
2
(A.12)
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The left hand side (LHS) of the equation is strictly positive while the right hand
side is negative as
3
1
1≠x‡ +
ˆV
ˆk
ˆV
ˆ‡
4
< 0. Consequently, the RHS is strictly smaller than
the LHS and my assumption true. This implies that, if under each state, s, ‡a > 0,
capital would be in the corner, kú = “s.
Moreover, assume that the interest rate is such that ‡a Ø 0, for any state, so that
rs Ø rfh and P Ø 1, and take kús = “s. The expected value for a bank of continuing
with their banking activities would be Vs = — [qs,hEs (Vs,h) + (1≠ qs,h)Es (Vs,l)] >
—Es (Vs,h). Given the expression of the value function provided in Corollary 1, V¯ ,
the expected bank value satisfies
—Es (Vs,h) Ø —
ˆ rs+“s≠c
rs+⁄
0
KdFs (x) Ø “s
As a consequence, the di erence between the expected value of capital when the
bank decides to continue with their activities, and the cost of such capital will be
strictly above zero, Vs > “s ≠ “s = 0, which violates the zero profit condition and
cannot be an equilibrium.
On the other hand, let me assume now that ‡a < 0 for any state, so that rs < rfl ,
and without loss of generality consider,  nbi = 0 so that loan market supply is
S = r+⁄≠“sÕ“sÕ
´ x‡
x“ F (x)dx ≠ (1 ≠ x‡)F (x‡), and the expected value for a bank of
continuing with their activities would be Vs = — [qs,hEs (Vs,h) + (1≠ qs,h)Es (Vs,l)].
Given that the average default probability is higher in state h than in state l, it is
trivial that Vs < —Es (Vs,l). Thus, under the characterization of Vs,sÕ provided in
Corollary 1, I have:
Vs < —“l
SWU x
‡ˆ
0
(1≠ x) dFs(x)≠ 1
“l
(1≠ — (‡s,l ≠ ¯‡s,l))S ≠ — ¯‡s,l
“l
xk¯ˆ
0
(1≠ x) dFs(x)
TXV (A.13)
Hence, Vs < —“l
´ x‡
0 (1≠ x) dFs(x) < —“l and for any k Ø “s, the expected profits of
banking activities are negative, Vs≠ k < 0, which cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Using these results and the first order stochastic dominance of the recessive default
distribution over the expansionary one, I have shown that a simultaneome equilib-
rium could only occur if rús œ
Ë
rfl , r
f
h
È
.
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In state l, and given Proposition 5, there is always trading of loans in the secondary
loan market as rúl Ø rfl
ii) and iii) Consider the specification of bank value function set in Corollary 1, then:
a) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ > Es (r¯sÕ)
V 1sÕ ≠ ksÕ =
Y_______]_______[
≠ksÕ “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
—
´ x“sÕ
0 kL
edFsÕ(x)≠ ks “
2
s
“s≠‡¯ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
— (A+B + C)≠ ksÕ ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “
2
s
“s≠‡¯
— (rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ psÕ (rsÕ + ⁄))≠ ksÕ ksÕ > ⁄+ c
where A = rsÕ+⁄≠‡“s≠‡
´ x‡
x“ FsÕ (x) dx, B = (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ x“
0 FsÕ (x) dx and C = —‡ rsÕ+⁄≠k¯
2
k¯2
´ xk¯2
0 FsÕ (x) dx
b) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ < Es (r¯sÕ)
V 2sÕ ≠ ksÕ =
Y_______]_______[
≠ksÕ “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
—
´ x“
0 kL
edFsÕ(x)≠ ksÕ ‹ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
— (A+B + C)≠ ksÕ ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > ‹
— (rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ psÕ (rsÕ + ⁄))≠ ksÕ ksÕ > ⁄+ c
where ‹ = “s + “s ‡¯Es(r¯sÕ |‡=“s)≠”“s < “s + “s
‡¯
“s≠‡¯ .
If Es (r¯sÕ) = ‡“s≠‡ ≠ ce, I have ‹ = (1≠ “s) ‡¯+ “s and where A = rsÕ+⁄≠‡“s≠‡
´ x‡
x“ FsÕ (x) dx,
B = (rsÕ + ⁄)
´ x“
0 FsÕ (x) dx and C = —‡ rsÕ+⁄≠k¯
3
k¯3≠“s
´ xk¯3
0 Fs (x) dx
c) If rsÕ Ø rfs
V 3sÕ ≠ ksÕ =
Y____]____[
≠ksÕ “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
— (A+B)≠ ksÕ ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
— (rsÕ + ksÕ ≠ c≠ psÕ (rsÕ + ⁄))≠ ksÕ ⁄+ c > ksÕ
where A = (rsÕ + ⁄≠ ‡)
´ x‡
0 FsÕ (x) dx and B = ≠ (1≠ —)‡ rsÕ+⁄≠k¯
1
k¯1
´ xk¯1
0 FsÕ (x) dx
Given the characterization of the equilibrium interest rate range, set in previous
part of the proof, the value function, VsÕ≠ksÕ , is continuous on rsÕ by the theorem of
the maximum, lies strictly below zero at the lower bound of that range and strictly
above zero at the upper bound. Then dVsÕdrsÕ =
ˆVsÕ
ˆrsÕ
+ ˆVsÕˆksÕ
ˆksÕ
ˆrsÕ
, when the equilibrium
is interior ˆVsÕˆksÕ = 0, by the envelope theorem, while if ksÕ = “sÕ I have
ˆksÕ
ˆrsÕ
= 0.
Therefore the second term is always zero so that the total derivative with respect to
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rs is equal to its partial derivative. Given the characterization of the value function
made in a), b) and c) it should be clear that the value function is strictly increasing
in rs, independently of the capital ratio, ksÕ , given that both, arbitrageurs entity
value and deleveraging banks value are increasing in that spread. Consequently
dVsÕ
drsÕ
> 0 and the interest rate spread is unique.
Moreover, computing first order derivatives with respect to capital in above specifi-
cation of the value function I get that:
a) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ > Es (r¯sÕ)
dV 1
sÕ
dksÕ
≠ 1 =
Y_______]_______[
≠1 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
—“sÕ (1≠ x“sÕ ) dFsÕ (x)dx |x=x“sÕ + 2— ≠ 1 > 0 “
2
s
“s≠‡¯ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
ˆV 1
sÕ
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ‡ˆksÕ
ˆV 1
sÕ
ˆ‡ ≠ 1 ? 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “
2
s
“s≠‡¯
— ≠ 1 Æ 0 ksÕ > ⁄+ c
b) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ < Es (r¯sÕ)
dV 2
sÕ
dksÕ
≠ 1 =
Y_______]_______[
≠1 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
—
1
“s (1≠ x“s) dFsÕ (x)dx |x=x“s + 2
2
≠ 1 > 0 ‹ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
ˆV 2
sÕ
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ‡ˆksÕ
ˆV 2
sÕ
ˆ‡ ≠ 1 ? 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > ‹
— ≠ 1 Æ 0 ksÕ > ⁄+ c
c) If rsÕ Ø rfs
dV 3
sÕ
dksÕ
≠ 1 =
Y____]____[
≠1 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
ˆV 3
sÕ
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ‡ˆksÕ
ˆV 3
sÕ
ˆ‡ ≠ 1 < 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
— ≠ 1 Æ 0 ⁄+ c > ksÕ
Note that the first order derivative in the case rsÕ Ø 11≠ps (”“s + c+ ps⁄) is negative
and has already been computed in the proof of statement i). The exact expressions of
the first order derivatives for the cases rsÕ < rfs with ‹≠(rsÕ ≠ c) > ksÕ > “s≠(rsÕ ≠ c)
and ‹ = (1≠ “s) ‡¯+“s or ‹ = “s “s“s≠‡¯ are complex, and their expressions are skipped
for simplicity.
a) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ > Es (r¯sÕ)
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d2V 1
sÕ
dk2
sÕ
=
Y_______]_______[
0 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
— “srsÕ+⁄≠“s
1
(1≠ x“s) d2FsÕ (x)dx2 |x=x“s ≠ dFsÕ (x)dx |x=x“s
2
“2s
“s≠‡¯ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
A ? 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “
2
s
“s≠‡¯
0 ksÕ > ⁄+ c
where A = ˆ
2V 1
sÕ
ˆk2
sÕ
+ 2 ˆ
2V 1
sÕ
ˆksÕˆ‡
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ
2V 1
sÕ
ˆ‡2
1
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
22
+ ˆV
1
sÕ
ˆ‡
3
ˆ2‡
ˆk2
sÕ
4
b) If rsÕ < rfs and ‡l ≠ ‡ < Es (r¯sÕ)
d2V 2
sÕ
dk2s
=
Y_______]_______[
0 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
— “srsÕ+⁄≠“s
1
(1≠ x“s) d2FsÕ (x)dx2 |x=x“s ≠ dFsÕ (x)dx |x=x“s
2
‹ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
A ? 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > ‹
— ≠ 1 Æ 0 ksÕ > ⁄+ c
where A = ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆk2
sÕ
+ 2 ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆksÕˆ‡
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆ‡2
1
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
22
+ ˆV
2
sÕ
ˆ‡
3
ˆ2‡
ˆk2
sÕ
4
c) If rsÕ Ø rfs
d2V 3
sÕ
dk2
sÕ
=
Y____]____[
0 “s > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c)
A < 0 ⁄+ rsÕ > ksÕ + (rsÕ ≠ c) > “s
0 Æ 0 ⁄+ c > ksÕ
where A = ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆk2
sÕ
+ 2 ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆksÕˆ‡
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ
2V 2
sÕ
ˆ‡2
1
ˆ‡
ˆksÕ
22
+ ˆV
2
sÕ
ˆ‡
3
ˆ2‡
ˆk2
sÕ
4
Therefore for the equilibrium to be interior it has to be the case that ksÕ > “s ≠
(rsÕ ≠ c) whenever rsÕ < rfs . Given i) it follows that ksÕ > “h ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c). More-
over, given that ˆV
2
sÕ
ˆksÕ
+ ˆ‡ˆksÕ
ˆV 2
sÕ
ˆ‡ ≠ 1 > ≠1 and
dV i
sÕ
dksÕ
≠ 1 > 0 ’i = {1, 2} whenever
“s ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c) + ‹ > ksÕ > “s ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c) it follows that the equilibrium interest rate,
rúsÕ , when ksÕ < “h ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c) is strictly greater than that when ksÕ > “h ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c).
This implies that the only stationary solution to the problem has to happen in
this last situation. If some bank in the economy would choose a level of capital
ksÕ < “h ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c), given rsÕ , any other bank could increase the level of capital
to a point where ksÕ > “h ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c) and make profits. Similarly, the first deriva-
tive is strictly decreasing for any — < 1 whenever ksÕ > ⁄ + c. Consequently,
⁄+ c > ksÕ > “s ≠ (rsÕ ≠ c) which is the expression shown in text.
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iv) The proof that there is a positive probability of some entrepreneurs facing re-
financing constraints comes directly from the fact that when s = l there is a pos-
itive probability of some banks being bankrupted, 1 ≠ Fl (x‡l,l) > 0. Given that
Pl,h < Pl,l it follows that 1 ≠ Fl (x‡l,h) > 1 ≠ Fl (x‡l,l) > 0. Similarly when s = h
I have 1 > x‡h,l > 0 so that 1 ≠ Fh (x‡h,l) > 0. Also, as x‡h,l > x‡h,h I have that
1≠Fh (x‡h,h) > 1≠Fh (x‡h,l) > 0. As bankrupted banks cannot refinance their loans
it follows that there is a positive probability of some entrepreneurs facing refinanc-
ing constraints in both s = h and s = l. The fact that when the economy ends up
in an expansion x‡l,l , x‡h,l , x ¯k1l,l , x ¯k1h,l > 0 while x‡l,l > x ¯k1l,l and x‡h,l > x ¯k1h,l imply
that there is a positive probability FsÕ (x‡sÕ,l)≠ FsÕ
3
x
¯k1
sÕ,l
4
> 0 of some banks being
interested into giving new loans to entrepreneurs when s = l. In the case s = h and
the equilibrium is interior, kúh > “h, I have xk
ú
h > x
¯ki
sÕ,h Ø 0 ’i = {2, 3} so that there
is a positive probability FsÕ
1
xk
ú
h
2
≠ FsÕ
3
x
¯ki
sÕ,h
4
> 0 of a bank being interested into
giving loans to entrepreneurs.
v) The proof of the e ciency of market prices comes directly from the range of suit-
able interest rate spreads set in i) along with the proof of Proposition 5. Given that
rús œ
Ë
(”“l + c+ pl⁄) 11≠pl , (”“h + c+ ph⁄)
1
1≠ph
È
I have that rús > (”“l + c+ pl⁄) 11≠pl
so that P¯s,l > 1 and thus Ps,l > 1. Similarly rús < (”“h + c+ ph⁄) 11≠ph which implies
¯Ps,h < 1 or equivalently Ps,h < 1
vi) If the solution to the problem is interior it is the case that ks > “s. Given the
characterization of the derivatives set in iii), shareholders of banks holding ine -
cient levels of capital, k < kús , face increasing returns to capital. Consequently bank
managers see it optimal to increase the level of capital via a capital injection from
shareholders while those would be willing to provide such capital.
vii) The optimality of refinanciation practices when s = h comes directly from the
proof of Corollary 1.
Value of 1 share of the Equity Index acquired by arbitrageurs. Assume arbitrageurs
assign a valuation to next period equity according to the intrinsic value of each of the
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banks issuing equity. Then, given that at current date the individual price of new eq-
uity is P¯i = K≠‡Le the unit value weighted index price is Px =
´ x‡
x“s  nbi P¯idFsÕ (x)´ x‡
x“s  nbidFsÕ (x)
while,
in equilibrium, the expected value of that index is Es (P Õx) =
“s
“s≠‡
´ x‡
x“s  nbi P¯idFsÕ (x)´ x‡
x“s  nbidFsÕ (x)
.
Consequently, P Õx≠(1+ce)PxPx =
“s
“s≠‡ ≠ 1≠ ce = ‡“s≠‡ ≠ ce which is the expression shown
in text.
The problem solved by Bank managers when – > 0 is.
max
ks
Vs (ks, B|rús)≠ ks
s.t : ks Ø “s
Where the expressions of Vs are identical to that shown in the proof of Corollary 2
substituting c and ⁄ by the expressions of cÕ and ⁄Õ shown in Definition 1, and where
equilibrium bond prices P uú, are given by the zero profit condition Vs (ks, B|rús) =
ks.
Regulatory capital under Basel Environment and Cumulative distribution formula.
Under the standard IRB approach of Basel II regulatory capital of corporate expo-
sures is measured according to the following formula:
lending restrictions restrictions
“s = ⁄ 
A
 ≠1 (ps) +
Ô
ﬂs ≠1 (0.999)Ô1≠ ﬂs
B
where the default correlation parameter, ﬂs, is computed according to the following
formula ﬂs = 0.12
1
2≠ 1≠e≠50ps1≠e≠50
2
However, the formula of regulatory capital under Basel II accommodates for the
existence of both Tier I and Tier II types of capital while imposing the additional
restriction that half of that capital requirement should be covered by Tier 1 capital.
Given that my model just accommodates for the existence of Tier 1 capital instru-
ments (essentially equity core capital) I decide to multiply above expression by a 12
factor. The foundations of that formula comes from the Single factor Vasicek credit
model (Vasicek (2002)) under which the state contingent CDF of the default rate
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x is given by Fs (x) =  
1Ô1≠ﬂs ≠1(x)≠ ≠1(ps)Ô
ﬂs
2
and where ps is the state contingent
average default rate.
C. Characterization of the Welfare Measure
The corresponding expressions for each of the state contingent components of the
Welfare Measure are:
NCsÕ,s = (1≠ ps)
Y_]_[
´ x‡
xk¯
k≠‡
kús
(1≠ x) dFsÕ(x) P > 1´ xks,sÕ
x
¯ks,sÕ
k≠kús
kús
(1≠ x) dFsÕ(x) P < 1
RsÕ,s = (1≠ ps)
Y_]_[
´ x“s
xks
k≠kús
kús
(1≠ x) dFsÕ(x)≠
´ x‡
x“s
“s≠kús
kús
k≠‡
“sÕ≠‡ (1≠ x) dFsÕ(x) ‡l ≠ ‡ > Es (r¯sÕ)´ x“s
xks
k≠kús
kús
(1≠ x) dFsÕ(x)≠
´ x‡
x“s
“s≠kús
kús
(1≠ x) dFsÕ(x) ‡l ≠ ‡ < Es (r¯sÕ)
NRsÕ,s = 2 (1≠ ps)
Y_]_[RR P > 1RR+NCsÕ,s P < 1
BRsÕ,s =
´ 1
x‡
´ 1
0 (rsÕ + k ≠ c≠ x (rsÕ + ⁄))LedFs(x)dFsÕ(x)
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D. On the homogeneity of banks capital problem
So far I have characterized the existence and unicity of a solution, under certain
conditions, for the optimization problem of representative’s bank managers. In the
proof of Corollary 1 I have illustrated how the only equilibrium when prices are above
its face value is collusive, so that the solution of a central planner and individual
banks will coincide. In what follows we, graphically, illustrate the irrelevance of the
assumption regarding the existence of a central authority when the economy is in
a recession, concluding that capital collusion constitutes, in fact, the only feasible
solution for individual bank managers problem. In order to do so, in the following
figure I depict, for a given parametrization of the problem, both the di erence
between expected bank’s value and book value of capital (in blue), for a bank holding
a capital ratio ki 7 kús , and that measure, (in green), when all the banks in the
economy hold exactly the same capital ratio, ki = k.
Figure B.1.: Di erence between expected bank’s value and book value. Collusive vs non
collusive equilibrium
Recall that under Assumption 1, at each period, the property of bank shares is
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transferred to a new generation of shareholders, on exchange of a payment equal to
book value of capital, only if bank capital is above the regulatory minimum, while
those have the possibility to recapitalize the bank through a non dilutory capital
injection. Thus, assume that a bank arrives to current state, s = h, with a below
optimal capital ratio, say (A) in above figure. Bank managers in this situation realize
that the expected bank value is above book value of capital, but that increasing
capital from there to, let’s say, (D) will, in fact, result in a net increase of capital
value. However, this will, also, be perceived by each bank manager of the economy,
so that all banks will increase their capital up to that point. However, under this new
situation, all banks in the economy hold exactly the same level of capital, and there
is an aggregate excess of capital, so that given the prevailing interest rate, rús , the
true di erence between expected bank value and book value will be characterized by
point (C).Alternatively, bank managers of the under-capitalized bank could decide
to to keep their actual capital level at (A), as this is also profitable. However, if
this is the case, bank managers of the other banks decide to increase their liquidity
provisioning to the economy, until their capital ratio goes to (A), as that would, also,
result in a net increase of capital value. However, under the new situation, again
all banks in the economy hold the same capital ratio, and there is an aggregate
shortage of capital, which results in real expected losses to all banks, a situation
characterized by point (B). In this new situation the marginal value of bank capital
will be above 1, and banks will find it optimal to increase their capital ratios.
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Chapter 3.
Market e ects of Bond Liquidity: An
analysis for the Euro Area
Abstract
“Liquidity: the quality of certain markets/assets that allows market participants to
materialize a transaction at a desired moment in time without any of those incurring
in further losses due to necessity”
I estimate a modified version of AFNS model, that includes an additional term to
account for the existence of a liquidity premium, to real market data on European
Government Bonds. That additional term is assumed to depend on time since the
bond was initially issued to the market, and then shown to relate with capital evo-
lution. My liquidity measure allows me to characterize the existence of liquidity
contagion patterns across European countries, further illustrating the existence of
two liquidity di erentiated markets within the euro area. The e ects of bond liq-
uidity shocks on credit developments is, then, analyzed. Improvements on liquidity
conditions lead reductions on credit spreads. The relation between liquidity (capi-
tal) and future yields is also presented. Higher liquidity leads to lower future yields.
This result is in line with findings on the relation between capital constraints and
equity returns evolution, presented in the first chapter of this dissertation. My re-
sults post evidence on the paulatine loss of representativity of interbank markets
since the burst of the European debt crisis.
117
Resumen
“Liquidez: la cualidad de ciertos mercados/activos que permite a los participantes
en los mercados materializar una transacción en el momento deseado del tiempo, sin
que ninguno de ellos incurra en mayores pérdidas por la necesidad”
Estimo una versión modificada del modelo AFNS, que incluye un término adicional
para acomodar la existencia de una prima de liquidez, a datos reales de mercado de
bonos gubernamentales europeos. El término adicional se asume que depende del
tiempo transcurrido desde la emisión del bono al mercado, y se muestra que esta
medida esta relacionada con la evolución del capital. Mi medida de liquidez me
permite caracterizar la existencia de pautas de contagio relacionadas con la liquidez
entre los paises europeos, ilustrando la existencia de dos mercados diferenciados de
liquidez en la Area del Euro. Los efectos de perturbaciones en la liquidez de los
bonos sobre la evolucion del crédito, también son analizados. Las mejoras en las
condiciones de liquidez llevan a reducciones en lso spreads de crédito. También
se presenta, la relación entre la liquidez (capital) y la rentabilidad futura de los
bonos. Mayor liquidez implica menor rentabilidad futura. Este resultado esta en
línea con la relación entre las restricciones de capital y la evolución de los retornos
en el mercado de acciones, presentada en el primer capítulo de esta disertación.
Mis resultados tambien evidencian la paulatina pérdida de representatividad de los
mercados interbancarios desde el estallido de la crisis de deuda europea.
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3.1. Introduction
The burst of Irish and Greek bond markets, and the subsequent increases of other
European bond yields, rose a controversy on whether “contagion” was led by credit
or liquidity concerns. Since the early 80’s academics and practitioners interest on
liquidity implications for asset pricing increased. Miller (1977), highlighted the
central role of liquidity to understand price formation in financial markets. Many
studies have, since then, remarked the role of liquidity for securities price formation.1
Collin-Dufresne (2001) found no evidence of relation between traditional liquid-
ity proxies and credit risk factors, while Du e, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003),
Longsta , Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) post
evidence in the relation of liquidity and credit as joint determinants of bond prices.
A theoretical explanation of the relation between those can be found in Brunner-
meier (2008), from which I borrow Figure 3.1, with contagion explained in Kyle
and Xiong (2001a), from a wealth perspective, and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer
(2013), following a limit arbitrage characterization.
Figure 3.1.: The two spirals from liquidity
1See Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)
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Portfolio adjustment dynamics are, usually, triggered by initial default shocks. Those
lead capital constrained investors to unwind their positions, prices diverging from
market fundamentals. That divergence drives subsequent portfolio adjustment pro-
cesses, due to mark-to-market practices. Those push up funding needs, leading
investors to re-balance their entire portfolio. Riskier investments, both in terms
of liquidity or credit, are sold with safer investments undertaken. Sold out pro-
cesses, further, push down market liquidity on more fragile markets, feeding back
the process and, potentially, leading to a simultaneous collapse of market liquidity
conditions.
From a theoretical point of view, flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity phenomena
can be distinguished, while their empirical consequences are very similar. Hence,
empirically disentangling both actions turns out to be very complex. Furthermore,
credit and liquidity are related in both expansions and recessions, while the intrin-
sic relation between both attributes is amplified by funding scarcity during crisis
periods.
The importance of liquidity conditions, for portfolio selection, along with endo-
geneity concerns, rises un-answered questions on appropriate strategies to identify
liquidity. Measurement of liquidity conditions on bond markets has, traditionally,
relied on a proxy based approach, such as in Warga (1992) and Boellen and Whaley
(1998), while a di erent econometric approach, based on instrumental variables and
modeling dynamics, is presented on Fontaine and Garcia (2012).
Fontaine and Garcia (2012), pairing some carefully selected on-the-run and of-the-
run Treasury Securities2 and using an age related measure, illustrate how changes
on liquidity and funding conditions interact for the determination of yields. Link-
ages between their funding liquidity measure (liquidity premium), the repo market,
and shadow banking are established, concluding that “funding conditions have a
pervasive and large e ect in the determination of interest rates, not only in crisis
periods but also in normal times”. Their results posts some evidence in favor of
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) theoretical model.
My study focuses in the analysis of liquidity implications on European Government
Debt Markets. The singular combination of structural and country specific features
2See, also, Elton and Green (1998) and Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005)
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characterizing those markets, along with recent price developments, makes this an
ideal market for a liquidity study. Among relevant characteristics of this market
are:
• Funding rules are common, as a common banking authority exists
• There are no currency risks for banks
• No common bond class or debt sharing commitment is present
• Each country bond market is singular due to taxation, market making rules,
macroeconomic conditions...
• Liquidity and credit quality are substitutes in this market, as pointed in Beber,
Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009)
Two di erent approaches are present, in the literature, to analyze the pricing of
European bonds. Some papers3 use factor models to study the determinants of yield
changes, or yield spreads in the European Market; while others relate changes on
European yields with changes in US Treasury yields.4 Following a similar approach
to that presented in Fontaine and Garcia (2012), I recover liquidity conditions of the
Euro-Area government bond market through the use of an a ne structure model.
Then I explore the interrelations of bond liquidity changes, across countries and
with other financial markets.5
The interrelations between European bond liquidity and other financial markets
have been explored in Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) and Allen, Carletti, and
Gale (2009). The first paper, illustrate how liquidity, CDS spreads and order flow
jointly determine flow volumes and yield spreads. They conclude that while liquidity
is an important factor to determine volumes invested in the market (and therefore
bid-ask spreads), credit concerns are relevant to explain the evolution of spreads
3See, for example, Geyer, Kossmeier, and Pichler (2004) and Menkveld, Cheung, and De Jong
(2004)
4Among others, Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003), Favero, Pagano, and Thadden (2010), and
Ang and Longsta  (2013)
5I believe that di erences in the use of monetary policy between the ECB and the FED, for the
considered period, have distorted the correlation between both markets. The Federal Reserve
has performed open market operations, to guarantee the correct transfer of the Monetary policy
to the real economy, while the European Central Bank has not been so active. This invalidates
a comparison based approach.
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across countries.6 In Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) a positive relation between
non-hedgeable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and interbank market volatility, in line
with the proposal of Goodfriend and King (1988) is found. Liquidity shocks conduce
to interbank market volatility peeks.
My results post evidence on the existence of two liquidity di erentiated, but inter-
related, bond markets within the Euro-Area. The first one is composed of Core
countries, with the second including Peripherals. A further decomposition, to be
rationalized in terms of market size is also found. For Core countries, bond liquidity
and cash markets are substitutives while this is not the case for Peripherals. Liq-
uidity contagion patterns are identified. The evolution of liquidity on small markets
is a leading indicator of future changes of liquidity on big markets. Also, changes
of liquidity conditions on big sized core bond markets lead changes of liquidity con-
ditions on Peripherals. This is in line with the existence of a wealth transmission
channel of liquidity, as proposed in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013) and Kyle
and Xiong (2001b).
While the evolution of liquidity conditions among European countries, and its rela-
tion with cash markets is relevant per se, I also analyze the interactions of that and
CDS spreads developments. Opposite to several studies7 were CDS spreads are seen
to lead bond liquidity developments, measured through traditional proxies, I find
positive liquidity shocks to reduce future credit spreads. This apparent contradic-
tion arises due to a measurement error of liquidity through traditional proxies. A
liquidity shock will be reflected on changes of, both, bid and ask price levels. When
the di erence between those is computed, a part of the liquidity e ect is neglected.
This is not the case when changes on CDS spreads are considered. Hence, liquid-
ity conditions will appear to a ect more CDS spreads, and that measure will lead
changes on the proxy variable.
In the next section I present the foundations of my liquidity model along with its
calibration. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 estimation results. In section 5
I conclude.
6This is in contrast with Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), where asset prices are found to be related
with liquidity risk (understood as the risk of a profound change in liquidity conditions).
7See, for example, Pelizzon et al. (2015)
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3.2. The model
3.2.1. Theoretical model
I start by stating the a ne term-structure model that can be solved for the bond
prices irrespectively of the existence of liquidity e ects. Assume a Gaussian process
for the a ne factors of each country Fi,c, that drive the short rate yield:
dF = K(◊ ≠ F )dt+  dBQ (3.1)
where K is assumed to be a diagonal 3x3 matrix. ◊, is the long run level of factors,
and BQ, is a vector of independent standard Brownian motions under the risk-
neutral measure, Q, and   is assumed to be a 3x3 diagonal variance-covariance
matrix.
ÿ
=
Qccca
‡1 0 0
0 ‡2 0
0 0 ‡3
Rdddb
Under those the assumptions, Christensen, Diebold, and Rudebusch (2009), (CDR
therein) show that the solution of the above dynamics, for the discount yield func-
tion, could be written as:
yt (m) = ac,t (m) +
3ÿ
i=1
Fi,c,t(m)—i,,c,t (3.2)
with ac,t (m) the maturity dependent drift8 and —i,c,t the corresponding factor loading
at date t, for factor i, and country c:
8The expression for the constant, ac,t(m), that guarantees ◊ = 0, under the risk neutral measure
Q, can be found in the appendix of this paper
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—1,c,t = 1
—2,c,t = (1≠e
≠⁄1m)
⁄1m
—3,c,t = (1≠e
≠⁄1m)
⁄1m
≠ e≠⁄1m
In addition to assumed dynamics for the short rate, and in line with findings of
previous chapter9, I believe in the existence of a country specific, capital ratio de-
pendent, liquidity premium,   (kc,t). Actual capital ratio is the result of capital
accumulation on previous period. Hence, actual bond prices would be related with
the capital situation at the moment the bond was initially issued and, as a conse-
quence, with the time the bond has been quoted in the market.10 Thus, I propose
the following specification for the determination of bond prices:
P ú (Fc,t, ageM,c,t, Lc,t) =
Mÿ
m=m1
Dc,t (m)◊ Cc,t (m) +  (kc,t) (3.3)
where Dc,t (m) = e≠m(ac(m)+b
€
c,tFc,t(m)) is the discount factor, for a country, c, of any
payo  taking place at any date, m. For the functional specification of the liquidity
measure,   (kc,t) = ’c (Lc,t, ageM,c,t), I follow Fontaine and Garcia (2012), while the
liquidity factor is assumed to a ect homogeneously the entire yield curve:11
’c (Lc,t, ageM,c,t) = Lc,te(≠
1
Ÿc
ageM,c,t) (3.4)
9The relation between bond prices and capital follows an exponential pattern. See Figure 2.2 for
an illustration
10The use of a variable related with the time, ageM,c,t, a bond has been quoted in the market, as
an instrument, allows me to avoid endogeneity concerns related with the simultaneous deter-
mination of bond portfolio size, bond price and capital holdings. This variable were, initially,
found to be relevant for the determination of bond prices in Warga (1992) and Fontaine and
Garcia (2012).
11This departs from the specification in Fontaine and Garcia (2012). In their model, the liquidity
factor loading Lc,t is additionally weighted by a maturity specific coe cient, —M . Parameters,
—M and Ÿc, are, then, estimated through the construction of buckets including bonds with
similar maturity but di erent issuance date.
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Consequently, the liquidity factor loading, Lc,t, should be interpreted as the average
(base) e ect on bond prices of the common liquidity conditions. The country specific
parameter, Ÿc, tries to capture, in a reduced form, the time decay in the incidence
of initial capital conditions for actual bond price determination. If Ÿc is positive and
equal to two, the relative impact in pricing of liquidity of a just issued bond is a
40% bigger than for those assets that have been in the market for one year.
Assuming an Orstein-Uhlenbeck specification for the evolution of the liquidity factor,
Lc,t, and using a simple Euler discretization for 3.1, leads to the following specifica-
tion for the dynamics of individual factors (both liquidity and term structure):
Fi,c,t ≠ F¯i,c = ki,c
1
Fi,c,t ≠ F¯i,c
2
+ ‡i,c‘i,c,t (3.5)
where ki is the auto-correlation parameter, ‡i the factor volatility and F¯i,c the long
run factor mean.
3.2.2. Model Estimation
The typical approximation to recover term factors is to use bootstrapped forward
rates from coupon prices. Unfortunately, that leads to near-exact pricing of the
original sample of bond prices which pushes liquidity e ects and price idiosyncrasies
into forward rates. A classical solution for the over-fitting problem is to exclude
bonds with large price discrepancies, relative to their neighbors.12 However, this
procedure removes any evidence of liquidity e ects, thus being unfeasible for liquidity
identification purposes.
Hence, instead of estimating our model on rates, or introducing potential selection
bias by an ad hoc selection procedure I decide to use un-smoothed fixed coupon
bond prices, and an unbalanced price panel, for the estimation of my state space
model. The formal representation of that is:
12See Fama and Bliss (1987) for further details
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Fc,t ≠ Fc = Kc (Fc,t ≠ Fc) +  ‘c,t (3.6)
Pt = „ (Fc,t, Cc,t, agec,t) +  ◊t (3.7)
where Kc is a 4x4 diagonal autorregresive coe cient matrix, „ a nx1 vector of
estimated prices resulting from 3.3.   is the 4x4 diagonal variance-covariance matrix
of factors and   the nxn diagonal covariance matrix of pricing errors. To simplify
the estimation of  , a linear maturity dependent specification for the individual
elements of that matrix is proposed:
 n = Ê0 + Ê1Mn (3.8)
3.6 fully characterizes factor dynamics and 3.7 measurement dynamics. System
estimation involves 16 parameters in a non-linear framework. Non-linearity results
in technical di culties with traditional estimation methods which leads me to the use
of Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) methodology, introduced by Julier and Durrant-
Whyte (1995).13
The UKF is more accurate, for the estimation of term structure models, than the
traditional Extended Kallman Filter,14 while presents the advantage of not requiring
analytical derivatives for its computation. Moreover, the estimation of model param-
eters can be made via likelihood function maximization, under a QML framework.15
That likelihood function could be written as:
L (Ê) =
T
 
t=1
l (Pt;Ê) =
T
 
t=1
log (  (Pt+1,t, t+1,t;Ê)) (3.9)
13The description of such filtering methodology falls beyond the scope of this document and, so,
we refer to the textbook of Wan and Merwe (2002) for its full discussion.
14See Christensen, Diebold, and Rudebusch (2011)
15For further details see Fontaine and Garcia (2012)
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where  (·) is the multivariate Gaussian density, and (Pt+1,t, t+1,t) the, one period
ahead, prediction of prices and mean squared errors (MSE).
The structure of the model, characterized on equations 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, require
imposing some parametric restrictions. To guarantee stationarity, the elements in
the autorregresive matrix, Kc, must remain within the unit circle, while Ÿc and ⁄1
must be positive. Additionally, a non-linear restriction to the second covariance
contour is imposed, to guarantee non-negative instantaneous interest rates.16
A fundamental concern with the proposed methodology relates to the consistency
of Unscented Kalman Filter parameter estimates, when using unbalanced panel
data. This problem, has been recently studied by Pancost (2013), for an unbalanced
sample of US treasury bond prices. At least for that case, the introduction of an age
related factor, improves asymptotic distribution of errors, leading to consistency of
estimates.
3.3. The Data
In this study, I use a weekly sample of sovereign bonds, for a set of European
Countries.17 From the complete sample of references I dropped floating coupon,
stripped and zero coupon bonds. I also drop bonds with special characteristics, as
early redemption or call-ability. Therefore, only fixed coupon bonds are considered,
to obtain an ex-ante liquidity homogeneous database. Finally, bonds with a residual
maturity of less than one year, more than 30 years, or whose initial maturity was
above 50 years are also dropped.
The sample period starts in January 2007 and ends in December 2011. Data then
includes 95, 456 observations, on 12 countries, and 261 weeks. Information on coupon
rates, payment frequency and maturity dates, joint with end-of-week clean prices in
16In the equilibrium no restriction is binding and the estimation is performed in two steps, using
Matlab. An initial parameter estimation is obtained, using monthly data, the fmincon optimizer
and multiple starting parameters. Then, those estimations are used as an initial guess for the
weekly calibration. The BFGS numerical approximation to the hessian matrix using fminunc
routine is then used to identify the variance-covariance matrix,  .
17Deutschland, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Finland
and Greece within the Euro Area and Switzerland as a Non-Euro country
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USD are recovered from Datastream, for each reference. From that information, I
compute coupon bond prices. Additionally, first issuance date information is used
to construct the age variable, in years.
Reference yields for the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 year maturities and 5 year CDS
spreads in USD (when available), are collected, for each country, from Datastream.
Time series data of the Eurostoxx Volatility Index (VSTOXX), Eurostoxx 600 Bank-
ing Index Market to Book Value ratio, Eonia rates, Euribor rates and 1, 2, 5 and 10
years IRS rates, are also obtained from the same source. Data on bond borrowing
comes from Markit DataExplorers database. That includes, for each reference and
day, information on average lending (repo) fees for di erent time horizons.18
As my sample period only cover a crisis, results are subject to critique due to the
existence of selection bias. While data on prices could be expanded to a previous
year, that is not possible for other series. An increase of the sample size to a more
recent year is, also, problematic. In this case, market actions by the ECB would
have modified existing relations between bond prices, making estimates unrepresen-
tative. Thus, following results should not be understood to be representative of long
run structural relations but, rather, interpreted in terms of what happens during
recessions.
3.4. Estimation Results
Table 3.1 presents Kalman filter estimates for model parameters under the proposed
methodology, with p-values in parenthesis. Results are presented for each country
but Deutschland. For this last country, liquidity estimates are not significant, at
any confidence level. This is consistent with the benchmarking role of Deutschland
Debt, and allow to interpret the liquidity factor in relative terms.
The liquidity factor (along with the traditional ones), is significant for all the consid-
ered countries, at least at a 10% level. However, great variation on estimates for the
18Descriptive statistics can be found in appendix to this document
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Table 3.1.: Unscented Kallman Filter estimates of the Term Structure A ne Model with
Liquidity
F1,c k1,c ‡1 F2,c k2,c ‡2 F3,c k3,c ‡3 Lc kL,c ‡L Ÿ Ê0 Ê1
AT 0.150úúú 0.969úúú 0.0197úúú -0.1344úúú 0.1026úúú 0.0143úúú -0.1771úúú -0.7206úúú 0.276úúú -0.004úúú 0.9741úúú 0.0021úúú 1.5474úúú 0,0024úúú 0,0033úúú
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
BE 0.1871úúú 0.9697ú 0.0032úú -0.1769ú -0.0019ú 0.0003úú -0.2254ú -0.9879úú 0.2985ú -0.0628úú 0.9143úúú 0.0018ú 2.9943ú 0,0139úú 0,0001ú
(0.0093) (0,0521 ) (0,0185 ) (0,0786 ) (0,0839 ) (0,0140 ) (0,0858 ) (0,0424 ) (0,0715 ) (0,0277 ) (0,0010 ) (0,0561) (0,0600 ) (0,0457 ) (0,0502 )
CH 0.0287ú 0.9696úú 0.0016úúú -0.018ú 0.0468úú 0.0102úú -0.0227ú -0.4998úú 0.0002úú -0.0238úú -0.2166ú 0.0004ú 2.9992ú 0,0094ú 0,0086úú
(0,0957 ) (0,0407 ) (0,0084 ) (0,0990 ) (0,0652 ) (0,0532 ) (0,0769 ) (0,0247 ) (0,0290 ) (0,0371 ) (0,0892 ) (0,0713 ) (0,0702 ) (0,0820 ) (0,0133 )
ES -0.3933úú 0.7673úú 0.0068ú -0.3226úú -0.0162úúú 0.3032ú -0.1113úú -0.8881úú 0.0025úú -0.0042úú 0.4547úúú 0.0041úúú 0.5196úú 0,0002úú 0,0014úú
(0.0152) (0,0393 ) (0,0927 ) (0,0109 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0521 ) (0,0265 ) (0,0306 ) (0,0478 ) (0,0432 ) (0,0485 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0193 ) (0,0499 ) (0,0306 )
FI 0.2188úúú 0.8957úúú 0.0016úú -0.1807úúú 0.2078úúú 0.0627úú -0.0813úúú -0.0194úú 0.0265úú -0.0048úú 0.7826úúú 0.0028úúú 2.1896úúú 0,0022úúú 0,0029úú
(0.0000) (0,0000 ) (0,0115 ) (0,0091 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0285 ) (0,0005 ) (0,0438 ) (0,0134 ) (0,0428 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0171 )
FR 0.3125ú 0.9892úú 0.0038ú 0.3243úú 0.0283úúú 0.4641ú -0.3782úúú -0.394úú 0.4429úú -0.0533ú 0.9673úú 0.0017úú 2.9954ú 0,0100ú 0,0000úú
(0,0769 ) (0,0184 ) (0,0672 ) (0,0110 ) (0,0015 ) (0,0740 ) (0,0035 ) (0,0447) (0,0331 ) (0,0922 ) (0,0231 ) (0,0136 ) (0,0678 ) (0,0852 ) (0,0252 )
GR 0.045úú 0.9932úú 0.0025ú -0.0226úú 0.8483úú 0.0089ú -0.0004ú -0.003úú 0.0856ú -0.0138úú 0.1836ú 0.0016ú 1.0605ú 0,0127ú 0,0143úú
(0,0428 ) (0,0330 ) (0,0963 ) (0,0245 ) (0,0145) (0,0739) (0,0978 ) (0,0153 ) (0,0842 ) (0,0104 ) (0,0588 ) (0,0995 ) (0,0729 ) (0,0878 ) (0,0189 )
IE 0.0552úú 0.9660úúú 0.0024úú -0.0371úú 0.0488úúú -0.0149úú -0.0144úú -0.2265úú 0.009úú -0.0027úú 0.9891úú 0.0009úú 0.6358úú 0,0026úú 0,0033úú
(0.0208) (0,0000 ) (0,0141 ) (0,0114 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0368 ) (0,0355 ) (0,0398 ) (0,0454 ) (0,0467 ) (0,0192 ) (0,0437 ) (0,0151 ) (0,0208 ) (0,0275 )
IT 0.0496úúú 0.9678úú 0.0022úú -0.0378úú 0.0016úúú 0.0198úú -0.0165úú -0.9328úú 0.0003úú -0.0053úú 0.9228úú 0.0051úú 2.996úú 0,0025úú 0,0034úú
(0.0002) (0.0224) (0,0382 ) (0,0226 ) (0,0000 ) (0,0395 ) (0,0392 ) (0,0119 ) (0,0498 ) (0,0496 ) (0,0362 ) (0,0438 ) (0,0321 ) (0,0207 ) (0,0332)
NL 0.7635úúú 0.9285úúú 0.0020úúú -0.2959úúú 0.0603úúú 0.9328úúú -0.2323úúú -0.2186úúú 0.0283úúú -0.0001úúú 0.9529úúú 0.0013úúú 2.5471úúú 0,0030úúú 0,0037úúú
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
PT 0.5054úú 0.995ú 0.0043ú -0.3438ú 0.6223ú 0.4829ú -0.0877úúú -0.002ú 0.0630ú -0.0099ú 0.9755úúú 0.0002úú 0.575úú 0,0011ú 0,0039úú
(0,0318 ) (0,0548 ) (0,0968 ) (0,0742 ) (0,0977 ) (0,0779 ) (0,0096 ) (0,0587 ) (0,0769 ) (0,0628 ) (0,0009 ) (0,0349 ) (0,0396 ) (0,0806 ) (0,0242 )
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
decay parameter, Ÿc, and on the impact of the liquidity factor on prices, is found.
For all Euro-Area countries, age has a positive e ect on prices. Older bonds are
overpriced compared to new issuances. This is consistent with a period of capital
deterioration. Estimates suggest the existence of two di erentiated liquidity mar-
kets within the euro-area: Core countries and Peripherals. A full characterization
of which country belongs to each category could be found in Table 3.3.
The average impact of liquidity is high and very persistent for Belgium and France.
For Belgium new references have a lower price of 6.28$ than their peers. For France
the discrepancy is of 5.33$. This is in line with the deterioration of their banking
systems, that led to the restructuring of some banks, like Dexia and Credit Lionnays.
Average e ect for the remaining core countries is much smaller and amounts, on
average, to 0.29$ while for peripherals the e ect is of 0.83$.
Estimates on the decay parameter, also, highlight the di erentiation of countries
within Euro Area. Peripheral countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) exhibit
low decay parameter values. An average value of 0.69 is estimated. Roughly speak-
ing, each year since issuance reduces the impact of liquidity on prices in a 75%. Core
countries, in contrast, exhibit an average decay parameter value of 2.54, equivalent
to a reduction of 33%, per year, on the e ects of capital. While the e ect of cap-
ital on peripherals bond prices reflect a high exposure to shocks, liquidity on core
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countries is a structural factor.
High persistence of liquidity e ects on core country prices, when compared to periph-
erals, could be rationalized in terms of convergence trading. According to theoretical
findings in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013), arbitrageurs belonging to di er-
ent, but integrated, economies holding di erent capital levels and risk exposures,
will buy assets in that economy for which returns are higher. Thus, relative liquid-
ity will be, apparently, above expected in riskier markets. However, market returns
(yields) will be always above those of less risky countries.
While Switzerland does not belong to the Euro-Area, I incorporate that country
to get a confirmation (limited) on the relation between my liquidity measure and
banking capital. As expected, the liquidity factor has a positive impact on prices for
this country, while decay parameter value is similar to that of Core Countries. This
is in line to the perception of Switzerland as a capital unconstrained economy.19
Figure 3.2, present the evolution of liquidity for each country.20 That provides fur-
ther evidence on the linkage of bond prices with capital and banking crises. The cases
of Ireland, Portugal and Greece are, by obvious reasons paradigmatic. Deep di er-
ences, among the economic conditions of those countries exist, while their graphs
illustrate the relevant e ects of banking crisis in government bond liquidity condi-
tions.
For Ireland, a sharp reduction of liquidity conditions followed the revelation of fi-
nancial di culties of Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland. Those di culties, led
to the issuance of state guarantees on September 2008. A similar pattern is ob-
served for Portugal, in the period 2008-2009, after the crisis of “Banco Portugues
de Negocios”, also bailed out by the government.
The case of Greece reveals both, the linkage between bond prices and banking fund-
ing costs and the e ect of a government bail-in by supranational authorities.21 A
sharp reduction in liquidity conditions followed the rating downgrade by S&P, in
19Further evidence on the linkage between liquidity and bank capital is provided on next sections
20Liquidity is presented in normalized terms. Changes, then, should be interpreted as significant
deviations from its structural level.
21Computation of the liquidity factor for Greece ended on April 2011. From that date, covariance
matrix becomes singular. This suggests an structural change in the relation between bank
capital and bond prices, likely to derive from debt restructuring negotiations
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April 2010, to non investment grade. That, excluded Greek debt as an eligible col-
lateral in financing operations conducted by the ECB. A sharp recovery of those
conditions took place after the central bank decided to relax debt eligibility con-
ditions, granting the access of Greek banks to financing operations, in May. The
start of debt restructuring negotiations between Greece and the Troika drove a big
increase in the impact of liquidity on prices at the beginning of 2011.
Figure 3.2.: Evolution of the Standardized Liquidity Factor by Country
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3.4.1. Spill-over e ects of liquidity across European countries
Predictive regressions of each standardized country liquidity factor using other coun-
tries lagged liquidity factor, are performed.22 Results, for a one week prediction hori-
zon23 are presented in Table 3.2. Those illustrate the existence of liquidity spill-over
e ects across European debt markets.
Table 3.2.: Spill-over e ects of the liquidity factor, 1 month horizon
AT NL FI FR BE IE ES GR IT PT
L.AT 0.990úúú 0.0220úúú -0.0256úúú -0.0530úúú -0.0128úúú -0.0862úúú 0.172úúú -0.0317úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.FI 0.0387úúú -0.0280úúú 0.931úúú 0.0193úúú 0.00666úúú 0.0141úú 0.0858úúú 0.00807úú -0.0200úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
L.FR -0.0300úúú 0.0283úúú 0.0103úúú 0.887úúú -0.0386úúú 0.0280úúú -0.0394úúú -0.0168úúú -0.0172úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.BE -0.0141úúú -0.0463úúú -0.0237úúú 0.0439úúú 0.916úúú 0.00573úúú -0.00714úú 0.0839úúú 0.0472úúú 0.00670úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
L.IE 0.00396 -0.0204úúú 0.0315úúú -0.0229úúú 0.994úúú 0.156úúú -0.115úúú -0.0436úúú
(0.358) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.ES 0.0142úúú 0.0489úúú -0.0178úúú 0.0401úúú -0.0224úúú 0.882úúú 0.0693úúú 0.0241úúú -0.0236úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.GR -0.0171úúú 0.0362úúú -0.0511úúú 0.00169 -0.0479úúú 0.788úúú -0.0358úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.IT -0.0356úúú 0.0548úúú 0.0390úúú -0.0871úúú -0.0426úúú -0.00617úúú -0.129úúú 0.921úúú -0.00926úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
L.PT -0.00770úú -0.0357úúú 0.0287úúú -0.0262úúú 0.0146úúú -0.132úúú 0.0212úúú 1.006úúú
(0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
L.NL 0.965úúú 0.0263úúú 0.0297úúú 0.0196úúú -0.0896úúú -0.0124úú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011)
Observations 2441 2441 2811 2441 2811 2441 2441 2431 2441 2811
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
According to the theoretical model in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013), substi-
tution e ects are likely to drive the evolution of closely related markets when capital
constraints are absent, while capital constraints are likely to lead to liquidity con-
tagion through the wealth channel. The degree of economic integration will also be
relevant. The greater the degree of interrelation between two countries, the greater
the size of the regression coe cient should be.
22Endogeneity is mitigated by including a lagged version of the predictive liquidity factor. Newey-
West robust standard errors considered for p-values computation
23Similar results are presented in TableA.1 and TableA.2 for alternative horizons
132
Hence the following convention is set. Contagion e ects will exist whenever the
regression coe cient is positive. Increases (reductions) in the liquidity premium, for
a country, translate into future increases (reductions) in the liquidity premium for
another country. Substitution e ects will exist whenever the regression coe cient
is negative.
Regression results on Table 3.2 reinforce the existence of two di erentiated liquidity
markets within the euro-area. That general categories can, further, be splitted on
two additional sets. Those two, approximately, correspond to a size categorization.
This categorization is presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3.: Countries by category
Big Market Small Market
Core countries France, Belgium Austria, Netherlands, Finland
Peripherals Spain, Italy Greece, Portugal, Ireland
Within each general category, liquidity conditions of smaller countries are leading
indicators (and thus contagion between countries exist) of price changes on bigger
bond markets. Liquidity shocks a ect quicker to more illiquid markets. Changes
on liquidity conditions on Spain (Belgium) lead changes on liquidity conditions on
Italy (France). Contingent on the prediction horizon (one week, two weeks or one
month), one standard deviation of the liquidity premium for Spain translates in
a future increase of 0.024 (0.0531 or 0.0818) standard deviations in the liquidity
premium of Italy. For Belgium, the same increase, leads to predicted increases of
0.0439 (0.0699 or 0.0626) on France liquidity. For smaller bond markets, similar
results are found.
Aggregate contagion e ects are present when considering the e ect of big core coun-
try liquidity shocks on peripherals liquidity. This points towards the existence of a
wealth channel for liquidity transmission. As bond prices, in core countries, increase,
due to funding liquidity, mark-to-market practices increase holders wealth. The in-
crease in wealth lead to portfolio re-balance (diversification) and price increases on
peripheral bonds.
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A flight to liquidity is, also, observed within regions. Aggregate substitution e ects
to Italy (Spain) are observed in the predictive regressions of Ireland, Greece and
Portugal. One standard deviation increase in the liquidity premium of Spain and
Italy, translate on aggregate reductions of the liquidity premium of 0.03 (0.05 or
0.09) standard deviations for the Irish case, of 0.05 (0.04 or 0.08) for the Greek case
and of 0.03 (0.06 or 0.12) for Portugal. Similar e ects are also in place for the case
of Belgium and France and smaller core countries.
Overall, those e ects point in the appropriate direction to validate the theoretical
model presented in Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013).
3.4.2. Liquidity and bond excess returns
Liquidity e ects extend to the predictability of bond excess returns. Those are
defined as the di erence between the benchmark yield and the Euribor interest rate,
for the prediction horizon. Results on the capacity of the liquidity measure to predict
bond excess returns, on di erent horizons, are shown in Table 3.4. As discussed in
Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005), for the case of US treasuries, term structure factors are incorporated, to
control for the information content on forward rates.
Table 3.4.: Bond Excess Returns and Liquidity
1Y YIELD 2Y YIELD 3Y YIELD 4Y YIELD 5Y YIELD 7Y YIELD 10Y YIELD
3 Months -0.546úúú -0.571úúú -0.574úúú -0.561úúú -0.535úúú -0.467úúú -0.401úúú
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
6 Months -0.556úúú -0.557úúú -0.547úúú -0.526úúú -0.498úúú -0.431úú -0.343úú
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.036)
12 Months -0.336ú -0.306 -0.276 -0.247 -0.219 -0.164 -0.0887
(0.078) (0.100) (0.128) (0.162) (0.202) (0.301) (0.521)
R2 3 Months 0.285 0.308 0.313 0.312 0.310 0.302 0.286
(0.223) (0.246) (0.254) (0.258) (0.260) (0.260) (0.253)
R26 Months 0.250 0.263 0.265 0.266 0.267 0.267 0.258
(0.188) (0.205) (0.213) (0.219) (0.224) (0.232) (0.233)
R2 12 Months 0.134 0.149 0.160 0.172 0.186 0.217 0.248
(0.115) (0.134) (0.148) (0.162) (0.178) (0.212) (0.247)
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
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In line with findings in Fontaine and Garcia (2012), the liquidity factor presents
high predictive capacity. The upper part of that table presents regression results of
our liquidity premium on future (annualized) excess returns for 3, 6 and 12 month
horizons and maturities ranging from 1 to 10 years. In the lower panel, adjusted R-
squared results are presented, including and excluding (between braces) my liquidity
factor.
Estimates are negative, and significant, for all maturities up to a 6 month horizon.
A one standard deviation shock to liquidity produces an impact on excess returns
that ranges from 54 to 40 bps, in 3 month predictions, and from 55 to 34 bps, on 6
month predictions. R-square measure, for the same horizons, ranges from 28.5% to
31.5% for the shorter and from 25% to 26.7% for the longer horizon.
Results excluding the liquidity factor illustrate that, on an average, a 20% of total
predictive power is due to that factor.24 Next, in order to grant the validity of
my factor as a true indicator of funding liquidity conditions I analyze the relation
between that and real repo rates.
3.4.3. Liquidity and lending (repo) market
DataExplorers data on lending comprises daily information on lending rates, bor-
rowed amounts and total lending capacity, by reference, for the full span of countries,
at a daily frequency. A value weighted average lending fee, for each instrument, is
available at weekly and daily frequencies. That data is aggregated, to construct a
country specific indicator, making use of transaction quantities for each reference,
and annualized weekly fees. Excess funding costs on repo transactions are, then,
computed, for each prediction horizon, as the di erence between lending fees and
their respective riskless rates.25
24Even though this results seem relevant, one concern is that model misspecification would lead to
estimates of the term structure factors that do not correctly capture the information content
of forward rates inducing spurious correlation between liquidity and excess returns. However,
absence of a unified database at a Euro level on forward rates does not allow us to perform a
formal test of this hypothesis.
25For prediction horizons below one year, Euribor rates are considered. For longer horizons, rates
are computed via bootstrapping methodology on 6 month IRS rate curve.
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Concerns with lending data relate with the fact that pure funding operations cannot
be separated of those performed for speculative purposes. Typical repo contracts
do not specify the necessity to disclose the objective of a repo (lending) transaction.
Potentially any repo transaction could be conducted with speculative purposes. An-
other concern arises due to the existence of “specials” and “reference bonds”. The
e ect of “specials” and “reference bonds” on repo market transactions is well doc-
umented in the literature. It will lead to an increase in the perception of overall
liquidity within a market, concentrating transactions at relatively lower rates.
Those concerns would translate into the existence of measurement errors on lending
rates. However, the amount of references for each country, helps keep measurement
error at a low level, when weighted averages lending fees are considered.
Predictive regressions, for di erent horizons, of the liquidity factor on excess funding
costs are then conducted. Country fixed e ects panel regressions include term struc-
ture factors to control for forward rate e ects, while Newey-West standard errors
are used to report p-values.26 Results are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5.: Repo market Excess Funding Costs and Liquidity
3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months 24 Months
LIQUIDITY -0.0991ú -0.126úú -0.155úú -0.172úú -0.209ú
(0.078) (0.042) (0.025) (0.020) (0.064)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.010
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
Regression results are conclusive, and illustrate the existing relation between our
measure and funding conditions in the bond market. A negative relation between
that and excess funding cost is present, for all prediction horizons, a maximum
predictive capacity obtained for a twelve month horizon. This is in line with the
theoretical relation between liquidity risk and funding costs. As bond liquidity risks
reduce, lenders would be more prone to accept those as collateral on their funding
26Estimates of term structure factors are dropped from regression results shown in Table 3.5.
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operations. Consequently, lending fees should reduce along with excess funding
costs.
The e ect of the liquidity factor, on predicted repo excess funding cost, is increasing
with time. This is in line with a period of reducing riskless interest rates, and
increasing cash needs by financial entities. The e ect of our liquidity measure ranges
from 9 to 20 bps, for 3 months and 24 months prediction horizons, with an average
daily excess funding cost of 46 bps and wide dispersion by country.27
The significance of the liquidity factor, as a predictive measure of excess funding
costs, illustrates the structural nature of liquidity. This is in line with findings in
Jordan and Jordan (1997), Buraschi and Menini (2002) and Cherian, Jacquier, and
Jarrow (2004), for the US market, and provides evidence of absence of misspecifica-
tion for the proposed model.
3.4.4. Liquidity and the CDS market
E ects of liquidity extend to the CDS market. As discussed in Brunnermeier (2008)
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), linkages between credit and liquidity are
likely to arise due to mark-to-market practices. Asset sell o s will follow credit
shocks, while portfolio re-balance will reduce asset prices, increasing liquidity risks
in the short run. In the long run, however, average credit spreads will not be a ected
by liquidity portfolio composition determined by fundamental characteristics.
While a pure credit product, like a CDS, should not theoretically include liquidity
e ects. The use of bootstrapping techniques on observed bond prices, to recover
CDS spreads, would attribute changes on liquidity conditions to credit shocks. This
creates, yet, another linkage between short term evolution of CDS spreads and
liquidity conditions.
To analyze the existence of such spurious relation between CDS and liquidity con-
ditions, the predictive capacity of my liquidity factor for CDS spreads is presented,
at a panel data level,28 and for di erent horizons, on Table 3.6. As on previous sec-
27The liquidity factor is relevant for Austria, Belgium, Spain and Italy and regression results by
country are available upon request.
28Country specific regressions are available upon request
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tions, term structure factors are included to control for the existence of forward rate
e ects while Newey-West robust standard errors are used for p-values computation.
Table 3.6.: Contagion of Liquidity e ects to the CDS market
3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months
LIQUIDITY -0.433úúú -0.385úú -0.284ú -0.211
(0.009) (0.028) (0.095) (0.215)
LEVEL 0.733úúú 0.835úúú 0.845úúú 0.683úú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.026)
SLOPE 0.381úú 0.130 -0.0263 -0.181
(0.021) (0.382) (0.850) (0.230)
CURVATURE -0.472úú -0.413úú -0.106 0.287úú
(0.015) (0.029) (0.452) (0.039)
R2 0.304 (0.252) 0.271 (0.233) 0.174 (0.154) 0.111 (0.098)
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
As expected, our liquidity measure is significant for the shorter horizons of 3 and
6 months, so that a one standard deviation shock in liquidity reduce CDS spreads
of 43.3 and 38.5 bps respectively, on average. The lower part of the table reports
adjusted R-squared measure, with and without (between parenthesis) including the
liquidity measure.
The importance of liquidity, as a predictor of developments in the CDS market,
reduces with the prediction horizon. Its explanatory power amounts to a maximum
of 5.2% for the shorter horizon and only to a 2% when 9 month predictions are
considered. This highlights the di using e ect of liquidity on credit spreads with
time. In the long run, CDS spreads truly reflect default probabilities while funding
constraints a ect credit spreads, in the short run, via liquidity conditions. This
validates the theoretical model in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
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3.4.5. Liquidity and Bank’s Market to Book Value measure
Now, I turn to the analysis of the interactions between bond liquidity and other non
bond markets. I start analyzing the relation between liquidity and bank capital. An
implication of bond pricing models29, arbitrage models30 and bank capital models,31
is that wealth (bank capital) e ects will work as a transmission mechanism of shocks
across markets. Reductions on bond liquidity will translate into lower banking ratios
and, mechanically, higher market-to-book value ratios.
Measuring wealth of an economy is a challenging task. A widespread convention,
when characterizing the inter-temporal evolution of wealth within an economy, is
to use the evolution of its GDP as a proxy, while a wide diversity of magnitudes
to measure aggregate wealth, like total assets, cash balances and other monetary
measures are traditionally used. In the modeling section of this chapter, the inclusion
of a liquidity factor, related with the time a bond has been quoted in the market,
has been justified to be a proxy of funding conditions. Evidence on the validity of
such perception is, now, presented.
Table 3.7, present results of predictive regressions on the value of Eurostoxx 600
Market to Book Value Banking Index and country liquidity factors. Term structure
variables are included to control for forward rate e ects, the VStoxx volatility Index
is included to control for aggregate equity risks, and a lagged values of the index to
control for endogeneity. Overall, regressions take the form:
It+h = –+
ÿ
—cLc,t + ◊Xt + ËIt + ÊVt+h + ‘t+h
Where Xt corresponds to the vector of term structure variables, Vt+h is the value of
the volatility index, It the lagged value of the market-to-book value index, and Lc,t to
the standardized value of the liquidity factor for country c at moment t. Regressions
are conducted at levels, rather than for variations, as book value magnitudes follow
29See Kyle and Xiong (2001a)
30See, for example, Kondor (2009) and Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2013)
31See previous chapter
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a slowly varying pattern. If, instead, returns were considered any liquidity e ect
would be, mathematically, cleared o  the market.
Table 3.7.: Funding Liquidity and Eurostoxx 600 Bank’s Market to Book Value Ratio
3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 12 Months
BELGIUM -0.0134úúú -0.0524úúú -0.0903úúú -0.0758úúú
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
FRANCE -0.0108úúú -0.0569úúú
(0.000) (0.003)
IRELAND -0.0879úúú -0.130úúú -0.124úúú -0.0842úú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033)
ITALY -0.0477úúú -0.0840úúú -0.119úúú -0.112úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PORTUGAL -0.0241úúú -0.0870úúú
(0.000) (0.004)
– 0.203 0.402úúú 0.651úúú 0.823úúú
(0.124) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.950 0.935 0.881 0.773
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
A clear pattern emerges from results, once non significant variables are dropped. The
evolution of the market-to-book value ratio is, in general, determined by liquidity
conditions on countries facing banking crisis during the considered period. Liquidity
of Italian Bonds is also relevant. This last fact, reflects, the importance of Italian
bonds for domestic banks’ portfolio composition,32 which makes those more exposed
to changes on bond liquidity conditions.
The relation between liquidity variations and market-to-book value is negative, as
expected. When liquidity conditions are above its long run mean, market-to-book
value is found to increase less than expected. This relation validate my perception
on the close evolution of funding and liquidity conditions, and arises due to the
32According to data from ECB, 40% of Italian banks’ bond portfolio correspond to Italian Gov-
ernment Bonds.
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increase of book values.33 R-squared values illustrate the capacity of liquidity factors
to explain changes on market to book value ratios. That measure oscillates between
95% for the 3 months horizon to 77.3% for one year predictions.
Unexplained market to book value ratio changes range from 20.3%, for 3 months pre-
diction horizon, to 82.3% for yearly computations. The higher impact on market-to
book value changes are due to deviations of liquidity conditions on Ireland. Among
European countries, that one su ered the deepest banking crisis, most of its banking
system including the two biggest banks (Anglo-Irish and Bank of Ireland) required
capital injections, lately coming from external institutions.34 Roughly speaking, one
standard deviation shock to this factor leads to unexpected reductions of the market
to book value of 13% to 8%, depending on the prediction horizon.
Greece liquidity factor is found not to have, statistically significant, impact on the
evolution of capital (funding) conditions. This relates to the fact that , opposite
to other European crises, Greek crisis is founded on credit rather than on liquidity
concerns. It also posts evidence on the low representativity of that banking system
at a European scale.
3.4.6. Liquidity and Cash Markets
I end up the characterization of the e ects of bond liquidity conditions, with an anal-
ysis of the relation of that conditions and cash markets. Over the considered period
a decline in the activity of the interbank market took place. That relates to con-
cerns on banks resilience. Resilient banks (core country banks) holding excess cash
positions have, over the period, restricted their activities in the interbank market,
to gain protection against unexpected default by potential borrowing banks (periph-
eral banks). A declining relation between Euribor rates and liquidity conditions of
peripheral banks is, hence, likely to exist over my sampling period.
Table 3.8 illustrate the existence of such evolution for a three month prediction
33While book value is dependent on past performance, market value is an expectational measure.
Hence, unpredicted deviations of liquidity from its long run mean will just a ect book values
and not market values.
34As a consequence Debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 45% to 106% on the 2008-2011 period.
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horizon and Euribor 3 month loans35. Instead of relating the Euribor rates to our
liquidity measure, an excess return variable is computed, as the di erence between
the relevant term Euribor rate and Eonia. Therefore, excess returns represent the
term risk premium a bank will receive by lending money to private sector at a long
term floating rate and financing those loans daily in the interbank market.
Table 3.8.: Liquidity e ects on 3 month Euribor
2007-2011 2007 2007-2008 2007-2009 2007-2010
AUSTRIA 0.0691úú 0.175úúú 0.0775ú 0.115úúú
(0.010) (0.006) (0.098) (0.008)
IRELAND 0.117úúú -0.696úúú 0.164úúú 0.209úúú 0.110úúú
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
BELGIUM 0.0730úúú
(0.002)
SPAIN 0.205úú
(0.038)
NETHERLANDS 0.418úúú -0.276úúú -0.118úúú
(0.000) (0.001) (0.008)
PORTUGAL 1.992úúú -0.188úúú
(0.000) (0.000)
GREECE 0.198úúú
(0.006)
ITALY 0.244úúú 0.0678úú
(0.000) (0.043)
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.826 0.578 0.506 0.500
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
The first column of that table shows whole sample period results with additional
columns presenting rolling regressions for 2007 to 2010 period including one addi-
tional year in each. A reduction in the explicative capacity of our liquidity measure,
as measured by R-square, and the number of country liquidity premiums related to
excess returns is observed, in line with expected results.
35Results for 6, 9 and 12 Month Euribor are qualitatively similar and available from the author
upon request
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The explicative capacity of fluctuations in liquidity reduces from 82.6% in 2007
to 38.1% for the entire period. Regression coe cients are positive, reflecting the
sustitivity of cash and bond markets in Europe. This is in contrast with findings in
Fontaine and Garcia (2012) where poor sustitivity between bond and cash markets
is observed. The relevance of Irish liquidity is in line with the documented behavior
of their banking system over the considered period.36
Table 3.9.: Liquidity e ects on 2 year IRS excess returns
2007-2011 2007 2007-2008 2007-2009 2007-2010
AUSTRIA -0.175úúú 0.452úúú -0.289úúú -0.347úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BELGIUM 0.0648úúú 0.0568úúú 0.0690úú
(0.003) (0.009) (0.016)
SPAIN 0.101úúú -0.281úúú 0.179úú 0.181úúú
(0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
FINLAND 0.142úúú 0.219ú 0.262úúú 0.256úúú
(0.001) (0.068) (0.000) (0.000)
GREECE -0.0458ú 0.170úú
(0.093) (0.019)
IRELAND -0.115úú -0.326úúú -0.108úú
(0.050) (0.003) (0.038)
ITALY -0.190úúú -0.169ú -0.168úúú
(0.000) (0.083) (0.000)
NETHERLANDS 0.0774úú -0.166úú
(0.022) (0.017)
PORTUGAL -0.162úúú -1.785úúú -0.355úúú -0.261úúú -0.210úúú
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.836 0.944 0.820 0.855 0.812
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
Joint variability of Eonia and Euribor rates could be contaminating results through
rates correlation. Table 3.9 present the results when considering an alternative excess
36 Irish banks increased the amount borrowed over the period in the interbank market at a 3
month horizon and used that to concede new mortgages and buy government bonds.
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return measure. This is computed as the di erence between Euribor 6 month rates
and 2 year vs 6 month Euribor IRS rates. IRS rates reflect the fixed payment a
bank will receive each year of the duration of the contract against a six month
floating payment equal to 6 month Euribor. Hence, its di erence with 6 month
annualized Euribor rate provides an idea of the risk premium assumed by the bank
when providing liquidity in the short run while borrowing in the long run.
Overall, regression results point in the same direction as the ones obtained for Eu-
ribor loans. A progressive decay in the relation between bond liquidity and cash
markets, as measured by R2.37 When analyzing the relation of both variables by
country, an asymmetric relation contingent on the category, Core/Peripheral, re-
veals. While cash and bond markets are substitutes for core countries, this is not
the case for peripheral ones. This validates the perception of core banking systems
as cash lenders, with peripherals behaving as cash borrowers.
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper I have illustrated the existence of an additional relevant factor to
understand the evolution of bond prices. That factor is seen to relate with capital
conditions. It is obtained through the incorporation on an a ne structure of an
exponential term related to the time a bond has been traded in the market (age).
The specification of that factor is rationalized, making use of the theoretical relation
between bond prices and capital, presented on previous chapter.
The validity of my factor, as a proxy for liquidity, is analyzed. I find a negative
relation between future repo rates excess returns and that factor. This is consistent
with the relation that would exist between liquidity and bond funding conditions.
As bond liquidity risk reduces, cash lenders would be more prone to accept bonds
as collateral on their funding operations. Hence, the excess of return required for
those transactions should reduce.
37The di erence between Euribor and Eonia rates represent the premia to long term lending
operations. The di erence between Euribor and 2 year IRS rates represent the premia of short
term lending operations. Therefore, regresion coe cients of the liquidity factor should exhibit
opposite signs
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Previous chapter model, suggests the existence of linkages between contemporaneous
bond market prices and previous period capital, due to the aggregate nature of that.
The time a bond has been quoted in the market should, then, be understood as
an instrumental variable of wealth accumulation during the period and, hence, of
liquidity. Evidence on the relation between liquidity conditions and bank capital
formation is found. Future market-to-book value is negatively related with actual
liquidity conditions, and hence positively related with capital accumulation (book
value). This relation is only found relevant for countries su ering banking crises.
My results point towards the existence of two liquidity di erentiated bond markets
within the euro-zone. The first group is composed by core countries and the second
by peripherals. A further characterization in terms of bond market size is, also,
found. Flight to liquidity between bigger and smaller countries, within each category,
exists. Liquidity changes are first identified on smaller countries, with contagion to
bigger countries, subsequently taking place.
The relation between bond and cash markets is, also, a ected by this di erentiated
behavior. Sustitivity between bond and cash markets for core countries exists, while
this is not the case for peripherals. This points towards the existence of a di eren-
tiated borrowing behavior. Core countries behave as cash lenders, using their bond
holdings as collateral on ECB refinancing operations, while peripherals behave as
cash borrowers.
However, a paulatine lost of representativity of interbank cash markets, over the
considered period is found. While at the beginning of the crisis, fluctuations in
bond liquidity conditions explain up to an 80% of the risk premium observed in the
interbank market, by the end of the sample period that capacity has reduced by a
half. This result reinforces my perception on the existence of linkages between the
evolution of liquidity, bank capital, and the quality of that.
My results highlight the existence of a contagion channel, in the short term, between
CDS market and the liquidity of bonds. Even though, in the long term CDS spreads
are not related with liquidity concerns and, hence, should be understood as valid
measures of default probabilities, in the short term liquidity squeezes could lead to
an increase in the perception of risk of underlying obligors. Hence the widespread
use of CDS spreads as su cient measures of the default perception, at least at short
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term horizons is challenged.
Moreover, my results also suggest that a substantial part of the short term evolution
of bond yield risk premium is driven by changes in liquidity. A similar result is
found in Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009). When this results are considered
in conjunction with those characterizing the relation of liquidity changes and CDS
spread formation, government recapitalization rules based on yield/credit spreads
are questioned. If the raise on those measures comes from an adverse evolution of
liquidity (that is of bank capital) tax payers should not be made responsible and
direct bank recapitalization/resolution mechanisms should be put in place. This
appears to have been, also, the conclusion of European authorities and has led to
the design of new banking regulation.
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A. Expression for the drift term, a(m), of the a ne
model
Expression for a(m): In Christensen, Diebold, and Rudebusch (2009) it is shown
that the expression for the time to maturity dependent constant of the a ne term
structure, a(m), is given by:
a(m) = (‡1m)
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where m is the time to maturity in years.
B. Tables
Table A.1.: Spill-over e ects of the liquidity factor, 2 month horizon
AT NL FI FR BE IE ES GR IT PT
L2.AT 0.965úúú 0.0500úúú -0.0430úúú -0.0843úúú -0.0173úúú -0.162úúú 0.295úúú -0.0604úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.FI 0.0763úúú -0.0559úúú 0.850úúú 0.0454úúú 0.0132úúú 0.0343úúú 0.132úúú 0.0158úúú -0.0397úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
L2.FR -0.0608úúú 0.0601úúú 0.0280úúú 0.815úúú -0.0737úúú 0.0707úúú -0.0276úú -0.0326úúú -0.0318úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.BE -0.0295úúú -0.0821úúú -0.0446úúú 0.0699úúú 0.835úúú 0.00991úú -0.0191úúú 0.0992úúú 0.0932úúú 0.00984úú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036)
L2.IE 0.0201úú -0.0471úúú 0.0631úúú -0.0413úúú 0.974úúú 0.296úúú -0.177úúú -0.0919úúú
(0.033) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.ES 0.0240úúú 0.0904úúú -0.0359úúú 0.0833úúú -0.0377úúú 0.771úúú 0.0922úúú 0.0531úúú -0.0451úúú
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.GR -0.0295úúú 0.0626úúú -0.107úúú 0.00628úúú -0.0815úúú 0.701úúú -0.0692úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.IT -0.0698úúú 0.108úúú 0.0883úúú -0.155úúú -0.0897úúú -0.0129úúú -0.134úúú 0.836úúú -0.0182úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
L2.PT -0.0197úúú -0.0943úúú 0.0580úúú -0.0527úúú 0.0367úúú -0.231úúú 0.0457úúú 1.005úúú
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
L2.NL 0.898úúú 0.0468úúú 0.0585úúú 0.0422úúú -0.161úúú -0.0233úúú
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Observations 2440 2440 2800 2440 2800 2440 2440 2420 2440 2800
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
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Table A.2.: Spill-over e ects of the liquidity factor, 3 month horizon
AT NL FI FR BE IE ES GR IT PT
L4.AT 0.913úúú 0.0941úúú -0.106úúú -0.127úúú -0.299úúú 0.511úúú -0.112úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.FI 0.142úúú -0.137úúú 0.689úúú 0.115úúú 0.0228úúú 0.0556úúú 0.185úúú -0.0771úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.FR -0.108úúú 0.0915úúú 0.0442úúú 0.735úúú -0.137úúú 0.0796úúú -0.0555úúú -0.0520úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.BE -0.0709úúú -0.116úúú -0.0654úúú 0.0626úúú 0.692úúú 0.0182úúú 0.130úúú 0.163úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.IE 0.0534úúú -0.0788úúú 0.146úúú -0.0592úúú 0.898úúú 0.526úúú -0.292úúú -0.167úúú
(0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.ES 0.0413úúú 0.171úúú -0.0970úúú 0.168úúú -0.0580úúú 0.586úúú 0.118úúú 0.0798úúú -0.0839úúú
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.GR -0.0399úúú 0.0936úúú -0.151úúú 0.0134úú -0.145úúú 0.454úúú -0.0882úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L4.IT -0.115úúú 0.201úúú 0.180úúú -0.196úúú -0.189úúú -0.0257úúú -0.195úúú 0.741úúú -0.0358úúú
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
L4.PT -0.0383úú -0.233úúú 0.117úúú -0.107úúú 0.0955úúú -0.393úúú 0.0568úúú 0.982úúú
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
L4.NL 0.731úúú 0.0876úúú 0.102úúú 0.0846úúú -0.266úúú -0.0736úúú
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2438 2438 2778 2438 2778 2438 2438 2398 2438 2778
p-values in parentheses
ú p < 0.1, úú p < 0.05, úúú p < 0.01
Table A.3.: Descriptive Statistics of Bond Prices Data by Country
COUNTRY AT BE CH DE ES FI FR GR IE IT NE PT TOTAL
# OF REFS 4,196 20,453 5,807 11,088 4,752 3,000 12,337 11,019 3,482 10,368 5,108 3,846 95,456
MEAN 16 78 22 42 18 11 47 42 13 40 20 15 366
ST DEV 2.80 1.69 1.15 10.69 1.95 2.25 1.14 4.77 1.32 9.84 0.68 0.65 21.53
MAX 19 83 24 58 22 15 50 53 16 54 23 16 400
MIN 11 73 20 26 15 9 45 36 11 25 18 14 336
148
Table A.4.: Statistics of Time Series Data
STATISTIC VSTOXX STOXX 600 BK INDEX EURIBOR 3M EURIBOR 6M EURIBOR 9M EURIBOR 12M IRS 1Y IRS 2Y IRS 5Y IRS 10Y
# OF OBS 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822 2822
MEAN 28.5008 1.0527 2.4854 2.6610 2.7656 2.8623 2.7101 2.8087 3.2782 3.7656
ST DEV 11.2292 0.5739 1.6922 1.6081 1.5643 1.5285 1.5402 1.3600 0.9894 0.7272
MAX 81.0300 2.3500 5.3810 5.4310 5.4630 5.4930 5.4380 5.4410 5.1600 5.0700
MIN 13.4500 0.3500 0.6350 0.9450 1.0850 1.2140 1.0760 1.2410 1.7280 2.3740
Table A.5.: Descriptive Statistics by Country
CDS SPRD 1Y YD 2Y YD 3Y YD 4Y YD 5Y YD 6Y YD 7Y YD 10Y YD LEND. FEE
AT
# OF OBS 179 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 165
MEAN 0.9372 2.1514 2.4602 2.7342 2.9754 3.1853 3.3659 3.5188 3.8293 0.3800
ST DEV 0.4655 1.5156 1.2930 1.1111 0.9626 0.8414 0.7434 0.6659 0.5440 0.3289
MAX 2.6500 4.8347 4.7695 4.8125 4.8327 4.8329 4.8220 4.8158 4.8785 2.5552
MIN 0.1100 0.0174 0.6450 1.1287 1.3914 1.6367 1.8784 2.1061 2.5783 -0.2043
BE
# OF OBS 211 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MEAN 1.0281 2.3610 2.6985 2.9870 3.2321 3.4388 3.6127 3.7589 4.0847 0.4372
ST DEV 0.8137 1.3739 1.1794 1.0212 0.8848 0.7629 0.6544 0.5618 0.4260 0.5058
MAX 3.9878 4.7725 5.1106 5.4829 5.6715 5.7280 5.7035 5.6495 5.8233 2.9997
MIN 0.1150 0.5561 0.8934 1.2201 1.5497 1.8746 2.1803 2.4524 2.9224 -0.5241
CH
# OF OBS 95 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 258
MEAN 0.4811 1.0938 1.2131 1.3482 1.4932 1.6419 1.7885 1.9269 2.2326 1.0473
ST DEV 0.1258 1.0258 0.9824 0.9347 0.8816 0.8251 0.7693 0.7185 0.6304 1.1154
MAX 0.7533 3.0120 3.0376 3.0656 3.0958 3.1498 3.1971 3.2324 3.3277 8.2684
MIN 0.2922 -0.1452 -0.0006 0.0667 0.1125 0.2095 0.3437 0.4949 0.9173 0.1771
ES
# OF OBS 179 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 244
MEAN 1.8579 2.6782 3.0697 3.3845 3.6353 3.8350 3.9965 4.1327 4.5180 -0.0733
ST DEV 1.1175 1.4465 1.1363 0.9310 0.7911 0.6948 0.6333 0.5989 0.5528 0.7425
MAX 4.8168 6.1229 6.1315 6.1472 6.1733 6.2132 6.2702 6.3476 6.7360 1.1313
MIN 0.3600 -0.0565 1.1838 1.8696 2.3589 2.7293 2.9917 3.2248 3.8892 -2.6730
FI
# OF OBS 197 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 206
MEAN 0.3521 2.1046 2.3427 2.5751 2.7968 3.0029 3.1885 3.3487 3.6267 0.3362
ST DEV 0.1939 1.5298 1.3743 1.2349 1.1037 0.9801 0.8683 0.7748 0.6824 0.4348
MAX 0.9400 4.6870 4.8211 4.8853 4.8989 4.8808 4.8502 4.8261 4.9843 2.7000
MIN 0.0925 0.3377 0.5342 0.8125 1.1387 1.4077 1.6640 1.8990 2.1416 -0.7819
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FR
# OF OBS 179 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MEAN 0.7265 2.1222 2.3843 2.6228 2.8388 3.0335 3.2079 3.3633 3.7258 0.3044
ST DEV 0.4938 1.5088 1.3280 1.1693 1.0315 0.9134 0.8133 0.7298 0.5607 0.3044
MAX 2.4527 4.7265 4.7377 4.7491 4.7608 4.7753 4.7923 4.8099 4.8644 2.0520
MIN 0.1100 0.2476 0.6754 1.0634 1.3436 1.5824 1.7968 1.9881 2.4364 -0.3744
GR
# OF OBS 173 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 188
MEAN 3.6225 4.7496 5.4825 5.9276 6.1491 6.2116 6.1793 6.1167 6.3902 0.4544
ST DEV 3.4982 3.1603 3.4277 3.5933 3.5809 3.4236 3.1869 2.9381 2.7627 1.3683
MAX 10.9021 16.8540 17.2828 17.2503 16.8511 16.1793 15.3293 14.3956 14.5468 13.7867
MIN 0.1690 0.9208 1.7877 2.4080 2.8982 3.2823 3.5672 3.7540 4.1297 -1.9670
IE
# OF OBS 199 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 247
MEAN 3.3374 3.8600 4.4340 4.8655 5.1756 5.3851 5.5150 5.5863 5.6579 1.0896
ST DEV 2.7275 2.2621 2.5049 2.6714 2.7283 2.6818 2.5531 2.3698 1.7883 3.2808
MAX 11.7613 14.5361 17.0435 18.3760 18.7351 18.3225 17.3396 15.9881 11.7372 24.9444
MIN 0.1825 0.9061 1.6419 2.2459 2.6944 3.0931 3.4411 3.7350 4.0718 -2.1669
IT
# OF OBS 211 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MEAN 1.5568 2.8736 3.1406 3.3859 3.6104 3.8150 4.0006 4.1683 4.5728 0.1732
ST DEV 1.2121 1.3626 1.2073 1.0745 0.9633 0.8724 0.8002 0.7446 0.6521 0.3892
MAX 5.5434 7.5429 7.5566 7.5746 7.5961 7.6204 7.6466 7.6741 7.7563 2.2707
MIN 0.1650 0.9414 1.4209 1.8499 2.2316 2.5764 2.8863 3.1286 3.6937 -1.2844
NL
# OF OBS 194 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MEAN 0.4944 2.1010 2.3496 2.5814 2.7961 2.9929 3.1713 3.3306 3.6889 0.3913
ST DEV 0.2953 1.5486 1.3645 1.2115 1.0797 0.9647 0.8658 0.7833 0.6575 0.4742
MAX 1.3384 4.6644 4.6362 4.6950 4.7287 4.7442 4.7608 4.8103 4.8164 3.2119
MIN 0.0625 0.1201 0.4681 0.7965 1.1023 1.3662 1.5941 1.8042 2.2166 -0.2554
PT
# OF OBS 211 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MEAN 3.1252 4.7141 5.0055 5.2354 5.4112 5.5406 5.6308 5.6896 5.7514 0.4888
ST DEV 3.5719 4.5518 4.2259 3.9966 3.8045 3.6201 3.4320 3.2361 2.5708 0.8039
MAX 12.3223 21.9345 19.5967 18.3553 18.3822 17.8803 17.0226 16.2202 14.5631 4.1383
MIN 0.1635 0.8329 1.4395 1.9568 2.4012 2.7475 3.0288 3.2611 3.7732 -0.6700
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